


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SOUTHERN AFRICA: *AN END TO WAR?*

Angola • Mozambique • Namibia



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To our readers:
We apologize for the delayed publication of this issue of *Africa Report*, which was due to the introduction of a new computer system. Now in place, this system will enable us to enhance our production capabilities in the future.

Photo Credit:
The cover photo of Mozambican refugees was taken in Massaca, Mozambique, by Margaret A. Novicki.



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Letters to the Editor

To the Editor:

The recently published interview with Dr. Mathilde Krim [November-December 1988] contained several inaccuracies regarding the Department of State's policies.

First, the Department's HIV testing program is based on departmental policy, not federal law. Second, we are unable to "pledge" that employees will donate blood for all U.S. citizens who need transfusions at posts overseas. Although U.S. embassy personnel traditionally have provided exceptional assistance to private citizens in emergency situations, the walking blood banks at these overseas locations, many of which are very small, cannot be viewed as a reliable source of blood for everyone who travels overseas.

Lastly, embassies are unable to provide medical care for private citizens and are therefore unable to provide saline solutions or any other medications. I would suggest that those who have this concern look into commercially available first aid kits that have such equipment. If traveling with a tour, the tour agency would logically be responsible.

—Paul A. Goff, M.D., M.P.H.
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C.

To the Editor:

After seeing your very informative November-December 1988, issue it occurred to me that perhaps some of your readers might be keen to support the Third World in its educational development.

Despite the highest budget allocation given to education, secondary schooling is not free in Zimbabwe and many bright students are unable to continue their education due to lack of financial means.

The Friends of the Children of Zimbabwe, a registered welfare organization, is very much aware of the plight of these youngsters and has established a sponsorship program to help at least 200 students every year. We would be glad to hear from any of your

readers should they be able to contribute to our general fund, or are interested in sponsoring one or more students, with the possibility of communicating directly with them. Any inquiries regarding the school fees structure, etc., would be welcome.

May I also add that any funds received for this purpose are all accounted for and not channeled into other directions—no one should have any fear on this score. In closing, may I say how delighted we would be to hear from your readers.

—Micheline Chidzero
Shamwari Dzevana Ve Zimbabwe
(Friends of the Children of Zimbabwe)
P.O. Box 8598, Causeway
Harare, Zimbabwe

To the Editor:

The focus of your November-December 1988 issue on "AIDS and Africa" was excellent and I thank you very much for giving such attention to the long overdue issue. Equally disturbing is the story of Maj. Kojo Boakye-Djan and his company's alleged activity toward the oppressed people of South Africa ["Update"].

It is quite distressing and difficult to understand when there are deserters among us. What will it take for the children of Africa to say: My dignity and pride for my people precedes my stomach?

There is a song in Ethiopia which goes something like this: *"When a father dies, one mourns in his land / When a mother dies, one mourns in his land / When a sister or a brother dies, one mourns in his land / Where could one possibly mourn when his country dies?"*

I hope that my views are shared, that without Africa's people free, we all are under apartheid, even those who get paid to do apartheid's dirty laundry.

—Lemlem Tsegaw, R.N.
Chesapeake, Virginia

To the Editor:

Trust in circumstances, one might tell the writers of your two articles on Namibia in the January-February 1989 issue. Your writers do not seem to accept the fact that the South African government might feel carrying out its agreement to withdraw from Namibia is in its national interest. Building up a military position is not contradictory to intent to withdraw. It can be a way to protect troops during the dangerous withdrawal period. Isn't this what the Cubans seem to have done in Angola?

Many conservative critics have charged that the Cubans intend to violate their treaty and find ways to keep troops in Angola. But why bother, one could reply? Why sign a treaty you intend to violate? To get the South Africans out of Namibia? But if Cuban troops stay in Angola, the South Africans leave, or return, to Namibia. Why would the South Africans bother signing a treaty they fully intend to violate?

This is not to praise the Pretoria government, just to look at circumstances. The South Africans can easily intervene in Namibia, and know it. A potential Swapo government in Windhoek will also know it, and seek to remain on as good terms as possible with the South Africans. Swapo President Sam Nujoma has already said that the ANC is not likely to be given bases in Namibia.

The South Africans may feel that by withdrawing from Namibia, and getting at least a substantial number of the Cuban troops out of Angola, they can have their cake (military security and economic advantage) and eat it too (avoid the casualties and economic drain of war as well as the political onus of staying in Namibia).

Looking at these realities, and those facing the Cuban government, puts the treaties in a different perspective than your articles. Nations often ignore logic, but the situation in Namibia and Angola looks very hopeful.

—Bruce Brager
Arlington, Virginia

"Unita is to be congratulated for its courageous demonstration over more than a decade that solutions to Angola's problems cannot be found through repressive military force," said Bush in the letter that was leaked to *The Washington Post*. "I also want to assure you that American diplomacy will continue to encourage African and other interested governments to provide maximum support to a process of negotiation leading to national reconciliation in your country."

The new administration's strong commitment to Unita comes at a cru-

American Institute. But Kaunda, the current chairman of the group of southern African frontline states, reportedly declined Bush's request that he play an intermediary role in the Angolan conflict, refusing to put pressure on the dos Santos government to negotiate with Savimbi.

Nonetheless, Bush's assurances to Savimbi that the new administration will not allow Unita to be left out in the cold only serves to undermine the Namibia accord and leaves the door open for increased U.S. military intervention in Angola. In recent years,

elections." At that time, the White House reiterated its staunch support for the rebels, and to judge from Bush's letter to Savimbi, it would appear Unita's backers in Congress can rest assured that the new administration has every intention of following in the footsteps of its predecessor. As DeConcini put it recently, "I'm pleased with the strong position Bush has taken and I urge him to continue."

In any event, Unita is not taking any chances. Right up to the December 22 accord, Pretoria provided Unita with hundreds of tons of arms and ammunition by organizing an airlift to the rebels' headquarters in Jamba, southern Angola. Savimbi subsequently admitted as much when he warned that if the dos Santos government refuses to engage in national reconciliation talks with Unita, his forces have stockpiled enough military hardware from South Africa to wage a countrywide war for the two years it will take the 50,000 Cuban troops to complete their withdrawal from the country.

But the rebel movement is seeking still more aid. A top Unita official, **Tony da Costa Fernandes**, has also made a direct appeal to the Bush administration, requesting assistance far beyond the annual covert aid program in order to compensate for the loss of South African support. In the past, Unita has been reluctant to discuss the importance of its South African connection, but with military aid having been officially cut off following the signing of the Namibia accord, Fernandes now readily admits that Unita received \$80 million annually from Pretoria.

More specifically, Fernandes said he had asked the Bush administration to increase "very urgently" U.S. "material help" to enable Unita withstand an expected Angolan government offensive in coming months. "We need more sophisticated, up-to-date equipment," he added, noting that Unita had recently built a new airfield near Jamba capable of receiving "all types of long-range aircraft."

Fernandes also revealed he had met with a number of senior administration officials and that he was "satisfied" with the response so far to Unita's appeal for additional aid. "I think there is an understanding," he said, pointing out matter-of-factly, "If there is aid, aid will reach us." ■

Margaret A. Novicki



Unita deserters in Lubango surrender to Angolan government forces

cial time for the rebel movement fighting to overthrow the government of President **José Eduardo dos Santos**. For years, South Africa has been Unita's principal backer, but now that Pretoria has pledged to end its military support for Savimbi and formally agreed to withdraw from neighboring Namibia as part of the December 22 tripartite settlement, additional U.S. aid takes on far greater importance.

Later in January, Bush launched a further diplomatic initiative on Savimbi's behalf by asking Zambian President **Kenneth Kaunda** to press Angola to include Savimbi as part of a government of national reconciliation. A copy of Bush's January 6 letter outlining his intended Africa policies was delivered to Kaunda by Sen. **Paul Simon** (D-IL) who was attending a conference in Lusaka sponsored by the African-

South Africa has not only had to airlift huge weapons shipments to Unita, but also troops to bail out the rebel movement fighting against Angolan and Cuban forces. The U.S. can now be expected to replace South Africa as Savimbi's principal military backer, making additional use of southern Zaire to ensure that Unita receives sufficient firepower to wage its war against the Angolan government in coming months.

Already last October, 51 senators led by Sen. **Dennis DeConcini** (D-AZ) wrote to President Reagan, urging that the U.S. should not "cease, suspend, diminish or otherwise restrict" assistance to Unita until all Cuban forces have left Angola, and the dos Santos government agrees to form "a government of genuine national reconciliation" and sets a date for "free and fair

LESOTHO

Johnny Maseko, editor of the privately owned weekly, *The Mirror*, was detained for a month and subsequently deported to Kenya in December after publishing a series of articles accusing Lesotho's ruling Military Council of widespread corruption and massive abuses of power. Maseko, who fled to Lesotho from his native South Africa in 1980, was given deportation orders while still in jail after having been held under the Internal Security Act.

After several weeks in Nairobi, Maseko returned to Johannesburg in early January, expressing hopes that he would be able to continue working as a journalist in South Africa despite fears by colleagues that he might be detained for his prior anti-apartheid activities. Meanwhile, *The Mirror's* new editor, Mike Pitso, vowed to carry on the anti-corruption crusade—prompting the military authorities to bar him from all government offices. But Pitso has refused to back down, concluding in a recent editorial, "It is up to those journalists who have remained within the battle-lines to continue the just war."

COTE D'IVOIRE

When Laurent Gbagbo, long-time opposition leader of the clandestine Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), returned to Abidjan from six years of self-imposed exile last September, he was welcomed back and publicly forgiven by President Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Gbagbo was reportedly even offered a government ministerial post. But the political honeymoon proved short-lived following the detention of Kobena Anaky, a prominent Ivorian businessman and close Gbagbo aide, who was arrested on charges of "financial malpractices." Gbagbo alleged the arrest of his friend was politically motivated since the government views Anaky as a major source of funding for the FPI.

The opposition leader, who has long criticized Houphouët-Boigny for refusing to tolerate a multi-party system, more recently accused the government of corruption and of failing to cope with the country's growing financial crisis. As a result, Gbagbo and several of his supporters have been repeatedly harassed by the authorities but have so far resisted pressure to disband the FPI.

MALI

President Moussa Traoré's government has finally closed down the notorious desert prison at Taoudénit in northern Mali where a large number of political detainees have reportedly died since it was first established by military decree in August 1969. Taoudénit prison, otherwise known as a special re-education center, was for years used by Traoré to detain political opponents and sympathizers of former President Modibo Keita, whom he overthrew 20 years ago.

According to human rights observers, many of the 50 to 100 prisoners held in Taoudénit at the time of its closure have been released, but the number of detainees who died while living in debilitating conditions remains a mystery. One former prisoner released in 1987 did tell Amnesty International, however, that seven out of 56 prisoners had actually died there during the three years that he was in detention.

POLITICAL POINTERS

BURKINA FASO

Capt. Boukary Kaboré, leader of the failed revolt at Koudougou air force base following the coup which killed President Thomas Sankara in October 1987, has accused the Popular Front government of attempting to liquidate all remaining Sankara loyalists in the country. Kaboré's claim came after seven Burkinabè soldiers, who had previously been under his command, were convicted by a military tribunal of assassinating Capt. Guy Lamoussa Sayogo and executed in late December.

President Blaise Compaoré's government speculated that Sayogo, a deputy commander of the Fourth Military Region who had led one of the battalions against the "Lion of Bulkiemdé," was murdered by the seven soldiers to avenge the deaths of at least 20 of their colleagues, 11 of whom were violently burned alive. But Kaboré, now exiled in Ghana, blamed Sayogo's death on power struggles within the Popular Front, suggesting that the captain's assassination was simply a convenient excuse to physically eliminate the opposition.

SOUTH AFRICA

Dr. Abu-Baker Asvat, health secretary of the banned Azanian Peoples Organization and leading figure in the black consciousness movement, was gunned down by an alleged robber in his Soweto clinic in late January only a month after winning *The Indicator* newspaper's Human Rights Award. Renowned nationwide for his dedication to providing health care and other humanitarian assistance to homeless squatters and victims of apartheid, the 46-year-old "people's doctor" had worked all his life to break down the racial barriers that separate Lenasia and neighboring Soweto.

Together with his nursing assistant Albertina Sisulu, co-president of the multiracial United Democratic Front, Asvat also helped transcend some of the ideological differences in the black community through his work. Asvat's funeral, the biggest ever held in Lenasia, was testimony to his accomplishments, bringing together thousands of people from diverse political persuasions to pay their last respects.

NIGERIA

After being at odds for nearly a year, the warring factions of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) finally buried the hatchet during a government-sponsored three-day peace meeting in December by overwhelmingly electing Paschal Bafyau as the federation's new president. Bafyau, secretary-general of the Nigerian Union of Railwaymen, was elected unopposed—together with 11 others—to run the NLC's affairs for the next four years. The breakthrough in the peace talks occurred once Alhaji Ali Ciroma, head of the "progressive" camp, and Takai Shammang, leader of the "democratic" wing, agreed to step down as presidential candidates in the interest of federation unity.

The NLC, in virtual limbo for 10 months after the government appointed Michael Ogunkoya as sole administrator of the dissolved congress, reached a mutually acceptable agreement when leaders of the two factions agreed to a peace formula allowing each side to share the top executive posts. Bafyau, a compromise candidate, pledged to work for workers' unity and vowed to uphold "democratic principles."

UPDATE

IN THE NEWS

Angola: An Offer Luanda Just Can't Refuse?

Just when it seemed governments around the continent had finally agreed not to mortgage their country's future, vowing to turn down lucrative toxic waste disposal offers from the West, reports have filtered out of a new deal which could make Angola one of the biggest dumping grounds in the world.

According to **François Roelants du Vivier**, President of the European Environment Alliance, the Angolan government recently signed a preliminary agreement with a Swiss businessman, **Arnold Andreas Kuenzler**, which would allow for the annual treatment of 5 million tons of toxic waste in the country. The \$2 billion contract reportedly calls for waste from Western countries to be stored in a 19,300-square-mile semi-desert area, about 125 miles north of the coastal town of Namibe in southern Angola. The four-year deal is allegedly due to start in March.

The government of President **José Eduardo dos Santos** has "categorically denied" reports of the waste disposal accord, maintaining that Angola would never be a "dustbin" for the West, but the *environmental group*—composed of members of the European Parliament—has since published what it claims is a copy of a contract licensing Kuenzler to import and treat waste in the country. In return, the Angolan government is said to have been offered massive financial rewards for use in "national projects of an urgent nature," namely in the spheres of education, public health, and general economic recovery. Roelants du Vivier also indicated that the contract could provide jobs for up to 15,000 Angolans.

Kuenzler, a one-time mercenary who fought in Katanga (now Shaba Province, Zaire) during the 1960s and assisted former Ugandan President **Idi**

Amin Dada in the 1970s, has in more recent years left his mark as an international arms dealer. And he is now embarking on what could turn out to be the most profitable phase of his career: the toxic waste trade. Together with his Swiss associate **Roland Straub**, who provided legal advice during the early stages of the project, he stands to make



Dos Santos: No toxic waste deal

between \$5 and \$10 million, using the Zug-based company Landis and Gyr to dispatch the proposed waste to Angola.

Roelants du Vivier claims that Kuenzler plans to build three incinerator installations to cope with the waste in an operation financed in part by the Texas Alley Bank, the Millen Bank, and the U.S. Casualty Agency insurance company. Indeed, Kuenzler has promised to build the incinerator plants along "strict" Ciba-Geigy standards, using the name of the Swiss pharmaceutical company as something of a

guarantee. But Ciba-Geigy has disclosed that it strongly opposes the project and has already taken a series of legal measures to prevent the use of its name.

Kuenzler, who claims to have concluded a similar deal in Namibia, says that Swapo President **Sam Nujoma** has also agreed to a toxic waste contract. He declined to give details of the accord, however, noting that it is destined to remain on the backburner until after Namibia gains independence.

In any event, news of Angola's alleged toxic waste agreement has caused considerable concern within the Organization of African Unity, according to Roelants du Vivier. And for good reason. After all, it was the very same European Environment Alliance which last year uncovered the trafficking of waste to Benin, Guinea-Bissau, and Nigeria. And those deals were only too real. ■

U.S. Aid to Savimbi: Bush Pledges to Keep the Money Coming

President **Bush** didn't exactly let the suspense build on Capitol Hill concerning the direction of his new administration's policy toward Angola. In fact, *Bush didn't even wait to take the oath of office before making it known that he would continue to provide Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels with U.S. military and diplomatic support.*

In what amounted to the first formal foreign policy commitment of his administration, Bush wrote a personal letter to Savimbi dated January 6 promising the rebel leader that the U.S. would continue to give "all appropriate and effective assistance to Unita" until a political settlement could be reached in Angola. Since 1986, the **Reagan** administration has officially funnelled about \$15 million a year of "covert" military aid—including sophisticated weapons like Stinger missiles—to Unita through the CIA.

Margaret A. Novicki

AFRICAN OUTLOOK

Kérékou Scrambles to Defuse Social Unrest in Benin

President Mathieu Kérékou's government is now sitting on a powder keg. Faced with the most serious economic crisis since seizing power in 1972, Kérékou has been plagued in recent months by growing social unrest and rumors of widespread government corruption which have seriously threatened the future of his rule.

Following weeks of massive strikes and demonstrations protesting the severe hardships caused by the government's rigid austerity program, Kérékou finally opted for a heavy-handed approach. In an effort to quell the revolt, he instructed the country's security forces to fire without warning at demonstrators in the streets after rioters ransacked public buildings and stoned two soldiers to death in Porto Novo in late January. Several demonstrators were subsequently injured during battles with riot police.

Rioting broke out following weeks of rising tensions between the government and striking teachers, students, and civil servants protesting non-payment of wages and grants. The strikes began when high school teachers in Cotonou and Porto Novo walked off the job in early January demanding four months back pay. Despite the government's public warnings against "mind poisoning," strikes quickly spread to the university where students protested not only the non-payment of grants, but also an IMF-backed plan to cancel this year's scholarships in a bid to slash the country's chronic budget deficit. When civil servants, who had not been paid for up to six months, joined the 15,000 students on an indefinite strike, the protests virtually paralyzed the running of all government offices.

Kérékou responded with a carrot-and-stick policy—promising to make payments of two months' salaries owed civil servants for 1988, while threatening to summarily dismiss striking employees if they did not return to work. But once the government failed to meet its initial pledge to civil servants and proved unable to discredit

widespread rumors that a sizeable grant from the French government to pay arrears in salaries had been embezzled by high-ranking officials, widespread rioting broke out in Porto Novo. Portraits of Kérékou and Beninois flags were burned in the streets and a number of shops were looted. Kérékou then ordered the security forces to "fire without warning, both at night and during the day, on all gatherings on public roads and in public places."

But what turned out to be particularly worrisome to the government was the apparent lack of response by the local security forces. Interior Minister Edouard Zodéhougan accused the police of being "passively complicit" in the unrest, forcing the government to dispatch a team of 100 paracomman-

dos to patrol the streets of Porto Novo. As a result, concern about the army's loyalty prompted Kérékou to order banking institutions to make the necessary salary payments to civil servants, giving priority to all military personnel.

In an attempt to stifle popular discontent, the government also detained a number of high-level officials and civil servants, including Tiamiou Adjibadé, a former minister of foreign affairs, Jean-Pierre Agondanou, a former prefect of Porto Novo who was a minister in the pre-Kérékou era, and Valère Houetti, a former secretary-general of the government. They were accused of inciting people of Porto Novo to "loot and cause confusion" during the unrest. Finance ministry

Continued on next page

Results and Prospects of Africa's Economic Showing: Few Optimistic Signs

After several years of persistently dismal results, Africa's economic performance in 1988 may elicit a slight sigh of relief, but hardly a cheer.

Over the course of 1988, reports Adebayo Adedeji, executive secretary of the UN's Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the continent registered an overall growth in its gross domestic product of 2.5 percent, a significant improvement over 1987's 1.3 percent. Yet, this still lagged behind the population growth rate of 3 percent, so if there is any good news, it is that the rate of decline in per capita output was not as steep as in recent years.

Could this be the beginning of a period of levelling off, prior to Africa's hoped-for recovery? The figures and assessments assembled in Adedeji's annual report, released in Addis Ababa on January 2, provide few grounds for such optimism.

Despite very modest improvements, Africa still appears out of step with the rest of the world. "The lackluster economic performance of the African

economy in 1988," says Adedeji, "is in sharp contrast to the marked recovery and economic resurgence in the industrialized economies and other developing economies...These booming conditions in the world economy have not had a stimulating effect on Africa."

Although the purpose of the ECA's report was not to quantify the social impact of Africa's economic performance, Adedeji nevertheless notes a "sustained deceleration in the standard and conditions of living of the average African," with average per capita income just 80 percent of what it was at the beginning of the decade.

One of the most significant factors in Africa's 2.5 percent GDP growth rate last year appears to be largely conjunctural: exceptionally good weather. This, Adedeji stresses, "is by itself an indication of the fundamental weakness of the economic structure, where a technologically backward agricultural sector is still predominant."

Thanks to the weather, the brightest


Continued on page 10

BENIN...continued

paymaster Grégoire Lahorou was called in for questioning and relieved of his post in the wake of the disturbances.

Authorities in Cotonou, claiming that the unrest was orchestrated by "vile individuals in the pay of domestic and international reactionaries," argued that the "actual objective of these unrepentant agitators is to bring about conditions conducive to preventing the implementation of the structural adjustment program." But reports of rampant corruption among high-ranking officials have not lent support to the government's allegations, fueling speculation within the country's under-

Cameratix



Kérékou: Sitting on a power keg

ground opposition movement that Cotonou's liquidity crisis is largely attributable to fraud and other financial irregularities.

During the weeks of unrest, several opposition groups became increasingly active in the country, clandestinely distributing tracts on campuses and in the streets denouncing the "despotic regime of General Kérékou," and calling on people to take part in a nationwide revolt. Indeed, the Communist Party of Dahomey (PCD) announced it had joined with various political and trade union organizations to form a National Salvation Committee (CSN), led by one of its founding members, Pascal Fantodji, in order to better mobilize opposition to the Kérékou government.

Evidently shaken by the level of discontent in the country, Kérékou dis-

"Apartheid" Belies Chinese Rhetoric

"China sees only poverty and hunger in Africa. They think we come here to eat their rice. Some think we all live in trees in Africa and only get dressed when we arrive in Peking," remarked one African student bitterly after simmering racial tensions once again overflowed on several university campuses in the country.

Since China first began offering scholarships to African students in 1960, racial clashes have been a recurring problem, with at least seven such incidents occurring on Chinese campuses. However, the latest disturbances sweeping through six Chinese cities were far worse than any before, prompting African students to refer to their experience as "Chinese apartheid."

The clashes began on December 24 in Nanjing when two African students refused to register the names and addresses of their Chinese dates upon entering a student dance hall at Hehai University. A fight broke out and the violence escalated through the night, resulting in injuries to 11 Chinese university employees and two African students. The next afternoon, a mob of Chinese students and university employees rampaged through the African students' dormitories.

Some 140 African students later fled for the train station hoping to escape to Beijing. But the police escorting the students refused to allow them to leave and forcibly took them to a guest house on the outskirts of Nanjing, supposedly for their own protection. They were held there for several days before police entered the house by force, reportedly attacking the students with truncheons and cattle prods, and taking four students into custody.

Thousands of Chinese university students and workers marched in the streets of Nanjing shouting "Down with Blacks!" and "Kill the Black Devils!" Demonstrations quickly spread to Beijing and other cities where protesters shouted "Blood for blood" and carried anti-African placards in several languages, leading to speculation that Chinese officials endorsed the activity. In particular, the Chinese students, who have resented the better stipends and living conditions of Africans studying in the country, condemned what they describe as the molestation of their women.

China, which has long proclaimed itself the champion of the Third World and built close economic and cultural ties with many African countries, has usually downplayed such overt displays of racism, often referring to them as "isolated incidents." But this time police and officials went on the offensive, blaming the African students for the troubles and refusing to punish Chinese students for destroying the dormitories.

This change in official attitude appears to reflect the Chinese authorities' worries about growing discontent among the Chinese student population, given their poor economic situation and lack of funds for even bare necessities. As a result, encounters between Chinese and African students have sometimes served as a useful outlet for violence which could otherwise be directed toward the government.

Changes in attitude have also taken place on the African side. In the past, African diplomats would usually turn a blind eye to student disturbances. But this time the racial clashes have threatened to create a serious diplomatic rift. More than 50 African nations protested against the overt racial discrimination and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) called on the Chinese authorities to redress the "appalling situation." It was the first time the OAU had officially addressed the problem.

With many of the 1,500 African students declaring they wish to leave China and continue their studies elsewhere, the government will now have to act quickly to dispel the discrepancy between its official line toward Africa and day-to-day reality if the country is to reestablish its once-valued image in the Third World.

closed in early February that he would adopt a more conciliatory policy toward opposition groups in exile. He even called on his political opponents to return to Benin so that they can "put forward, in practical terms, the magic

potions they claim can help reverse the economic conditions in the country." But without assurances of a general amnesty, it remains highly improbable that opposition groups will take up his offer. ■

PROSPECTS...continued

spot in 1988 was agriculture. Africa's number one priority sector experienced a remarkable growth of 3.8 percent, compared to an estimated decline of 1.2 percent in output in 1987. The most favorable results in food production were recorded in countries such as Morocco, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, where record cereal crop harvests were attained. However, a danger now exists that deficiencies in storage crop collection and marketing may result in the loss of a large proportion of these bumper crops, while other countries like Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola, and

prices have fallen to their weakest levels since 1986.

The impact of the slump in oil prices has been especially pronounced, with the oil-producing countries generally experiencing the worst overall performance. In Gabon, revenues from oil fell to barely a quarter of what they were in 1986, and Nigeria fared little better. This year, while the growth in output in the non-oil exporting countries is forecast at 3.7 percent—perhaps their best performance since the beginning of the decade—the economies of the oil producers are expected to grow by only 1.8 percent.

Not surprisingly, given the slump in most commodity prices and the inadequacy of current debt relief measures, Africa's debt burden has worsened. The continent's total outstanding external debt now stands at \$230 billion, and the debt service ratio has risen to more than 40 percent on average.

These external factors, combined with the failure of existing structural adjustment programs to bring recovery,

should lead to some serious rethinking of economic policy in Africa, suggests Adedeji. "We need to engineer a fundamental restructuring of the African economies instead of perpetuating the neo-colonial monostructural production system at a time when the demand prospects for these commodities are dismal."

Yet even a further reorientation of African economic policy will face impossible constraints if the international economic environment does not improve. Noting that the ECA has been pointing for some time to the linkages among different external factors affecting Africa's economies, Adedeji stressed that in 1988, as in previous years, "poor demand and prices for export commodities, excruciating debt burdens, and net outflow of resources from Africa constituted the triple arms of the unbearable albatross around Africa's socio-economic and political neck. Until this yoke is removed, recovery and development will continue to elude Africa." ■

Betty Press



Adedeji: Not much to smile about

Mozambique continue to be affected by famine or near-famine conditions.

Agriculture's improved performance also had a carry-over effect on manufacturing, where agro-allied industries account for 60 percent of manufacturing value-added in Africa. It is estimated that manufacturing value-added increased by about 3.2 percent in 1988, compared to a 0.2 percent fall in 1987 when agriculture performed poorly. Yet in general, manufacturing continues to be hampered by serious structural deficiencies.

As in previous years, the depressed world prices of most of the export commodities upon which Africa depends has been a major obstacle to economic recovery. The prices of cocoa, coffee, and tea have either crashed or remained low, while oil

Houphouët's Basilica Stirs Controversy

Côte d'Ivoire may be facing an unprecedented financial crisis, but one would never know it in President Félix Houphouët-Boigny's home town of Yamoussoukro where an army of 1,500 laborers is working day and night to complete what will be the largest Christian church in the world. The new Roman Catholic basilica, Our Lady of Peace, which is undoubtedly Houphouët-Boigny's most ambitious—and extravagant—project to date, will cost at least \$130 million to build, at a time when the country is facing severe economic difficulties.

Towering over the red earth and green vegetation of Côte d'Ivoire's political capital, the controversial Greco-Roman structure is scheduled to be dedicated in September, with its massive 280-ton metallic dome rising 37 feet higher than St. Peter's in Rome. Largely constructed by French and Israeli contractors, the basilica will have taken three full years to build. Among its most impressive features are the ground floor walls and doors which are made exclusively of 13th century-style hand-blown stained glass

from France. Made in 400 different tints, the stained glass will cover two acres of windows—the equivalent of two years' output of all the stained glass companies of Europe. The lavish structure, surrounded by 88 acres of French-style formal gardens, also boasts 272 Greco-Roman columns, and Italian marble tiles to fully cover the 7.4-acre esplanade.

The basilica itself, complete with air conditioning and escalators, can seat 7,000 and hold another 11,000 standing. Overall, Our Lady of Peace is designed to accommodate some 300,000 worshippers inside and out.

Critics, however, point out that Côte d'Ivoire hardly has enough Catholics to fill it. Only 15 percent of the country's 10 million inhabitants are Catholic, with 30 percent of the population Muslim, 5 percent Protestant, and the rest animist. Indeed, the primary role of the basilica, suggest some observers, will be to serve as a backdrop for a spectacular funeral when the 83-year-old president passes away.

Nonetheless, Houphouët-Boigny, who converted to Roman Catholicism

in middle age, also sees the basilica as a symbol that the southward spread of Islam from North Africa stops at Yamoussoukro. Located more than 150 miles north of Abidjan, the nation's political capital lies on the dividing line between the predominantly Muslim north and the Christian south.

"Le Vieux," hoping Pope John Paul II will consecrate the basilica in September, has said he plans to offer it as a gift to the Vatican upon completion. But so far, the Vatican—experiencing serious financial difficulties of

More of the Same in Pretoria

When Frederick W. de Klerk took over as the new leader of South Africa's ruling National Party in early February, he delivered a so-called "verligte" (enlightened) speech to Parliament, declaring that white domination must come to an end. The party, he said, "will strive for a non-racialistic country, free of racial hatred and negative discrimination on the basis of race. I want to state unequivocally that the National Party is against domination of any one group by others. White domination, in so far as it still exists, must go."

But de Klerk was quick to reassure the white community that he in no way intended to dismantle the fundamentals of apartheid, reaffirming Botha's repeated rejection of a universal franchise extending to the country's 25 million blacks. "Domination by a majority is as unacceptable as domination by a minority," he stressed. "The only route is a system which eliminates domination."

Despite adopting Botha's rhetoric about the need to reform apartheid, de Klerk is known for his uncompromising commitment to the principle of racial segregation—based upon the "group pillar" philosophy whereby each ethnic group is a separate pillar of society and should govern its own affairs. Indeed, during his 17 years in Parliament, de Klerk has been a consistent advocate of racial segregation. As he said in Parliament only last year, "The National Party demands, as a basic pattern, that own residential areas be maintained, that own state schools are not threatened...and this is done by the maintenance of own facilities."

With de Klerk's election as party leader, it appears to be only a matter of time before he takes over from Botha as executive State President. Botha, who resigned as party leader after suffering a stroke in mid-January, remains in poor health, leading to speculation that he may be forced to formally hand over his powers in Parliament sooner than he would have liked. Party insiders disclosed that Botha had wanted to cut a deal naming de Klerk to a newly created post of prime minister to take over the daily burden of running the country, thus freeing the president to concentrate on the bogged down program of reforms. As part of the agreement, Botha would then stay on for another year before passing the presidency to de Klerk.

But given Botha's slow recovery, de Klerk is likely to urge him to announce an early general election and to step down from office in order to end the political paralysis plaguing the country. Impatience is already growing within the National Party to have an election by mid-year rather than in March 1990, so as to preempt a fallout by right-wingers opposed to the proposed decolonization of Namibia. A snap general election would help de Klerk consolidate his position and allow the ruling party to take advantage of the current disarray among opposition groups to both its left and right.


Andries Treurnicht's right-wing Conservative Party did well in last year's by-elections and municipal elections, but more recently, saw its attempts to reintroduce petty apartheid in the industrial town of Boksburg seriously backfire when a black boycott severely hit white shopkeepers' pockets. National Party members say this political setback may have cost the conservatives considerable support among the white electorate.

As for liberal groups to the left of the ruling party, they are just in the process of realigning their forces. The fledgling Democratic Party, which brings together Zach de Beer's Progressive Federal Party, Dennis Worrall's Independent Party, and Wynand Malan's New Democratic Movement, is due to be launched on April 8. The new party will join with black organizations in protest against the apartheid system and attempt to woo dissident National Party members to its cause. But in the immediate period, it appears to have little chance of challenging the government or the official opposition status of the Conservative Party in an upcoming election, once again leaving the National Party firmly in control.

[\\$130 million]—if it is 40 billion francs—change the crisis which has hit my country?" But independent observers estimate that the basilica

may cost perhaps as much as twice that amount, representing a sum even "Le Vieux," with his immense personal fortune, will find difficult to cover. ■

Camera/afix



"Le Vieux": Showing faith in his money

its own—has been reluctant to accept the basilica, given that it will cost \$1.7 million a year to maintain.

As a result, even local Catholic laymen and the Church hierarchy in Côte d'Ivoire have expressed reservations about undertaking such an extravagant project at a time of financial crisis, while others have publicly ridiculed the plan for wasting the country's limited resources. As one Ivorian merchant put it, "They shouldn't be spending money on things like this when people can't afford to send their children to school and people are dying because they can't buy medicine."

Although the actual cost of building Our Lady of Peace remains a closely guarded secret, Houphouët-Boigny has maintained that the basilica is entirely a private concern, built on his own land and financed with his own money. Furthermore, he asked, "In what way could my meager 40 billion francs

LIBYA

On his final day in office, President Reagan announced he had agreed to modify trade sanctions imposed against Tripoli three years ago, thereby allowing five U.S. oil companies with assets worth as much as \$4 billion to "resume their operations in Libya, transfer operations in foreign subsidiaries, or sell their assets."

The decision followed an intensive lobbying campaign by the oil companies—including Conoco and Marathon—which have been foregoing up to \$120 million in profits a year since sanctions were imposed in 1986 in response to terrorist attacks. At the time, Reagan pushed through the sanctions while allowing the oil companies to negotiate "standstill" agreements to avoid default on their contracts. But more recent fears that Libya might nationalize U.S. assets when the agreements expire in June, and evidence that Tripoli has enjoyed a \$200 million post-sanctions windfall, prompted Reagan to end the business freeze and relieve the new Bush administration of a delicate issue.

EGYPT

President Hosni Mubarak's government is set to approve a new foreign investment law that will greatly simplify procedures for overseas investors and prove especially helpful to companies establishing joint ventures in the country. The new law, which features several investment incentives, including a 5 to 15-year tax exemption for firms operating in the free trade zones, is expected to pass the People's Assembly without difficulty and be enacted in March.

By cutting bureaucratic red tape and improving the climate for new foreign investment, the government hopes to reduce its staggering \$43 billion external debt and obtain a rescheduling agreement with foreign creditors. But first Egyptian authorities will have to strike a deal with the IMF which has long demanded a rigorously applied reform program involving the abolition of state subsidies. So far, however, the government has held out for more gradual reforms, fearing that rising prices will lead to widespread social unrest.

NIGERIA

The IMF formal approval of a \$650 million standby credit for Nigeria has formally opened the door for extensive loans and rescheduling arrangements with Western creditors which should help alleviate the country's massive \$26 billion external debt. President Ibrahim Babangida's government, however, having long resisted such a deal because of popular opposition to the IMF, has stressed that its stance toward the Fund has in no way changed and that it might not actually draw on the available credit.

As Alhaji Abubakar Alhaji, minister of state for the budget, has put it, "Nigeria has neither applied for, signed an agreement for, nor taken the IMF loan." On the contrary, argue officials in Lagos, the accord is rather a vindication of the government's own structural adjustment program—a home-grown austerity plan which the IMF has now fully endorsed.

BUSINESS BRIEFS

ZIMBABWE

Describing the present investment code as "conducive neither to local nor foreign investment," Finance Minister Bernard Chidzero has set the stage for introducing a sweeping liberalization program designed to attract a steady flow of new foreign capital to the country. Despite last year's impressive 6.5 percent growth in GDP, the government has been plagued by a recent trend of disinvestment and an inability to convince the international community that it offers a stable and profitable environment for foreign capital.

The new guidelines are expected to cut through the web of red tape by creating what Chidzero calls a "one-stop investment office" to provide advice and process investment applications. The reforms will also alter the current policy on the remittances of profits and dividends abroad. At present, foreign companies are allowed to remit only 25 percent of after-tax profits—or 50 percent for firms that have invested since independence—but soon the pay-out ratio will be raised to 100 percent for "priority" projects.

CAMEROON

President Paul Biya's government is building a major new international airport as part of a far-reaching plan to modernize and expand the country's existing air traffic sector. The aim of the project is to strengthen and enhance Cameroon's 69 civil airports, aerodromes, and airfields and make them safer and more reliable by 1991. The government is working to achieve this goal in consultation with the International Civil Aviation Organization which will provide the necessary expertise to enable Cameroon to make full use of its trained aviation personnel.

The five-year project will involve the construction of a new Yaoundé-Nsimalen International Airport with the help of funding provided by the Italian government, and the upgrading of Garoua Airport at the cost of \$40 million to take international traffic. During the plan's final phase, security facilities at Douala International Airport, the country's main gateway, will be significantly tightened.

SIERRA LEONE

President Joseph Saidu Momoh has introduced new measures regulating the mining and marketing of diamonds and gold in a bid to reverse the fortunes of Sierra Leone's floundering economy. Nearly 85 percent of the country's foreign exchange comes from gold and diamond exports, but smuggling of both minerals has severely cut into earnings in recent years, despite the government's November 1987 economic state of emergency which imposes stiff penalties for illegal dealings and restricts the amount of foreign currency that individuals may possess.

The new policy, designed to improve government control over the key mining sector, should increase the country's overall sales revenue, intensify cooperative mining as opposed to individual operations, and guarantee the flow of foreign exchange earnings through the official banking system. Gold and diamond export licenses have thus been reintroduced but with much tighter restrictions, while exporters will now have to surrender 60 percent of their proceeds in foreign currency to the Bank of Sierra Leone.



THE BATTLE FOR ZAMBEZIA


Committing its best troops to the fight for control of Zambezia, the Frelimo army has gained some ground against Renamo in the economically vital province. However, the war has cost the region's people dearly, with a third now dependent on food aid for survival.

By KARL MAIER

The booming cadence of thousands of women pounding grain with pestles in huge wooden mortars echoes like an ancient heartbeat through a sea of reed shacks around the northern Mozambican town of Gile. Suddenly, everything falls quiet, as all strain to hear the faint whine of a distant engine.

As a white aircraft swoops before the thrusting cliffs of Mount Gile, groups of cheering men, women, and children rush up to the dirt airstrip.

The plane from Zambezia's provincial capital, Quelimane, 150 miles south of Gile, is the only contact with the outside world. All roads out of town have been cut by bands of rebel gunmen roaming the countryside. Food, clothes, and medicine must be flown



Frelimo soldier: "Government forces now hold all of Zambezia's district capitals"

the dust to a halt, 10,000 people clad mostly in rags look on. The crowd roars with excitement as sweaty young men emerge from the vessel's dark belly with sacks of maize and seeds on their shoulders. In 30 minutes, the aircraft soars above the misty mountain ranges of northern Zambezia, as soldiers with long wooden switches chase away giggling little boys clawing at the gravel for fallen grain morsels.

With its crumbled buildings surrounded by a camp of 40,000 refugees, Gile looks like a skeleton, eaten away by a grinding bush war for control of its destiny. Gile is on the frontline of the 14-year-old conflict in the southeast African nation between President

in, and often they arrive too late. Alongside the runway are the graves of 1,500 children killed by a measles epidemic last October.

By the time the Spanish-built CASA transport plane slides through

Joaquim Chissano's Frelimo government and the insurgent Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo)—a group formed by Ian Smith's Rhodesian government in the early 1970s, and handed over to

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South Africa when Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980.

The story in Gile is much the same in the rest of the vast province of Zambezia. Once the source of over 50 percent of Mozambique's hard currency exports and bountiful crops of sugar, tea, copra, and coconuts, the province is now a major drain on the national economy. One-third of its 3 million people have lost their homes or livelihood to the war and now depend on international aid to survive. Starvation lurks. Demands for food, clothes, housing, and other basic necessities have swamped Mozambican and foreign relief efforts.

Frelimo recaptured Gile from the rebels last year and has gained some ground in the region over the past two years. But now the army is stretched thin. The 3,000 Tanzanian soldiers that defended government-held areas in Zambezia are gone. The army has committed its best troops to the battle for Zambezia, but undermined by a chaotic logistics system, it is barely holding on to a patchwork of isolated garrison towns. The insurgents, flush with weapons and in league with traditional healers and religious leaders, are pressing closer. Like most other district capitals in Zambezia, Gile is surrounded.

Government forces now hold all of Zambezia's district capitals, or what is left of them. During their 18-month occupation of Gile, the rebels stripped the town of everything they could carry, even doors, toilets, and roofing.

The refugees began streaming into Gile shortly after an army battalion marched for three days across the mountains to recapture the town on July 10 last year. Since then, the government and foreign aid agencies have scrambled to rebuild a semblance of a local economy. Because outright military victory by either side appears impossible in Mozambique, Frelimo's only chance of holding on to the territory is to re-ignite trade and commerce.

In Gile, that means striking a delicate balance between arrivals of food

aid and consumer goods that can be traded with farmers for local crops. "Our only hope is to commercialize, to give peasants a reason—such as clothes, soap, and cooking oil—to produce," Gile's burly district administrator, Berto Malabo, says in Portuguese. "Free food aid alone can kill the people's initiative to produce."

An immunization program for infants is under way, local carpenters are making chairs and doors, and trees have already been chopped for a new Catholic church. Since the war has driven most priests out of the rural areas, religious work throughout Zambezia falls to catechists like João Pedro Mlapa, 46, who lost three of his eight children to measles. Outside his hut sits a pile of freshly cut logs that will be the foundation of the new church. The local military commander is helping Mlapa plan construction, something that would have been unheard of a decade ago during Frelimo's early revolutionary campaign against religion. "We must pray not only for our lives, or an end to the war," he says. "We are praying mostly for our souls, our future. It will only be through prayer that the war will end."

When Renamo ruled Gile, the powerful traditional doctors, priests, and spirit mediums held sway. Throughout Zambezia, those who lived with the rebels tell similar stories. Most of the rebel commanders are Ndaus—a sub-group of the Shona people who inhabit neighboring Zimbabwe and central Mozambique—and they rely on traditional religious leaders for advice.

The Ndaus' dominance of Renamo dates to its creation by the late Rhodesian intelligence chief, Ken Flower. During the early 1970s, Flower's Central Intelligence Organization recruited mainly Ndauspeakers along the border to spy on Zimbabwean nationalist guerrillas who were using Mozambique as a launching pad for attacks into Rhodesia. Frelimo's early policies of moving people into communal villages and its hostility to traditional religious and political leaders also created vol-


unteers for Renamo in the area.

"Renamo people said, 'our struggle is of the spirit,' or 'our struggle is for the ancestors,'" says Bartolomeu Quilima, a 42-year-old primary school headmaster who was held for a week in the Renamo base at Gile. "Before each battle, they would kneel around a special clearing surrounded by flowers and clap their hands three times," he says. "Then a *corondeiro* (traditional doctor) would wave a goat tail dipped in magic liquid at each one as they marched off. Some believe the liquid stops bullets."

Since they drove Renamo out, the crack Frelimo commandos guarding Gile—nicknamed the Red Berets for their headgear—have turned back several rebel attacks, including a big assault by three units on September 11. Among the 39 guerrillas Frelimo says its troops killed that day was a highly regarded commander, Callistus Meque. The soldiers dragged his body through town to show the refugees that the feared Renamo general was dead.

Frelimo's Red Berets are the pride of a Soviet military program better known for its failures in Mozambique. While Britain and other Western countries run high-profile military training programs to help Frelimo, the Soviet-trained Red Berets have proved themselves in Zambezia to be the army's most effective soldiers. Trained for eight months as an assault force, they turned back Renamo's biggest-ever offensive in 1986—one that nearly cut Mozambique in two. Even the province's biggest city, Quelimane, was in jeopardy. The rebel threat was so grave then that Mozambique's northern neighbor, Tanzania, sent 3,000 troops to help defend Zambezia's towns.

Results were initially dramatic. Throughout 1987-88, the Red Berets toppled one rebel-held town after another on the north bank of the Zambezi river, leaving Tanzanian forces in their wake to defend the towns. Zimbabwean paratroopers launched a similar offensive across the river in the central provinces of



Displaced persons camp, Zambezia: "Refugees began streaming into Gile shortly after an army battalion marched for three days across the mountains to recapture the town"

Sofala and Manica.

As Renamo was pushed back into the Zambebian bush, its fighters ransacked the towns, marching off with everything—sacks of maize, zinc roofing sheets, and air conditioners. Over half a million people began a mass exodus from Renamo-controlled areas into Frelimo-held towns and across the border into neighboring Malawi. Relief agencies such as Save the Children, Oxfam, and Unicef began pouring in millions of dollars worth of food, trucks, seeds, and clothes.

But by the end of 1988, Frelimo's military position was again gloomy. Tanzania's troops withdrew from Zambezia amid rumors that Dar es Salaam was irritated with President Chissano's closer ties with South Africa. But the mounting costs of Tanzania's 23-month operation, both in casualties and money, appeared to be more likely reasons.

Officials 1,000 miles away in the Mozambican capital, Maputo, still put a brave face on the Tanzanian exit, saying the province's situation is under control. But people in Zambezia often see it differently. "When the last Tanzanians went to the airport to leave," says a Frelimo official in the Zambezi border town of Luabo, "the old women followed them and cried. People are not sure how long we can hold out."

Frelimo's influence has never been great in Zambezia. Its own nationalist war barely reached Zam-

bezia before young Portuguese army officers overthrew the Salazar dictatorship in Lisbon in June 1975. Portuguese rule left an especially harsh legacy in the province, with feudal lords ruling over huge tracts of land called *prazos*. Colonialism in Gile meant that all able-bodied men were liable to be bused about 70 miles west to work on the tea plantations of Gurue for six months of the year. Back at home, their wives were obliged to grow cotton for Portugal's textile industry.

During the early independence years, Gile and most of Zambezia were spared the spreading violence of Renamo's war, which swept across the central provinces of Sofala, Manica, and Tete. But the war came to Zambezia in 1982, when Renamo officials agreed in South Africa to merge with a regional dissident group known as Africa Libre based in neighboring Malawi. Constant ambushes closed major roads in a campaign that has left millions of pounds worth of charred vehicle hulks strewn along key highways. By 1984, Renamo was threatening important centers on the Zambezia plateau, towns like Gile.

Most of the Portuguese and Indian businessmen abandoned their shops as the rebels closed in on Gile. The economy quickly collapsed. Then Renamo began a year-long assault that took Gile on October 28, 1986, the day Maputo was burying Mozambique's first president, Samo-

ra Machel, who had died a week earlier in a plane crash in South Africa.

Renamo passed orders to the townspeople through its network of notorious informers, the *mujibas*. Their main task was to feed the guerrillas, but they were also called when manpower was needed. Men, women, and children were forced to block Gile's airstrip with trees and rocks during the Renamo occupation. When Frelimo returned, they had to remove the barriers. The army's wrath, in turn, fell hardest upon the Renamo *mujibas*. At least 50 who failed to turn themselves in were executed.

As dusk settles over Gile, the dull beat of women pounding grain dies away and a cloud of smoke from thousands of fires hovers over the camp. Families sit down to dine on manioc and shots of local brew. The electricity was knocked out years ago, so the nights are pitch dark during most of the rainy season when clouds block out the moonlight. Little boys kick at each other showing off karate moves they learned from the Red Berets. Soldiers back from a day in the trenches fool around amid screams and shouts, or listen to Billy Ocean and Madonna tunes on portable radios. Those on night duty stroll in the town center cradling AK-47 assault rifles. The buzz continues until the early morning hours, when all goes silent. In Zambezia, Renamo attacks only between 3:00 and 7:00 a.m.

Right on cue, on November 27, a trio of 300-strong Renamo battalions—code-named "Tiger," "Wolf," and "Thunder"—attacked the prosperous western mountain town of Gurue at 3:45 a.m. and quickly routed the Frelimo garrison. A DC-3 Dakota carrying aid supplies was hit by ground fire while preparing to land. Four days after they came, the rebels melted back into the bush.

The relatively easy occupation stunned Mozambican officials and foreign aid workers. A rich, tea-producing area, Gurue could earn Mozambique precious foreign exchange, though sabotage has rendered the railway to the Indian

Ocean unusable.

Gurue is healthy by the standards of Mozambique, Africa's poorest nation. Emocha, the state tea corporation, has vast plantations and factories in the rolling hills around the town. The economy has picked up sharply over the past two years, as businessmen and farmers have taken advantage of Frelimo's new free market economic policies. Gurue is an area of such strategic importance that Frelimo should defend it at all costs. Even Renamo never expected to take the town, according to civilians taken captive during the assault.

By the time a relief column of elite troops, trained by the private British firm, Defence Systems Ltd., drove the rebels out on November 30, all of Gurue's shops and most of its private homes had been emptied. Indian shopkeepers lost millions of dollars worth of food, clothes, and consumer goods. Some gunmen stripped in the middle of the town, put on their new stolen garments, and left behind piles of rancid rags in the street. Renamo killed no civilians, although four children starved to death hiding in the tea fields. At least 60 people were kidnapped and forced to haul the booty 15 miles southeast to the guerrilla camp in the mountains of Maquirinqua. From there, things of value are believed to have been dispatched for sale in Malawi.

One who escaped was Artur Varela, a 40-year-old tea worker at Emocha, who says he witnessed a rebel gang rape his 13-year-old niece. Standing amid the burnt rubble of one tea company warehouse destroyed in the attack, Varela says he recognized several of the guerrillas as co-workers.

Many of the local men in the insurgent ranks would like to accept President Chissano's year-old amnesty offer, Varela says, but they believe that the army would execute them. "Most say they were kidnapped by Renamo and want to come back. But they are scared that they will be shot," he says. "They have heard about the amnesty, but

they have no faith in it."

Frelimo approved the amnesty in late 1987, but only about 3,000 of Renamo's estimated 22,000-strong army surrendered, and last December the government extended the offer. Chissano has made other moves as well. While repeating his rejection of direct talks with the rebels, he authorized the 17-church Christian Council of Mozambique last August to meet with Renamo leaders to convince them to lay down their arms.

A month after that, Chissano held a summit with his South African counterpart, P.W. Botha, and secured a pledge that Pretoria would abide by the 1984 Nkomati peace accord signed between the two countries. At a celebration marking a new effort by Mozambique, South Africa, and Portugal to repair the giant Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme, Botha promised to end his government's support for the rebels, who had sabotaged Cahora Bassa in the first place. Pretoria has since sent non-lethal military aid to Mozambican soldiers guarding the pylons which carry electricity 1,000 miles south from the Zambezi River to the Transvaal.

At the other end of the country, leaders in Maputo receive public assurances from both South Africa and Pretoria's close African ally, neighboring Malawi, that they will not support the rebels. But in northern Zambezia, Renamo appears too well-equipped, too flush with ammunition to be living purely off the land without outside help.

Witnesses in Gurue say that at least one white fighting alongside the insurgents died in the Gurue assault. They say he was in his early 20s with sandy brown hair and a new camouflage uniform, and that he rode around town in the back of a red truck perched on an anti-aircraft gun.

Ilario Alexandre, a 23-year-old carpenter, later found the dead man in his backyard on returning home. "It was smelling so bad that you had to have courage to come close," he says. "The white soldier was buried,

but the dogs were pulling him out of the grave. You could see his head and chest clearly. His left arm was detached." Intelligence officers decided against digging up the grave to seek the man's identity.

The blame for the Gurue debacle fell squarely on the military authorities back in Quelimane, the provincial capital. All around Zambezia, local officials and army officers complain that they could not be counted on to defend their territory when urgent requests for supplies went unheeded for weeks, sometimes months. "It could happen here," a Frelimo official in the Zambezi river town of Luabo responded when hearing the news from Gurue. "Our troops started stealing some of the food aid when they did not receive any army rations for a month."

Nearly all of the 18,000 people now in Luabo have lived under Renamo at one time or another. The rebels occupied the town in July 1985 and stayed there until the Red Berets ran them out in March 1987, after a heavy aerial bombardment.

"Life there is not like it is here. Anytime you have something good, like a nice shirt or some food, they take it. The people out there are crying," says Domingos Jamussa, 23, who lived near Nyatinde, a Renamo base 15 miles north of Luabo. "We have very little here, but here at least there is a possibility that we develop and improve things for the children. Out there in the bush, there is no future."

With President Chissano's government back in control, residents of Luabo are waiting for British technicians to return to the giant Sena Sugar Estates factory that was built with English capital and which soon came to dominate the town. But many years and millions of dollars will be needed to get the company running again. Renamo saboteurs ripped out the entire electrical system and reduced parts of the complex to rusty piles of twisted metal. Perhaps no other scene better symbolizes the war's insane economic cost to Zambezia and to Mozambique. ○



MOZAMBIQUE

A PERMANENT EMERGENCY

By MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Facing yet another food emergency this year, the Mozambican government is launching its third appeal to the international community for support. While the donor response has been generous, the crisis will be ongoing until its root cause—Renamo's war and continuing South African backing—is ended.

When the donor community gathers in New York in April to respond to the Mozambican government's third appeal for emergency assistance in as many years, the scarred lives of millions of the nation's citizens—brutally uprooted by Renamo's war and haunted by the specter of starvation—will hang in the balance yet again.

And again donors will come to the aid of this beleaguered country, providing humanitarian support on a massive scale, yet the war will grind on—still sustained by South Africa despite pledges to the contrary—leaving in its wake death, hunger, and hundreds of thousands of walking wounded.

Isabelinha Lapissonne is among them. Clad in a soiled and tattered dress, her slight form is clung to tenaciously by a cluster of shivering children, themselves porting no more than frayed food aid sacks as protection from the late afternoon winds that sweep across the bleak landscape.

In a barely audible whisper, she recounts a tale of horror that is all too common in Mozambique today—one that could be echoed by any of the 6,000 displaced people, or *deslocados* as they are known, who inhabit this sprawling refugee camp in Dondo, 20 miles from Beira, the

capital of Sofala province.

Her glazed eyes staring past her visitors, Isabelinha talks about the day Renamo overran her village, Galinha, and "everything went wrong." Her husband was ailing when the "bandidos" entered their hut, and "they beat him with sticks until he died," she relates in a hushed monotone.

"They killed the men and took the women, forcing us to carry food and ammunition to their camp. We never ate the food we grew—they forced us to give them everything. We don't



Children at the Dondo refugee camp: "A quarter of a million have lost their parents; thousands more are traumatized or have been physically mutilated"

have clothes—we wore leaves—because they took it all."

Isabelinha, whose trauma is etched on her face, ageing her well beyond her 20-odd years, arrived at Dondo a week earlier, escaping from

Renamo's grip by night into the bush and making her way on foot to the refugee center. Eyeing her five small children whose distended bellies and discolored hair are hallmarks of prolonged malnutrition, she says, "We are receiving some food now, but no clothes yet."

Set up in early 1987, this resettlement camp, like those now scattered throughout Mozambique's 10 provinces and in the neighboring countries, is meant to provide temporary accommodation until Renamo-held areas are recaptured by the Frelimo army and the *deslocados* can go home to reconstruct their broken lives. But even as some are able to do so, a new crop of displaced people is created elsewhere, and the ebb and flow of human misery continues unabated, exacerbating a chronic food emergency in this potentially rich nation.

Jose Carlos Zuca, the district secretary of defense at Dondo, shows his visitors around the camp, pointing out its meager facilities—a makeshift health center and a primary school. In a dusty sandlot, small boys kick around a soccer ball, laughing and chasing one another. Under a broad acacia tree, women are rehearsing dances and songs to commemorate an upcoming national holiday.

For a moment, the desolation of

life in this camp is eclipsed by the cheerful vignettes of everyday life. But Zuca pierces the illusion: "The flow of people from bandit-held areas is continuous and the conditions here are very difficult. They carry diseases and to feed them is a problem. There is just not enough food."

Even outside the capital, Maputo,

the tide of people fleeing the rural areas for the relative security of proximity to urban centers is mounting daily, causing massive food scarcities. In Massaca, just 18 miles west of the city, tents donated by UNHCR are home to recent arrivals at this "Nucleus for Refugees," as the camp is called. Hastily built last August, the camp accommodates


over 600 people from Maputo province, a third of whom fled into South Africa when Renamo swept south late last year and were promptly repatriated back across the border.

Ana Bila, an elderly woman, expresses embarrassment at her shabby attire, her dignity intact in spite of her harsh surroundings. She explains that she and 224 others fled from Mapulanguene into South Africa when the town was attacked by Renamo last December. Four of the refugees were reportedly taken by South African soldiers to Skukuza, inside Kruger National Park, to a major Renamo camp for recruitment, from which they were subsequently released.

"We call them thieves," Ana says of Renamo. "We don't think they want to rule us because then they would treat us like human beings." When asked when she expects to return home, she answers: "We can't go back until the war is over. It is better to stay here till then and try to rebuild our lives. We get some help from the government, but there are too many people, so it is not enough."

Never enough food, a refrain heard often in this nation of fertile agricultural land, crossed by a myriad of rivers, and with miles of Indian Ocean coast.

Ana Bila, a refugee at Massaca: "We have only maize and beans to eat, and when the maize is finished, we eat only beans"



We have only maize and beans to eat, and when the maize is finished, we eat only beans."

Raimundo Xavier Tiago is head of the district's Department for Prevention and Combat of Natural Calamities (DPCCN), a division of the Ministry of Cooperation created in 1980 to handle relief for drought and flood victims, but now charged primarily with assisting the *deslocados* and distributing food aid. From DPCCN provincial headquarters, he has just taken delivery of 240 bags of U.S.-donated maize and 480 bags of beans, the monthly allotment for the district's 34,580 people.

"My priority is to give food to the people at Massaca, and then to those in town, but there is never enough food," Tiago says.

Never enough food, a refrain heard often in this nation of fertile agricultural land, crossed by a myriad of rivers, and with miles of Indian Ocean coast. Unlike other nations which suffer seasonal or episodic food deficits due to adverse weather or natural disaster, Mozambique's emergency is a structural, long-term one—punctuated periodically by drought and floods—with its roots stretching back to colonial history.

But there is no question what is behind today's crisis. It is unambiguously the result of Renamo's maniacal war, one that has taken the lives of 600,000 people and caused nearly half of Mozambique's 16 million people to be dependent on food aid for survival. A recent Unicef study confirms: "War is much more responsible than drought for the shortage of foodstuffs, because of its destructive impact on Mozambique's economic and social fabric."

With its economic and social fabric in shreds, domestic food production is all but moribund. Over 75 percent has been disrupted, due to the fact that some 1.6 million people are displaced internally, another 2.8 million directly affected by war in the rural areas, and some 2.6 million now crowding the urban areas in need of food aid.

This April, although the needs have increased, Mozambique's



appeal to donors will be nearly the same as last year's \$332.6 million, including 460,000 tons of food and logistical support in the form of trucks, boats, and airlift facilities. Noting that the response to past appeals has been generous, Deputy Minister of Agriculture Alfredo Gamito adds that distribution is the major bottleneck at the moment, with DPCCN's modest capabilities stretched beyond their limits.

With most of the nation's road network dangerously impassable, airlift, road convoy, or ship are the only options to get food to the needy. According to Richard Morgan, Unicef's senior program officer for the emergency, airlifts are currently supplying Niassa, Nampula, Zambezia, and Sofala provinces, but the cost is astronomical—\$16,000 for one planeload of maize from Maputo to Niassa. As the war has spread to all 10 of Mozambique's provinces over the past year, it is logistically impossible to mount a relief operation on such a scale by air.

And even when food arrives at provincial capitals, there is no guarantee it will reach its destination in the hinterland. Between January and March this year, nearly 5,000 people died of starvation in Memba, near Nacala in northern Mozambique, although food supplies had reached Nacala port. But Renamo-sabotaged bridges and mined roads blocked

Malangatana mural, Maputo: "A gritty will to survive the latest in a series of scourges which have postponed the attainment of peace"

delivery of the food even 35 miles away.

"Airlifts should be a last resort," says DPCCN director Salomao Mambo, whose unit distributes some 140,000 tons of food aid per year to 3.3 million people, mainly via its 250 trucks and a small fleet of ships. In last year's emergency appeal, DPCCN requested 700 trucks as well as protection equipment and radios for the vehicles and drivers. But it received only 21, while 35 DPCCN trucks were destroyed in Renamo ambushes on food convoys over the same period, costing the lives of 20 drivers and their assistants.

Ensuring that the food aid they donate arrives at its destination is ironically a sensitive point for donors, as the armored trucks, for example, which DPCCN has requested, are regarded as military aid. One Western aid official in Maputo remarked that it is antithetical to the concept of humanitarian assistance to provide such protection.

But DPCCN has only 10 armored vehicles, enough for one convoy. Meanwhile, Mambo says, "Food is sitting here in Maputo and people are dying." Among them, according

A Conversation with Melissa Wells

The American ambassador in Maputo talks with *Africa Report* about directions in U.S. policy toward Mozambique. Relating her experiences with the victims of Renamo's war, Ambassador Wells answers the American right-wing which seeks to legitimize the rebel movement.

■On the evolution of U.S.-Mozambican relations: In 1983-84, there was a watershed in Mozambique's policies internally and toward the outside world and the U.S. featured in that change of policies. There was an opening to strengthening relationships with more countries than was customary and to trying some new ideas like market forces, private investment, and so forth—joining the World Bank and the IMF and adopting an economic recovery program.

Our bilateral aid program was started in 1984 and we have come a long way since then. We are the single largest donor in terms of emergency assistance and Mozambique is now a participant in a regional program under funding for SADCC in rail rehabilitation. So when you count all those faucets, in 1989, Mozambique is the largest recipient of U.S. aid in sub-Saharan Africa. Emergency assistance totals \$55 million, there is another \$10 million in logistical support, \$15 million in development assistance, and \$20 or 21 million of the regional, equalling about \$102 million.

There has been an increase in exchanging visitors that has helped strengthen the relationship, and last August we had the first-ever U.S. ship visit to Mozambique, which was enormously successful. I look forward to a continuation of the policy under President Bush. At this point, I would be surprised if there were any radical departures from the existing policy that President Reagan set out, which I believe is a very good one.

■On prospects for the U.S. supplying non-lethal military aid: The administration put forward a modest proposal for a military educational training program back in 1985 and the Congress rejected that. Since then, there has been a prohibition on military assistance to Mozambique. I am not in a position to gauge the mood of the Congress now, but I think the whole issue should be looked at again. The administration put forward those proposals for very sound reasons and I for one believe those reasons are still valid today.

■On U.S. right-wing support for Renamo: I am very familiar with the views held by the conservative elements who espouse those policies. I wouldn't say we've overcome them, but I have done my very best to understand where they are coming from. I hold the record of having had the longest wait for confirmation as ambassador—11 months and two days—answered more questions than anybody else, 246, and had the largest number of votes against my confirmation. When you go to post with all that on your back, you want to understand why there is this type of feeling.

I read what those who espouse the view that Renamo is fighting a battle for free elections and so forth have said and I have great difficulty with that. Let me give you an example. I just spent a week in Malawi where I visited almost all the Mozambican camps. I went to the Tete side, down to Nsanje, to Milange on the Zambezia side, and it was the first time I had met Mozambicans outside their own country in that status.

I came across two different camps. In one were people who had fled from the city of Milange in Zambezia when that city was taken over by Renamo and in another were people who had fled from the surrounding area of Milange when the Frelimo forces had retaken the city. The chieftancy system had been reinstated by Renamo when it took over. I talked to these chiefs and the people they brought with them. They explained how under the Frelimo government, the chief system was abolished and when Renamo came in, they put the chiefs back. When they fled for safe haven, they fled with the people

under them and maintained the chief system in the camps.

The ones who fled from the city are also organized—there were about 21 different sections in this camp—but each section elects its leader! That was a very interesting commentary—organization at the grass roots and how the free choice process works. It was so graphic to me!

The chiefs were very open and talked about the war and the destruction that Renamo had carried out inside the city of Milange, which is maniacal destruction, as if people are destroying something day in, day out. Every door, every window pane, every tile! You wonder what purpose it serves. There was one place I went to in Zambezia province where all the latrines had been hacked down systematically! The playground was destroyed bit by bit. This is not the kind of destruction that occurs during combat. This is methodical, meticulous destruction. The walls are left, they cut up all the furniture and burn it. I don't understand it. If you take over a place, you might want to have the luxury of a latrine!

I have heard so many reports that in Renamo-held areas, they do administer and have some sort of structure. So I asked the chiefs: Did you have schools? They said no, they had schools only when Frelimo was around. Did you have health services? No, none at all. This type of information is very important for us to know, not simply to accept that somebody is fighting against communism. When you look at what is going on in this country, you wonder what is behind this war. It is still very difficult to determine what is behind it.

■On President Chissano's dialogue with South Africa: In fact, we had an intensification of incidents here in the south [since the September Songo meeting between Presidents Chissano and Botha]. But we strongly support President Chissano's initiative, his courage to start up a dialogue with President Botha, which continues. There is the joint security commission which has met several times.

Our understanding is that the government recognizes that there is no military solution in sight. It has taken a number of steps. The amnesty has been extended, although it has not been as successful as one would have liked. The initiative to start up the dialogue with South Africa is part of this pattern. Also, in his speech to the popular assembly at the end of the year, the President said that "men of good will" were taking up contacts with the other side. A number of the church groups have been making exploratory contacts [with Renamo]. That is not to say that they are empowered in any way to recognize or negotiate or make any commitment. The official position is that these "contacts" are to explain the amnesty. But you can figure out from there what might happen.

■On Mozambique's prospects for the coming year: As far as its economy is concerned, I think you will see some real benefits. Within the last six to eight months, the number of ships and tonnages going in and out of Maputo port has doubled or tripled, so I think you will see a pick-up in the economy. As far as the U.S. is concerned, we have a number of investors interested, some have signed memoranda of understanding, others are still looking around, but because the government is so open, there is room for investors. Simply to say that because of the security situation, one couldn't invest here is not correct. There is certainly room for investment. We all hope that strides will be made toward peace, but I'm not in a position to give you any crystal ball picture on what might happen there. ○

to Unicef, are 494,000 children who have died "from causes directly attributed to malnutrition associated with war."

And those who manage to survive often face an even bleaker future. Posted outside district government offices are billboards bearing abandoned children's photographs, their names, those of their parents, and their home villages, if they know them—a poignant reminder of the war's most innocent victims. A quarter of a million have lost their parents; thousands more are traumatized or have been physically mutilated.

A UNDP document on the emergency states that "expansion of health care was an important priority and success after Mozambican independence. That dream has been shattered. Health centers are burnt. Health workers are killed. Medicines and equipment are looted."

Between 1982 and 1987, according to Unicef, Renamo had destroyed or caused the closure of 822 health units, of which only 567 were later rebuilt or reopened. The human consequence is that children die of preventable diseases such as diarrhea and malaria, and even routine vaccination programs are not done. Mozambique's infant mortality rate is currently one of the highest in the world—200 per 1,000 births.

At the Ministry of Health, Joana Manguiera, national director for social welfare, identifies orphans, abandoned children, pregnant women, and the elderly as the most vulnerable groups and those who should be targeted for emergency assistance. Seeking to avoid creating a "beggar mentality," Manguiera says, the government's approach to the nation's overwhelming social needs is a self-help one, trying to rebuild facilities at the district level and relying on traditional cultural values regarding care for children and other war victims.

"The international community has given a lot of support to Mozambique," says Manguiera, "but it is never enough. We need more help, but of the kind to make our commu-

nities self-sufficient. We want to solve our problems for the long-term," she says emphatically.

But the depressing fact of life is that until there is an end to Renamo's mindless and savage war—comparable to that of the Khmer Rouge according to a high-ranking U.S. official—no long-term solutions to any of Mozambique's social or economic problems appear even remotely likely.

Against formidable odds, the Mozambican government is doing all it can both to inject some dynamism into its economy and to seek solutions to the war—tasks which appear herculean in the conflict-ravaged nation. Launched in 1987 in a bid to reverse the policy failures of a decade, the economic recovery program has achieved remarkable results by all accounts, nowhere more evident than in Maputo, whose once-barren shops and markets now bustle with purpose and life.

Indeed, life goes on almost miraculously, seemingly driven by no more than a gritty will to survive the latest in a series of scourges which have postponed the attainment of peace, a prerequisite for economic development. In the Green Zones surrounding Maputo, women kneedeep in mud plow the rain-soaked earth, hardily planting another season of maize, rice, and garden vegetables to supply the city's markets.

The ports of Maputo and Beira—along with Nacala, the hubs of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference's regional port and railway system—hum with new activity, stubborn outcroppings of economic vitality and reminders of the rich potential of a nation now starved and strangled by a senseless war.

In Beira, a city that seems frozen in time and badly in need of a coat of paint, new offices and residences for the Beira Corridor Authority are springing up along a once-quiet seaside avenue. Trucks laden with goods and vehicles carrying expatriates of all nationalities careen in and out of the port.

AFRICA

PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES



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But a visit to Beira Central Hospital is a sharp reality dose. Dr. Francisco Songane, the hospital director, explains that firearm wounds are the leading cause of death in the surgery department and a walk through the wards reveals room after room of amputees, victims of land mine explosions or gunshots.

When and how will the war ever end? No one seems to have an answer. President Joaquim Chissano's strategy thus far has been to extend an amnesty to Renamo soldiers willing to give themselves up, as well as to permit discreet contacts between the rebel organization and representatives of the churches.

On the diplomatic front, he secured promises from South African President P.W. Botha in Songo last September that Pretoria's assistance to Renamo would come to an end. A Mozambique/South Africa joint security commission is meeting regularly, and cooperation has begun on the rehabilitation of the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme.

But curiously, the war has intensified rather than abated since the

The depressing fact of life is that until there is an end to Renamo's mindless and savage war, no long-term solutions to any of Mozambique's social or economic problems appear even remotely likely.


Songo meeting. More than 600 power pylons stretching from the Cahora Bassa dam in northwestern Mozambique to the South African border were sabotaged in the two months following the presidential summit. As Marcelino dos Santos, chairman of the Mozambican parliament, stated, it is unlikely that Renamo had the technical capacity to carry out such systematic destruction in so short a time.

Alison Rosenberg, U.S. deputy

assistant secretary of state for African affairs, recently confirmed that South Africa is continuing to supply Renamo despite Pretoria's protestations to the contrary. And although contacts are underway between the Bush administration, the British government, and southern African leaders with an eye toward launching a diplomatic initiative, potentially involving the Soviet Union, to end the war, until South African support for Renamo is cut once and for all—and a means of monitoring its compliance is found—the war is destined to grind on.

And the international community will continue to pour in emergency support—Mozambique is now the largest recipient of American aid in sub-Saharan Africa—but the lifeline it will provide is a tenuous one for the likes of Isabelinha Lapissonne, Ana Bila, and the millions of others whose futures are exceedingly grim ones.

Billboard bearing photos of abandoned children: "A poignant reminder of the war's most innocent victims"



Margaret A. Novicki



PEDRO DE CASTRO VAN-DUNEM "LOY": CREATING CONDITIONS FOR PEACE



Margaret A. Novicki

By MARGARET A. NOVICKI

In this *Africa Report* exclusive, Angola's new minister of external relations explains his government's concerns regarding the implementation of the New York accords on Namibian independence and Cuban troop withdrawal. Discussing Angola's efforts to resolve its internal problems, he outlines options for Unita and its leadership, in order for peace to be attained.

Africa Report: What is your government's view of the tripartite agreement signed in New York in December, and are you optimistic that South Africa will fulfill its part of the agreement?

Van-Dunem: The government of Angola made a giant effort in order to achieve the results it did—the signing of the Brazzaville protocol and the New York accords. The problems of peace in Angola and the accession to independence of Namibia have been the priority concerns of the Angolan government for some years. Angola put forward a number of initiatives which made it possible for the negotiations to culminate in the accords. We have to be satisfied naturally because a part of this process has achieved its ends.

We had to make quite a few concessions and even in some cases sacrifice some of our principles. But our objective was to create conditions for Namibia to attain independence and for peace in our country, which we need for the development of our people. Now our next efforts will be to materialize the accords. There will be some aspects which will require a great effort on our part, but it is a central question for us and we will work toward it.

We cannot speak on South Africa's behalf. But experience has shown that the South Africans do not honor their obligations. The Nkomati accord is an example. But with all the pressure that has been put on South Africa to implement resolution 435, we believe that in some fashion, they will honor the accords. We have been concerned with getting some kind of guarantee, and that is why we insisted that the accords be signed under the auspices of the UN Security Council. That way it will not just be a South African or an Angolan problem if South Africa does not honor the agreement, but a matter for the UN.

But things seem to be changing a bit. The UNTAG contingent is being reduced, an alteration in resolution 435. If we continue to make these changes in the resolution, we may one day arrive at the point where there will be no implementation of 435. This is one of our fears.

We were forced to go from concession to concession throughout the entire process. We believe that 435 should not be altered and that the obligations that were assumed by the various parties should be complied with. We have faith that the process will develop in a normal manner. The first contingent of Cuban troops began its withdrawal in mid-January, as did the movement of some of the Cuban troops from southern to northern Angola.

Getting back to the question of South Africa, we know that in Namibia, a number of maneuvers are taking place which are contrary to both the spirit and the letter of the accords, changing the correlation of forces in Namibia. This naturally creates many difficulties during the implementation of resolution 435, and also provides for the destabilization of Namibia just after independence. There also seem to be some moves with respect to the electoral process, with South Africa introducing some elements from outside of Namibia so that they can vote. The international community—above all the Security Council as guarantor of the accords—has to be vigilant to see that there are no alterations in the implementation of 435.

Africa Report: Does your government feel that your security concerns have been adequately addressed in the accords?

Van-Dunem: Any agreement of this type carries risks. As I said before, we made a giant effort to create a situation which would provide conditions for Namibia to attain independence. South African troops finally pulled out of Angola. According to

resolution 435, they will also pull out of Namibia, meaning that the possibility of South African invasion of Angola becomes more remote. They would either have to pass through Namibia or come by sea. So we feel that Namibian independence will contribute to eliminating some of the external factors which have led to these problems.

That will leave only the internal aspects, and our government has already widely disseminated the forms of solution that we think are appropriate for the internal problem—the policy of clemency and national harmonization, the reintegration into Angolan society of all who have agreed to lay down their arms. This has been substantiated in the amnesty law which was recently passed.

At a certain stage in the negotiations, the American administration said that when Angola presented a calendar for Cuban withdrawal acceptable to all the parties, then the U.S. would begin a different type of relationship with Angola, recognizing Angola diplomatically, ending assistance to Unita. We attained an acceptable calendar and signed a global accord, but to our surprise the American administration publicly affirms that it will continue support to Unita and the destabilization of Angola. We are continuing with measures to explain the noble objectives of the Angolan people, and we continue to believe that Angola's problems should be solved internally.

In the Alvor accords in 1974, the liberation movements came together with Portugal and formed a transitional government which was to have led to elections in Angola. The transitional government only functioned for a short while, because shortly after that, the FNLA, acting under the auspices of the CIA, began to attack the MPLA bases. Unita also withdrew from the transitional government and took up arms against the MPLA. On November 11, in agreement with the Alvor accords, the MPLA assumed its responsibilities and proclaimed Angola's independence. At that time, Unita, together with South African forces, was fighting about 200 kilometers south of Luanda. To the north, the FNLA, with regular Zairian troops, was also fighting in a range of 19-20 kilometers from Luanda.

Then there was the proclamation of a clemency policy by the late president, Agostinho Neto. The forces which formerly were part of the FNLA are at this moment reintegrated into society, political and military leaders. One of my directors was the FNLA's prime minister in the transitional government. Some of the higher level FNLA officers are today members of the command in the Angolan armed forces.

Unita for its part intensified its aggression against our country, together with South Africa. Using the banner of anti-communism, Unita managed to convince the American authorities that Angola was a sort of satellite state, so that the Americans gave them support, allowing them to kill our men, women, and children, and to destroy economic targets. This policy has continued up to today. There is nothing left for Unita to do but lay down its arms and return to Angolan society and help the same people that for many years they were killing reconstruct the country.

We don't understand what type of policy of reconciliation

the State Department is talking about. They say we need to negotiate, to reconcile, to hold free elections. They are telling us to negotiate with the murderers of our own people—what can we negotiate with them? In fact, the Angolan people are too generous to say to people who have raped, killed, and stolen that they will regard them as prodigal sons and call to them to return home to work together.

We are creating all the conditions for this policy to be materialized. And the American administration, which forced us to go from concession to concession, starting with linkage, comes back with another linkage, after a tremendous effort which was waged under its own mediation. Now they say first you have to reconcile, then we can talk. So then we pose the question: What really are the interests and objectives of the American administration? It would be better if they would clearly put them on the table. We arrive at a certain stage and then the administration comes again with new conditions. They should leave us to resolve our internal problems.

Africa Report: Do you believe South Africa has stopped its support to Unita? Has the U.S. government made it a condition on your government to reconcile with Unita or no recognition?

Van-Dunem: South Africa continues to provide logistical support to Unita. They are going to leave all their equipment and arms in Angola with Unita, and we are convinced that they will continue to give support in whatever fashion they

can. Naturally they won't be able to have their own troops in place because then they will have to violate Namibian territory. As they themselves have said, they are Unita's allies and we don't see how they will be able to stop giving them support.

With respect to the United States, we think it is incongruous that it continues to support the destabilization of Angola. I personally think it is a mistake, but I believe that the good sense of the new American administration will prevail and provide for an adequate solution. We already received a message that first we should reconcile before we can proceed to recognition.

The U.S. is our main trading partner. With respect to Angolan exports to the U.S. and Angolan imports from the U.S., Angola can be classified in the third and fourth positions in Africa respectively, and there are tremendous possibilities for cooperation between the two countries, not just in the field of oil, but in diamonds, transportation, agriculture, fisheries, and so forth. We find it strange that the American administration is betting on the destabilization of one of the most important African countries economically. Angola could be the next largest economic power after South Africa.

Going a bit further, I believe that the understanding at which the U.S. and the Soviet Union are arriving pulls the ground out from under this philosophy that the U.S. is practicing. Angola should be given an opportunity to solve its internal problems and any external help should not have the character of an imposition.

Africa Report: How will an internal resolution come about, because it doesn't seem that Savimbi will give up, despite your amnesty offer?

“WE ATTAINED AN ACCEPTABLE CALENDAR AND SIGNED A GLOBAL ACCORD, BUT TO OUR SURPRISE THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION PUBLICLY AFFIRMS THAT IT WILL CONTINUE SUPPORT TO UNITA AND THE DESTABILIZATION OF ANGOLA.”

Van-Dunem: Savimbi of his own volition will never give up. His interests are not in reconciliation, but in the taking over of power. And reconciliation would only be an intermediate step to that. It is unfortunate that Savimbi's politics are not known to the American administration. The State Department's position on Mozambique was the same as its position on Angola until the State Department's Gersony report about the atrocities that Renamo is committing. The American administration needs to know that the real policy of Unita is one of destruction and ambition.

At times, one has the impression that just as the State Department says, Savimbi is the uncontested leader of Unita. But he retains his leadership of Unita through a policy of terror. How many close collaborators of Savimbi were killed? How much of the population and other elements of Unita were decimated? Obviously Savimbi can only survive in this type of climate.

We waged a struggle for our independence and Savimbi did not take part in these efforts. On the contrary, he was on the side of the Portuguese and then the South Africans against the Angolan people. Will he be able today to defend the interests of the Angolan people after making them martyrs all this time? Savimbi is an excellent public relations man, he speaks well, but what is his true nature? When he says he is part of the anti-communist struggle, that really means gallons and gallons of blood of Angolans who were killed. What type of reconciliation can be done with this person? How can we bring Savimbi in without his instruments of terror and put him together with the population who has been the target of his aim to liquidate them?

Africa Report: What then is the solution to this problem? Reconciliation with Unita, but without Savimbi?

Van-Dunem: As Savimbi is the spiritual father of the hideous crimes against our people, at this moment he cannot be encompassed within the policy of clemency. Maybe perhaps after some years, but we cannot find any justification before our people to explain why we would include Savimbi at this point. We can bring in his other companions even from Unita's leadership, because a large part of the atrocities that were committed by Unita were through the force of terror. Many of his closest collaborators were purely and simply physically eliminated. Those who opposed Savimbi's policy paid with their heads.

We are talking about human lives and we know that Americans are sensitive to the question of human rights. Why then do they remain indifferent in the face of the murder of tens of thousands of people? We are continuing to try and find solutions to the problem, but we insist that the solution has to be internal. In no way can external conditions be imposed. We appreciate all types of external support for the solution of our internal problems, but this type of support cannot go against the interests of our own people. Otherwise, we will continue the struggle.

Africa Report: So the war with Unita will continue for some time?

Van-Dunem: We think that the continuing application of the policy of clemency and harmonization will contribute to some Unita members reflecting and laying down their arms to join us. In the first phase, the movement to come back was rather weak, especially due to Unita counter-propaganda saying there was a trick, that those who came back would be killed. As members of Unita begin to verify that this is not true, they will come. They are already coming. In the case of those peas-

ants and workers who were kidnapped, then forced to take up arms by Unita to kill their own people, what would be the political or ideological interest in their continuing with Unita? They want peace, they want to be able to go back to their villages, their land. So these type of people can come. Savimbi doesn't come back because he has his own interests.

We are convinced that the peasants who form almost the totality of Unita's military units will no longer find any reason to continue to kill their own mothers, fathers, and children. And for those who do continue, they will meet with the proper reply. The Angolan people know how to find a solution to their own problems. Those who are living in the interior will know how to receive their own brothers and sons. They have already begun to take them back. So the military movement will slowly, gradually, by degrees diminish.

We don't have enough people to carry out our own development, so there is no reason for us to reject sons of Angola, although they erred for quite some time. Conditions will be created for their dignified reintegration into Angolan society, just as it was for the former members of the FNLA.

Africa Report: Does the timetable for withdrawal of Cuban troops give your forces enough time to take over?

Van-Dunem: The Cuban forces were invited to our country to help fight the South African and Zairian invasions, and remained in our country merely as a dissuading factor. They did not clash with the South African forces until July 1988. We were honoring our obligations with respect to the positions being maintained by the Cuban forces in our country, which were not to have advanced beyond the 15th parallel.

We could have gone together to kick out the South African troops from the southern part of Angola. I spoke about some of the concessions we were forced to accept—this is one that cost us quite dearly. The Cuban troops only entered into battle at Cuito Cuanavale when the South African troops insisted on breaking the circle there.

Savimbi knows that the Cubans didn't participate in fighting against his forces. For propaganda purposes, he would say anything, especially in the U.S. But the U.S. also has proof that the Cuban troops were not participating in the fighting. This strengthens our opinion that our problems should be resolved internally. Even with the presence of the Cuban forces in our country all this time, they were never used for that objective. If Unita puts down its arms, there will no longer be war.

The calendar which was approved was not our own initial proposal, but the result of negotiations. We think that we will be able to restructure and reposition our own forces in the field. I would like to believe that the war will end. We are waging a great effort for this to happen.

Africa Report: Do you expect a change in American policy with the Bush administration?

Van-Dunem: I would take up Jesse Jackson's slogan: "Keep hope alive!" Perhaps that sums up everything we can say. We would like to believe that in the midst of this process of relaxation of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the United States will reformulate its policy with respect to Africa. But until we see some practical aspects, our own experience has shown us the contrary. Perhaps it will be [Secretary of State] Baker's place to define what the future U.S. policy will be. We would like to believe that it will be a policy which will defend the interests of the African peoples, not other interests which are to their detriment. Yes, we believe that it is possible for the United States to change! ○



NAMIBIA

THE TRANSITION TIMETABLE

By JOHN A. EVENSON

UN Security Council Resolution 435 contains many loopholes which could enable South Africa to undermine the free and fair election process in Namibia. The international community must ensure that the aims of the independence plan are not subverted and that the UN transition team fulfills its mandate unimpeded.

"If you want to kill the bull, it is easier if you bring the bull into the kraal."

—Namibian proverb

What many thought was impossible is now beginning to take place. On April 1, 1989, a peace-keeping force from

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the United Nations flew into Namibia and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435, the Western-composed/UN-adopted independence plan for the trust territory known as South West Africa, began.

"435" has been the numerical shorthand for Namibian independence from the Republic of South

Africa since it was adopted by the Security Council in 1978. The plan was accepted by the South West Africa People's Organization (Swapo), and for years, the cry "435 Now!" was heard in the often-banned meetings of Namibia's largest liberation movement. Even churches in the territory, proudly claiming to represent more than 75 percent of

Back in the Republic, the \$1 million a day cost of defending 'Suidwes' against Swapo's small army was no longer economically justifiable"



John Liebenberg/NCCT

its 1.5 million people, prayed and lobbied for the implementation of 435.

In 1978, if only for diplomatic consumption, the South Africans announced that they also accepted 435. But when it came to implementation, Pretoria was intransigent. While never officially repudiating the plan, 435 became the object of continued scorn. How could the UN be trusted with their "Suidwes-Afrika?"

Chief among the objections was the problem of UN "impartiality." The UN General Assembly had accorded Swapo "sole and authentic" representative status in 1976, and therefore, in Pretoria's eyes, the UN was already biased. Yet the Security Council had never afforded Swapo "sole" status, and under 435, Swapo would be treated no differently than the myriad of smaller parties.

Nevertheless, 435 was still flawed from the South African point of view. Its leaders admitted that Swapo would win any unrigged election, meaning that the "Marxist" Swapo would be in charge of the country, and that the "communist onslaught" had been victorious. For P.W. Botha and his National Party, this might provoke an ultra-right backlash and encourage open rebellion among the Republic's black majority.

While Pretoria prevaricated, in 1982, the U.S. gave South Africa another reason for not leaving Namibia—the presence of Cuban troops supporting the Angolan government. "Linkage" became the codeword. Pretoria did not have to respond to the demands of the UN for implementation of 435 until the Cuban troops had left Angola. By increasing its military incursions into the former Portuguese colony, Pretoria ensured a protracted deadlock.

Then came the events of 1988, and the cumulative effects of the arms embargo and economic sanc-

tions. With the dogged diplomatic initiatives of Chester Crocker once again underway, South Africa found itself deep inside Angola with an unexpected military reversal. In the midst of a campaign alongside Jonas Savimbi's Unita guerrillas, the South African Defence Force (SADF) suddenly found itself unable to accomplish its stated goal, the capture of the key Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale. SADF generals were forced to admit some of their losses—more than 50 white soldiers—not to mention the hundreds of black troops whose deaths were reported by SADF deserters.

White opinion in the Republic, including the Dutch Reformed Church, was immediate. "Why," it was asked, "are we losing our boys in Angola?" In July, the final straw came when a large number of South African troops were suddenly surrounded deep inside Angola by a combined force of Cubans and Angolans. To have fought would have been a costly exercise, with precious white lives lost.

The Cubans and Angolans did not attack, but instead demanded that the hitherto unproductive negotiations take a new turn. This act of statesmanship led to the December 22 signing of a tripartite agreement setting out the conditions for Cuban withdrawal from Angola and South African withdrawal from Namibia. The impossible seemed now to be probable. On January 16, the Security Council announced that on April 1, 1989, the long-awaited implementation of 435 would begin.

To many observers, South Africa's willingness to quit Namibia was quite unexpected. But beneath Pretoria's bravado, the South African economy was suffering a downturn and credit squeeze, especially as a result of American sanctions. Despite loopholes, the arms embargo had severely crippled the hitherto invincible SADF, so that now the Angolans and Cubans were both better equipped and more eager to engage in combat. In past winters, the South African Air Force (SAAF) would have bombed the Angolan

positions and protected Unita against the government forces. But now, the Angolans had superior radar and planes. No longer could the SAAF fly into Angola with impunity.

Meanwhile, back in the Republic, the \$1 million a day cost of defending "Suidwes" against Swapo's small army was no longer economically justifiable. With shrinking gold reserves due to reduced foreign investment and the need to pay or roll over large overseas bank loans in the next two years, the threat of further sanctions from Europe and Asia concentrated the minds of Botha's cabinet. Given all these military, diplomatic, and financial factors, Pretoria decided to cut its losses.

One might have expected a spirit of jubilation among the leaders of Namibia's liberation movement and the churches. Instead, deep-seated skepticism about South Africa's true intentions were expressed by both leaders and people in the street. The most frequently heard comment inside Namibia was, "I'll believe it when I see the last SADF trooper roll out of our country on his way to Cape Town."

And as the implementation of 435 came closer, the reversal of expectations was striking. Part of the reason for this change in perception was that more Namibians are now aware of the loopholes contained in 435 that will provide South Africa with many opportunities to undermine the "free and fair" election process. Already in 1978, Swapo President Sam Nujoma had described the Western plan as containing "language so vague and unavoidably ambiguous that it is subject to different and unavoidably conflicting interpretation."

Swapo agreed to 435 in 1978 only because it was assured by the Western nations on the Security Council that it would bring Namibia its independence within months, not years.

In accepting 435, Swapo gave in to the West's compromise over the more definitive Security Council resolution 385 of 1976. When South

Africa refused to leave Namibia following the adoption of 385, there was tremendous pressure in the General Assembly to pass mandatory comprehensive sanctions against Pretoria. Although they eventually conceded a mandatory arms embargo, the five Western nations moved quickly to protect their economic interests, proposing in effect that 435 would obtain Pretoria's approval without the need for sanctions.

Eleven years ago, Namibian independence was to be a touchstone of the integrity of the UN, a shining example of how the primacy of international law and reason could triumph over the selfishness of individual states. The last major remnant of European colonialism in Africa, save for apartheid itself, was to be put to death.

Accordingly, resolution 435 maintained many of the basic goals of the previous document. For example, the stated purpose of 435 is "to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations." But unlike 385, the entire transition procedure will now take place with Pretoria holding onto Namibia's only deepwater port, Walvis Bay, and still in administrative control of the territory.

After April 1, roughly 13,000 white South African and 24,000 black colonial civil servants will continue to govern the day-to-day activities of "Suidwes" from their offices in Windhoek and outlying towns. A yet undetermined number of South African police, presently serving in units of the security branch and the South West Africa Police, will remain in charge of the maintenance of law and order.

Apartheid-based ethnic administrations set up by South Africa will also remain in place. Under 385, all these would have been dismantled and the UN itself would have administered the country. Thus with 435, South Africa will retain much of its illegal control during the transition to independence.

To fulfill the requirements of 435, the Security Council directed the

UN secretary-general to appoint a special representative whose "central task will be to make sure that conditions are established which will allow free and fair elections and an impartial electoral process." In 1978, a Finnish diplomat, Martti Ahtisaari, then UN Commissioner for Namibia, was appointed by Kurt Waldheim to be this special representative, and his appointment has been continued by Perez de Cuellar. Ahtisaari has long experience in Namibian matters and should be able to carry out his duties with wisdom and integrity.

The South African counterpart to Ahtisaari is its colonial administrator in Namibia, Louis Pienaar. Confusingly, the South African government has also appointed a special envoy to Namibia, Willem Retief, presently Pretoria's ambassador to West Germany, to liaise between South Africa's appointed government in the territory, the administrator-general, and Ahtisaari.

On behalf of the secretary-general, Ahtisaari is charged to "certify, satisfy himself, guarantee, direct, supervise, and control" a complex number of items and procedures so that the conduct of the electoral process, the elections themselves, and the certification of the results are seen as fair and appropriate.

He must certify the restriction to base, withdrawal, demobilization, and disarming of thousands of South African armed and led soldiers, commandos, home guards, air force, and counter-insurgency units.

Ahtisaari must also approve the release of political prisoners and detainees from both South Africa and Swapo, ensure the repeal of discriminatory laws and restrictive legislation in the territory, and approve new legislation that describes the registration of voters and procedures for the election of a constituent assembly that will write a constitution for the new nation. Already imposed by 435 upon that constituent assembly are a number of constitutional principles to guarantee a multiparty parliamentary system and the protection of private property. The constitution must be

agreed by a two-thirds majority.

Crucially, Ahtisaari must "certify the suitability" of the South African-led police force in Namibia to keep law and order during the transition period. He must also ensure that the returning refugees, probably numbering more than 60,000, are treated equitably. He will monitor the campaign period, the registration of voters, and finally, the actual elections, due to occur at 400 polling places scattered throughout the 317,827 square mile territory.

Finally, Ahtisaari will certify the proper conduct of the elections and will remain with at least a portion of the UNTAG forces until a new government is in place, possibly by April 1, 1990.

To accomplish this major and complex task in the presence of the South Africans, Ahtisaari will command a force of civilian and military personnel known as the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). Components of this force will staff the 50-plus UN offices scattered throughout the territory, monitor the actions of South Africa's police at major police stations, monitor the SADF withdrawal and the demobilization of all other South African-led military and paramilitary forces, and monitor the election process.

In 1978, UN military experts said that they could accomplish their peace-keeping role during the transition period with a military component of 7,500 troops. Another 3,000 civilians were seen as necessary to assist Ahtisaari in the many non-military tasks necessary to ensure "free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations."

In 1989, however, the permanent members of the Security Council, led by the United States but with the compliance of the Soviet Union, began insisting that the cost of maintaining the original UNTAG military component was too high. They demanded, in words that bordered on diplomatic blackmail, that the secretary-general reduce the number of UNTAG troops, lest the costs "jeopardize the prospects for other

peace-keeping operations in the future."

In 1978, the South African Defence Force in the territory was about 60,000-strong, the South African police force about 3,000, and the number of armed Angolan Unita guerrillas inside Namibia was less than 1,000. Now in 1989, South Africa's troop contingent in the territory is both much larger and better equipped. In addition, there are now 30,000 Namibians (conscripts and volunteers) in the South African-led "South West Africa Territory Force" (SWATF). The number of South African police has increased to over 8,500 and a new unit—the brutal counter-insurgency group, "Koevoet"—has at least 3,000 members, claiming to be ordinary policemen.

The permanent members argued that since there is already a monitoring force watching the border between Angola and Namibia as a result of the December 22 tripartite agreement, there was no need for the original seven infantry battalions. They conveniently ignored the fact that the established monitoring force has been unable to function in northeast Namibia, where South Africa and Unita control the Angolan border.

In this region, known as Kavango and Caprivi, more than 2,500 armed Unita troops move at will, intimidating the Namibian populace. There are at least two major Unita bases in the Kavango-Caprivi area, and as yet no declared provision authorizing the UNTAG forces to monitor the Angolan rebels' withdrawal or confinement to base. The South Africans have moved thousands of Angolan refugees tied to Unita into northeast Namibia. There are realistic fears that Pretoria will grant these Angolans, both armed combatants and civilians, identification papers to skew the election results.

Not surprisingly, the South Africans expressed their pleasure at the reduction in UNTAG forces, whereas Swapo and the Namibian churches vehemently opposed it. In two urgent appeals to the secretary-general, Namibia's bishops told of

Appropriate Timing of Transition to Independence for Namibia in Accordance with Security Council Resolutions 435 (1978) and 629 (1989)

*(All dates and events are based upon the Annex to the
Settlement Proposal - S/12636 - of 10 April 1978)*

Mid-February		Core UNTAG staff arrive in Namibia to prepare for the establishment of the mission.
1 April	Formal cessation of hostilities. Restriction to base of Swapo and South African forces and release of political prisoners and detainees begins. Repeal of discriminatory and restrictive laws begins.	The Special Representative of the SG and most UNTAG civilian, police, and military personnel arrive between 1 April and mid-May, are deployed to 50+ locations in the territory and assume duties in accordance with phasing and deployment plans.
By mid-May	Refugees begin return to Namibia. General rules for elections issued. Reduction of SA forces to 12,000. Repeal of discriminatory and restrictive laws completed.	UNHCR assists in return of refugees. UNTAG continues organizational and monitoring activities.
By early June	Reduction of SA forces to 8,000. Release of political prisoners/detainees completed.	All UNTAG activities continue.
By 1 July	Further force reductions to 1,500 SA troops. Military installations on northern border under UN supervision or deactivated.	All UNTAG activities continue.
Approx. 1 July	Official start of electoral campaign. Voter registration begins.	Second major contingent of civilian UNTAG staff arrives to support monitoring of electoral process.
Early October (approx.)	Major part of electoral poll watchers arrive, deployed to UN centers for assignment to designated polling stations.	(Poll watchers are approx. 800 professional election personnel coming from various member states).
1-8 November (approx.)	Elections to Constituent Assembly which is to draw up and adopt constitution.	UNTAG supervises elections, tabulation, and publication of voting results, to the SRSR, who then certifies the results.
By mid-November	Completion of withdrawal of remaining 1,500 SA troops. Closure of all bases. Convening of Constituent Assembly.	UNTAG activities continue. Many staff expected to depart at this stage.
Date unspecified	Conclusion of Constituent Assembly. Steps necessary prior to installation of new government.	UNTAG activities continue, with more staff departing.
Date unspecified	INDEPENDENCE	

arms being cached at strategic places in the territory by "forces unfriendly to Namibian independence" and reported that members of Koevoet were being integrated surreptitiously into the regular police force.

If meeting the original UNTAG troop size was merely a problem of finance, the bishops said consideration should be given to "the terribly high price already paid by Namibians in their struggle for freedom and to the inestimable cost that would be paid should one life be lost because there were not enough members of UNTAG to monitor and control the already known excesses of those disposed toward the South African system."

Backed by the Non-Aligned Movement and the OAU, most non-permanent members lobbied for the full UNTAG force. But in the end, Perez de Cuellar outlined a compromise plan that provided three beefed-up armed infantry battalions instead of the seven originally required, keeping the number of troops initially sent to Namibia at 4,650. With a nod to Swapo and Namibia's bishops, he provided a slightly larger civilian police component, from 350 to 500, and declared that UNTAG would demobilize the thugs of Koevoet.

On February 16, the Security Council adopted the scaled-down peace-keeping plan, at a cost of \$416 million, some 57 percent of which will be borne by its permanent members—the U.S., Soviet Union, China, France, and Britain—the largest UN peace-keeping mission since the Congo. However, despite the fact that the accords name the five permanent Council members as their guarantor, most seasoned observers both inside and outside Namibia expect the implementation process to be subverted by South Africa during the transition.

And Pretoria has already begun to do so. Knowing that the UN wants to dismantle Koevoet, the South African head of police in Namibia, Gen. Gouws, announced on February 1 that almost one-half the police

he has assigned to enforce "law and order" during the election period are members of Koevoet. Gouws said that the 3,000 Koevoet members were already integrated into the civilian police force, and that to give them a police role during the transition would keep them employed and prevent them from taking up arms against Swapo.

Pretoria's administrator-general, Louis Pienaar, announced in February that the 30,000 members of SWATF would continue to be paid by the government, even if they were disbanded by UNTAG. Also, Pienaar said that the laws he will announce governing the election process would aim to "curb intimidation" by banning from the election any person or organization "found guilty of violence or intimidation." To the untrained eye, this seems perfectly correct, but the wording is South Africa's long-standing euphemism for Swapo.

Knowing that SWATF would be disbanded, Pienaar went ahead in January and conscripted 3,000 young Namibians, sending them off to Pretoria's training camps. News from the churches indicates that the SWATF troopers are being indoctrinated in the "evils" of 435, and then sent out into the villages, giving meal, meat, and sweets to the people with the exhortation, "Don't vote for Swapo!" All this is funded by Pretoria, a full five months before the official four-month campaign period is to begin.

When one looks at the infrastructure built by South Africa in Namibia, with laws, education, commerce, and a centralized colonial administration all placed on an apartheid foundation, one can see the enormity of the task facing the special representative if the foundation of democracy—"free and fair" elections—is to occur. Under 435, South Africa, not the UN, will determine the voting system, register the voters, print the ballots and tally them. Ahtisaari and his UNTAG will have to certify that the process is free and fair, but how far will he allow the South Africans to go before he demands a

stop to their antics? And when he makes such demands, will the Security Council back him and bring pressure on Pretoria?

Looking at only one small part of 435—the actual balloting procedure—is instructive. There will be 400 polling places dotted around the immense territory. At each polling site, South Africa will officiate, certifying that the person is registered, handing him the ballot, taking the ballot, and placing it in a place ready for counting. Ahtisaari has planned for two UN civilian monitors at each site. If one of them is ill, then the balloting will go on. But what if the second UN staffer is called away, either by nature or to eat or rest? Who watches the ballot box?

South Africa continues to control the borders of Namibia during the transition. Will Pretoria permit bona fide observers from churches and human rights organizations abroad to enter the country to assist the small UN team? Will Pretoria permit journalists to watch the events of transition, even those whom it has barred from entry in the past? Will Ahtisaari ensure that overseas monitors, invited by the churches or other non-governmental agencies, are permitted to come to help their Namibian partners?

Ahtisaari must "certify the suitability" of the South West Africa Police to keep law and order. Most of its duties in the past have involved intimidation and the arrest without trial of Namibia's citizenry. Many have also been involved in numerous documented cases of beatings, torture, and murder of Namibians opposed to South African occupation. How will Ahtisaari handle the almost certain intimidation that will come from the "certified" police?

Is it any wonder that many Namibians are afraid that 435 will lead to a possible Congo debacle rather than a Lancaster House success? South Africa has tried to kill 435 for ten years in the diplomatic corridors of the world. It could be that Pretoria has decided that this time the bull can be more easily killed inside the kraal. ○

tracked oil deliveries to South Africa and issued detailed reports documenting ships, registry, tonnage of oil carried, port(s) of embarkation, and date of arrival in South Africa. This information has been made available to lobbying organizations and to the press. Jaap Woldendorp, head of SRB, estimates that their investigations can account for 55-60 percent of the oil that reaches South Africa.

This information has also been supplied to the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, which did little with it until 1986 when the Inter-governmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa was formed, largely at the behest of Kuwait, an oil producer whose oil never shows up in South Africa. In November 1987, the Group issued an official report echoing SRB's findings. A follow-up was issued a year later.

What the reports showed was a steady flow of oil from the Gulf states to South Africa. But while privately urging countries to try to prevent their oil from reaching South Africa, the UN has refrained from public criticism or anything that might embarrass the nations that have been identified as suppliers.

"The oil situation from 1979 to 1982 was rather desperate for South Africa," Woldendorp said. "They were buying oil all over the place. You had a lot of different sources. Oil came from trans-shipments from Rotterdam, the Netherlands Antilles, and Singapore. And of course also from the Persian Gulf area and Brunei. After that, South Africa managed to restructure its oil procurement apparatus and if you compare 1984 with 1979, the number of companies involved is much smaller and the number of countries from which the oil originates is much smaller."

Those years marked an increasing reliance on a single oil supplier—Saudi Arabia. One SRB report concluded that there has been "a steady flow of crude oil from Saudi Arabia to South Africa since 1979."

From January 1979 through August 1987, SRB documented at least 76 crude oil deliveries totalling 18 million tons from Saudi Arabia to South Africa. There were also 53 deliveries from the United Arab Emirates, 52 from Oman, and 36 from Iran. The other major supplier was Brunei, from which SRB documented 57 shipments over the same period. The actual number of shipments from these countries is substantially larger.

SRB estimated conservatively that prior to 1987, 25 percent of South Africa's imports originated in Saudi Arabia. "I would say that the United Arab Emirates and Oman account for a bit less, and Iran is about 5 percent. The other main supplier is Brunei at about 6 percent," Woldendorp said. Together, deliveries from these countries account for 60 percent of South Africa's oil needs.

In the 1988 report, covering the years 1985 through the beginning of 1987, however, the bulk of the oil seems to be flowing from the U.A.E, with Brunei and Saudi Arabia only mentioned a few times. Woldendorp doesn't believe that necessarily means that the Saudis have stopped supplying oil, rather that they have done a better job covering their tracks. "That other 40 percent that we don't find is likely to be Saudi oil," he said.

The Saudis won't discuss the charges, preferring to issue a standard statement: "Saudi Arabia boycotts South Africa economically, including the supply of oil, and breaches of these regulations are punishable...Any deviation or manipulation of any oil shipments after it leaves Saudi Arabia by any other party is subject to a penalty and punitive action. We stand firm with our brothers in Africa on this issue."

But people who know the inner workings of the Saudi oil business think otherwise. Though it may not be official government policy to sell oil to South Africa, individual members of the Saudi royal family have large quantities of oil under their personal control. The oil is a kind of allowance, and selling to South

Africa is a perfect way to derive top dollar for a tanker of crude.

The SRB estimates that South Africa's premium is sixty cents to \$8 for every barrel of oil it imports. The total bill to South Africa comes to around \$2.3 billion per year above the market price of the oil, and between 1979 and January 1988, South Africa paid about \$25 billion in excess charges to thwart the oil embargo. "A lot of people have to eat from that," Woldendorp said, "the trading companies, the shipping companies, and there are consistent rumors, very difficult to substantiate, that people within the oil exporting countries, especially government people, are also pocketing part of this."

Another incentive to export to South Africa is that the oil is off the books. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have come under fire for violating OPEC quotas in the past. Since exports to South Africa are unofficial, it is a convenient place to dump oil in excess of the quotas.

But the Saudi violations of the oil embargo may be even more calculated. The Saudis have long been supportive of a number of governments and right-wing causes championed by the U.S. government. In the summer of 1987, an Arab-American businessman named Sam Bamieh appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Africa subcommittee. Looking to uncover some African angles in the Iran-Contra affair, the committee asked Bamieh what he knew about Saudi Arabian funding of Unita in Angola.

Bamieh, who had extensive business connections with the Saudi government, as well as a personal relationship with King Fahd, testified that a deal had been struck between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in 1982 when Saudi Arabia received AWACs planes from the U.S. The Saudis, he said, had agreed to supply arms to Unita, the anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and the Contras in exchange for greater Saudi control of the AWACs. Then, almost in passing, he said that the deal also included one more element: Saudi oil to

South Africa.

Nothing much came from Bamieh's allegations. The Iran-Contra committee interviewed him but did not include his testimony, or anything to do with the Africa connection for that matter, in its final report. The Saudis never answered the allegations, choosing instead to attack Bamieh's personal credibility. A group of congressional aides who has looked into the allegations say that it hasn't found anyone who can corroborate Bamieh's story—but it can't find any evidence that contradicts him either.

Oil to South Africa, like arms to the Contras, pleased some powerful friends in Washington. Bamieh testified that Saudi Arabia was interested in neutralizing the influence of the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S., as well as in gaining more control over the AWACs. In that way, the AWACs deal was a double coup: They triumphed over the Israel lobby, which opposed the sale, and began a close relationship with the CIA and NSC people that have become known during the Iran-Contra affair.

All oil producers pay at least lip service to the embargo. But a large portion of the oil shipping business is the kind of rogue operation that attracts adventurers, mercenaries, and the types of people who might enjoy the challenges of violating the embargo. This makes it difficult to monitor the deliveries and collect hard proof that one nation or another may be cooperating with South Africa.

Many of the ships that dock in South Africa are rustbuckets on their last runs before being scrapped. Others might be Panamanian or Liberian-registered tankers owned by holding companies of one nationality and leased to other companies of different nationalities. In addition, shipments of oil are often swapped or sold en route. And papers and bills of lading can be easily forged or doctored.

Much of the oil that reaches South Africa arrives in combi ships that are designed to carry oil and coal. South Africa exports much of

its coal to Taiwan, and a ship returning to South Africa will often try to maximize its profits by picking up a load of oil in Brunei on the way. These deliveries are also difficult to document.

In 1987 for the first time, a country made it a crime for its nationals to bring oil to South Africa. During the first half of 1987, Norwegian tankers were thought to account for a quarter of the oil arriving in South Africa. That stopped when on July 20 of that year, it became criminal for any Norwegian to be involved in an oil delivery to South Africa.

But this legislation and the increased attention to oil shipments may only make the parties involved more careful. SRB reports that in 1979, only about one-third of the ships docking at South African ports made an effort to keep their calls a secret. Today more than 90 percent make some attempt to hide their tracks, often with forged documents. In 1987, SRB documented one incident where a tanker from the Persian Gulf docked in the Netherlands, unloaded half of its cargo, and then unloaded the other half in Germany. But on its way back to the Gulf, it picked up what it had left in the Netherlands and dropped it off in South Africa.

On January 30, 1987, a French supertanker, *Licorne Océane*, took on Iranian oil at Hormuz and set off for South Africa. Though the Liberian-flag ship is owned by the French government-controlled *Compagnie Générale Maritime et Financière*, it had been under the control of a British company, *Seatramp (U.K.) Ltd*, which is half-owned by another French company. The ship received the following instructions from home:

"It is most important that the vessel's name is not displayed at the dis[charge] port...If it is possible the vessel's name must be covered with canvas securely fitted in place on the bow, the stern, and the bridge. The owners' identification on the funnel should also be removed. On leaving the dis[charge] port, there should be nothing on board the vessel

which would indicate where the vessel has actually been. This must include the disposal of all newspapers or magazines or calendars from the port. If any stores are taken, then any packages or documents relating to them which would show where they were purchased must also be disposed of.

We understand that the above requests may seem unusual, but rest assured that it is in the best interests of the vessel and her owners."

The *Licorne Océane* docked at Durban under the name "M 49" to unload her cargo.

Clearly then, the largest part of the burden in ensuring that the embargo succeeds falls on the oil exporters. Though they cannot have absolute control over where their exports end up, they can certainly take steps to insure that the oil they send out is contracted to legitimate purchasers. If the oil then ends up in South Africa, the companies responsible will be easier to track. Kuwait has succeeded in stopping its oil from reaching South Africa. The other Gulf states can do the same.

The UN will also have to take violations of the embargo more seriously and take steps against states that violate it. The explanation that they do not want to criticize member-states is a blatant lie. The UN has never hesitated to criticize the U.S., Great Britain, or Israel on any evidence of collusion with Pretoria.

Some UN insiders feel that the sanctions movement has not been inspired primarily by a desire to attack apartheid. "Saudi Arabia has gotten away with it until now, because the real purpose of bringing up embargos in the UN has been to embarrass the West," said a high-ranking UN official. But, he added hopefully, "That is starting to change."

The last two reports from the Intergovernmental Group are a step in the right direction. At least the UN has acknowledged where South Africa's most crucial outside support is coming from. What happens next will have much to do with how long apartheid will survive. ○



FORTRESS SOUTH AFRICA

By MICHAEL MAREN

Despite a voluntary international oil embargo, South Africa has been able to find exporters, companies, and shippers willing to sell it petroleum, the one resource for which it must have a dependable external supply. Better monitoring of violations by the UN and the sanctions movement could have an impact on the South African economy's most vulnerable sector.

One of the frustrating ironies of the sanctions movement is that there is probably no country in the world better equipped to withstand prolonged economic isolation than South Africa. Mineral-rich and agriculturally prosperous, the country is a virtual fortress. Its near-monopoly on some strategic minerals, including diamonds, gold, and platinum, assures an uninterrupted flow of exports, even to some of the nations that most vocally oppose its government. At the same time, there are few raw materials that South Africa needs to import, and only one resource for which it absolutely must have a dependable external supply—oil.

The South Africans have gone to extraordinary lengths to ensure that there is oil. In the late 1960s, the government created SASOL to develop coal liquefaction technology, allowing it to turn South Africa's cheap and abundant coal reserves into petroleum. SASOL now contributes about one-fourth of the country's petroleum requirements, but at a cost of about \$75 a barrel. And SASOL plants produce gasoline

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mainly for consumer use. Nearly all the diesel fuel that the military and transport sectors run on is imported.

The South Africans have used coal wherever possible, generating electricity, cooking, or heating water, in order to conserve on petroleum. But conservation has been pressed to its absolute limits. There is virtually no margin left for replacing oil with coal. SASOL is now experimenting with technologies to convert natural gas to motor fuel, but without much success.

In 1969, Pretoria launched an accelerated program to stockpile a strategic oil reserve. Abandoned gold and diamond mines were turned into vast underground oil storage facilities and a complicated network of pipelines was set up to move oil to and from these reserves. South Africa has perpetuated a strategic lie that it has an ample supply of fuel buried beneath the ground. Though the actual size of the stockpile is a closely guarded state secret, South African officials have leaked information putting their reserves at three, six, or 12 years, depending on whom you talk to or which rationing program is deemed feasible at the time.

"That's simply not true," said one expert who has been examining South Africa's oil situation over the past 10 years. A recent unpublished report says that South African reserves could at best last no more than 250 days. "The country," he concluded, "is hanging by a thread."

But that thread remains unbroken as South Africa, despite the voluntary international oil embargo that was approved by the UN in 1973, has been able to find exporters, companies, and shippers willing to bring oil to its ports, at a rate of about 220,000 barrels a day.

The sanctions strategies being promoted by various anti-apartheid organizations have concentrated on stopping investment in South Africa and banning South African exports, measures aimed at slowly suffocating the regime. Curiously, they have not spent much time drawing attention to South Africa's oil imports. But oil is the regime's Achilles heel—the one area in which sanctions could be effective. If oil imports were stopped, it would deal a sudden and crushing blow to the nation's economy and force the regime to bargain for its life.

Since 1979, the Shipping Research Bureau in Amsterdam has

THABO MBEKI:

SHINING A SPOTLIGHT ON SOUTH AFRICA



Margaret A. Novicki

By MARGARET A. NOVICKI

The African National Congress' new director of international affairs examines the movement's diplomatic and military strategies for the coming year. With international attention focused on the Namibian independence process, the ANC will ensure that the spotlight on apartheid doesn't diminish and action against it, particularly sanctions, is strengthened.

Africa Report: What is the ANC's strategy for 1989 on the diplomatic front?

Mbeki: One of the important things this year is that the implementation of UN resolution 435 on Namibia starts from April and elections to the constituent assembly on November 1 take place in conditions of peace and stability. It is very important that the South African regime not be allowed to destabilize Namibia in order to demonstrate that democratic transformations of the kind visualized for Namibia are not possible and to justify the continuation of the apartheid system. It is an important issue for the ANC and for the people of South Africa.

As one of the important projects of the year, the ANC will be participating in the education of international opinion, mobilization of people, and persuasion of governments to ensure that the purposes which the UN pursued when it agreed to the process of independence for Namibia are realized. There might be some misconception that because Pretoria signed this agreement, there is a change in its political perspectives, that it has demonstrated good will, trustworthiness, willingness to cooperate, and therefore doesn't pose a threat to the process of independence. That is a misconception because the nature of the regime hasn't changed. It didn't

enter into the negotiations because of a transformation in its thinking. Circumstance forced it to enter into this process.

There is an illusion that with regard to Namibia, you are dealing with a different regime from that with which the Mozambicans signed their agreement in 1984. It is very important that the member-states of the UN should discharge their obligations toward Namibia to ensure that it becomes independent in conditions of peace, to let the Namibians decide among themselves what to do without any destabilization or interference from South Africa. It is an important diplomatic struggle to achieve that.

The second important point is that during this year, the South African regime will continue its campaign of repression inside the country. There is a lot of speculation about possible elections for the tricameral parliament. No doubt as in the past, the government will try to make sure that those apartheid elections take place in conditions of "stability" in South Africa, with minimum interference by the democratic movement. Therefore, it would want to have the lid very firmly down—no demonstrations, no strikes, no protests. That means repression.

If you look at the history of this region, the independence of Mozambique and Zimbabwe inspired activity inside South Africa, as did the defeat of the South African army in 1976 in

Angola. And no doubt the regime will know that the process toward Namibia's independence will inspire the South African people.

We want to make it very clearly understood by the rest of the world that whatever might be happening with regard to Angola and Namibia, apartheid remains, as does the need to intensify pressure against it, so it will be important that we get the world to continue to focus on the issue of sanctions. The regime would want to take advantage of the Namibian process to direct focus away from South Africa, saying: Let's resolve the Namibia question and when we're done, we'll come back to the South African question. That is one of the reasons why it would want to create problems in Namibia, trying to sort out what will be presented as internal Namibian conflicts that have nothing to do with South Africa in the hope that as the UN, the OAU, the non-aligned, and everybody is entangled there, they won't have time to look at the South African question.

So this year, the ANC must make sure that the spotlight on the South African issue doesn't diminish in intensity and that action against apartheid, particularly in the form of sanctions, takes place. Hopefully the U.S. Congress will impose new sanctions this year. That will be important in itself, but also with regard to increasing pressure on the major Western powers to follow the U.S. example.

One of the things that increases the possibility of movement in that direction is the change of administration in the U.S. It is our expectation that Bush will not be a replica of Reagan and won't feel this compulsion to defend apartheid, that he will take a more active anti-apartheid stance, which would increase the possibility for further movement on the sanctions issue. The Commonwealth is addressing that same question again this year. On the diplomatic front, it is an important project of the ANC to make sure that the sanctions campaign is not only sustained, but stepped up.

The other important thing is that toward the end of last year, we saw Botha beginning to wander around the African continent, with visits to Zaire and Côte d'Ivoire. That must stop and it is our expectation that major meetings of the OAU will address the issue to ensure the unity of the continent in its opposition to apartheid and in repulsing any effort by the Botha regime to break into Africa. There will be a special session of the UN General Assembly discussing the issue of apartheid later in the year, and it can further consolidate international unity around the illegitimacy of the Botha regime, the need to support the democratic movement, the ANC and others, the need to impose sanctions and ensure the most effective isolation of the apartheid system, and in the aftermath of the Namibia process, to look at the question of how to expedite the process of change with regard to South Africa itself.

Africa Report: How effective is the ANC as an actor in the diplomatic arena? How is your influence felt or not felt among the major Western powers?

Mbeki: The ANC has contact with virtually every government in the world. Even Margaret Thatcher has said publicly that the ANC is central to the solution of the South African issue and the British government will have to deal with the ANC in order to find a solution. The situation has now become irreversible—the recognition and understanding of the ANC's place in the South African struggle, whether people like our policies or don't. Therefore the need for anybody who wants to become a player in that situation to be in contact with the ANC is generally accepted.

I don't know whether Thatcher would meet with us—we haven't asked for any meeting with her and she hasn't offered any. But it is not an issue to meet her. What is at issue between ourselves and the British government is its stand on sanctions. Nothing has been said that would indicate the possibility of a meeting there. But there would be the Commonwealth meetings this year and Thatcher will have to respond directly to that. If the U.S. moves further on sanctions, she will have to respond and so we have to wait and see whether she continues being a militant opponent or whether Britain falls in line with what seems to be general opinion in the European Community.

Africa Report: It is said that the British government is decisive in getting movement from the South African government, and until it adopts sanctions, not much change can be expected.

Mbeki: No. I think the people of South Africa hold the key to the matter. The principal pressure point and agent of change has to be the ANC, the democratic movement, the struggle. The rest of the world is important and Britain occupies a special place partly by virtue of South Africa having been a British colony, and also because of the extent of British economic involvement there and the obvious good relations that exist between Margaret Thatcher and P.W. Botha. So it is true that the British government under Thatcher would presumably have a bit more influence on that situation than the Italian government.

But in the end, what will move the British government to make whatever little contribution it can to the solution of the South African problem will be the intensity of the struggle at home. If it senses that Botha is in control, has managed to impose stability and absence of struggle, it won't move either, whatever instability Thatcher might have. But the South African question is not Zimbabwe. It is not a British colony. The OAU has been preoccupied by the South African issue ever since its foundation and organizations like the OAU have to be at the center of any international participation in terms of the solution to that problem. The UN determined a long time ago that it had a special responsibility toward the people of South Africa, so the international community is engaged and involved, and it would not be correct to suddenly elbow it aside simply because Britain might have special relations.

There is no major power that has exclusive prerogative to intervene on behalf of everybody. Indeed the concept of a contact group would not be acceptable, because if there was a particular role to play by the international community, our position would be that organizations like the OAU and UN should be elected to act on our behalf.

Africa Report: So the determining factor is the intensity of the struggle. What is your strategy inside the country in this regard?

Mbeki: The ANC's basic strategy remains unchanged. The struggle has to be intensified on all fronts—political, military, sanctions, diplomatic. It cannot be exclusively a military struggle. For example, important political struggles emerged toward the end of 1988 on the transformation of sport in South Africa along non-racial lines. That work will continue and is an element in that policy. The military offensive must continue, and necessarily an intensification of the military struggle must mean more losses both on our side and that of the regime. But we are in struggle to defeat the apartheid regime and to ensure the transfer of power to the people and the emergence of a democratic South Africa, and that is what

we must pursue. All the elements of that strategy are very important and relate to one another.

The ANC is not going to be persuaded to abandon armed struggle simply because somebody has decided that it is impermissible to use force to achieve political objectives. There is no such principle. The ANC is not going to bow down to that kind of pressure. We wouldn't want to buy improved relations with the American administration at the cost of the struggle. The struggle has to continue. We've got to liberate ourselves and we've got to use what seem to us as the correct means. So generally, the strategic positions of the ANC are not going to change. We must continuously intensify our offensive on all fronts and if there is pressure against the ANC because more soldiers and police are dying, the ANC can withstand such pressure.

Africa Report: What impact has the state of emergency, increased repression, banning of organizations, had on the ANC's ability to mobilize activity inside South Africa?

Mbeki: The state of emergency—involving arrests and killing of many people and banning of organizations—must have an effect. If the UDF [United Democratic Front] is banned and Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] is not allowed to engage in political struggles, it must have an effect on the capacity to organize people. But the state of emergency has not had any effect on the mood or morale of the people, on their readiness to struggle.

The point was demonstrated very clearly in October when there were local government elections. Even in those areas that had been specifically targeted during the state of emergency for suppression of the democratic movement and restoration of governability—bribing people by building roads, painting houses, trying to attend to unemployment, while arresting anybody connected to the democratic movement—they found that in the elections, there was not even one candidate ready to stand. It is a demonstration of the unchanged mood of the people with regard to opposition to apartheid.

The second important factor is that democratic organizations in the country have sunk very deep roots among the oppressed, so people can be arrested, organizations banned, but that doesn't necessarily mean they have been destroyed. Last June, the ANC called for a three-day stay at home and there was a massive response to our call. Whatever might have happened to the democratic movement in terms of the state of emergency, organization had struck such deep roots that it was possible to carry out the biggest-ever general strike in the country.

Another element is that if it is illegal to conduct peaceful political struggle, then people find non-peaceful forms. They are not going to stop struggling simply because Botha says it is illegal. So then there is an increased flow of people into military struggle. That doesn't necessarily mean people leaving the country, because as the regime itself says, during 1988, the largest number of ANC military cadres that it captured were people who had been trained inside. And the reason there is that response from the people is in part because of the illegalization of peaceful political struggle.

So one of the results of the state of emergency is a radicalization of the struggle, and notably among the whites themselves. What do you expect young white people in the End Conscription Campaign to do? They were engaged in political struggle to end conscription and provide different forms of national service, and got a very good response among the

white youth. Then they were banned. They are bound to remain opposed to conscription, although the campaign is banned, and if they can't continue the struggle in this way, they must find other ways.

The regime continually exposes itself even to the white population as supremely anti-democratic and incapable of being an instrument of change, committed to this anti-democratic position, to repression. In that situation, it is natural that you have the three white parties getting together to form a more effective opposition. Even those in the ruling party who have been hoping that the process of so-called reform is going to produce a real result are beginning to say it can't, because the daily activities of the Botha regime are pointed in an opposite direction from fundamental change. So they begin to look for a different home, different solutions. Even members of parliament begin to insist on the centrality of the extra-parliamentary struggle, saying change is going to come from outside.

We need to link up with the extra-parliamentary forces and build one common stream of struggle. The struggle continues because the masses are committed to that struggle and because the extent, level, and depth of organization is such that the regime can't smash and destroy the democratic movement.

The ANC has been an illegal organization for nearly 29 years and continues to work whether there is a state of emergency or not. Partly because of the state of emergency, a lot of people recognize the need for these underground structures, which are not dependent for their operation on whether they are legal or not. Therefore the ANC itself attracts more people, gets stronger, and is able to continue to play that role of leadership in terms of mobilization.

Africa Report: But by the arrests of so much of the leadership inside the country, has a certain amount of anarchy and division resulted among the various elements of the democratic movement?

Mbeki: The oppressed are by no means in any state of anarchy or disorganization. We were talking earlier about the June stay at home. It was not possible even for the regime to claim that workers were forced not to go to work, they were intimidated, because nothing of the sort happened. There is no example anywhere to demonstrate a situation of anarchy and loss of control by the leading political forces in the struggle. When we intervened and said that necklacing must stop, it stopped.

The ANC is very concerned to end the violence in Natal and has openly called on everybody in the region to get together to resolve that problem. It is our expectation that to the extent that the problem can be resolved, it will be resolved. So although it might be possible to persuade Inkatha, Cosatu, the UDF, churches, and everybody else to get together to talk and get an agreement, it is in the interests of the regime that the conflict continue. But we are quite confident it is possible to get all these forces to act together to end the violence.

Last year, the ANC met with Nactu [National Council of Trade Unions] and we issued a joint statement in favor of one democratic trade union federation in the country. Since then, the level of cooperation between Nactu and Cosatu has improved significantly and the process must lead toward such a federation. At the beginning of December, we had a very important meeting with the leadership of the South African Council of Churches, and we agreed on a lot of positions about the ending of violence in Natal, about how to handle the release of political prisoners, Mandela and the other peo-

ple, etc. We agreed that all of us need to support the process leading toward peace in Angola and independence for Namibia.

Africa Report: What is the effect on the continuation of the military struggle of the ANC being forced to leave its bases in Angola?

Mbeki: Having to move a large number of people from one country to another must have a disruptive effect, because we have to devote resources, time, and people to that process. But it is in our interests that it shouldn't slow down the struggle, so we will try to make sure that it doesn't. The relocation of ANC military personnel won't make any difference. Angola doesn't share borders with South Africa, and if our military cadres are moved to another country that doesn't share borders with South Africa, it is not of any consequence.

Africa Report: What is your assessment of the releases from jail of political prisoners, including your father, Govan Mbeki, and the constant talk of the imminent release of Nelson Mandela?

Mbeki: The campaign for the unconditional release of political prisoners is very important and has become a very powerful campaign. There is nobody in the world who doesn't make this demand. However much the British or American governments might disagree with us on other issues like sanctions and armed struggle, at least they agree with us on this issue. Even the Afrikaans press, on the occasion of Mandela's 70th birthday, printed editorials calling for his release. So the

releases that have taken place have been in response to that pressure, as has been the case with some of the releases of state of emergency detainees—a victory that has come about because of the intensity of the campaign.

Naturally, the regime would then want to use those releases to try and buy a bit of space for itself, to suggest that it is interested in change, that it has now moved Mandela out of a prison cell into a house, and that is change for the better, and that it is on course toward an ultimate release. But Mandela is still in prison, it doesn't matter the nature and the shape of the cell, so that struggle continues. The regime has no intention to negotiate anything. It feels itself strong enough to withstand pressure and perpetuate the apartheid system. P.W. Botha certainly thinks that, and therefore feels no cause to do anything about releasing the political prisoners so that there can be negotiations.

Even bankers say that from an ordinary, commercial point of view, the risk factor in South Africa is very high and continues to grow and why should they put their money in a such an unstable situation? But if certain things like the release of political prisoners were done, there would be increased confidence among the banking community that the risk factor is getting lower.

So when it gets pressures of that kind, the regime has to respond. It is not as though in conditions of stability they ask: What do we do about political prisoners and therefore negotiations? The struggle is continuing and they respond to the struggle in one way or another. The releases that have taken place have been because of that pressure. The pressure has to be sustained and in the end we will get all of them out, whether or not the government has a plan of what to do when they are released. ○

“During this year, the South African regime will continue its campaign of repression inside the country”

Alan Tannerbaum/Sygmia





FINDING A MEETING POINT

By ANDREW MELDRUM

Harare was the venue for two recent meetings designed to exert pressure on the South African government to begin negotiations. The first, between Afrikaner lawyers and the ANC to discuss constitutional proposals for the post-apartheid period, showed more common ground than that of Commonwealth foreign ministers, marked by acrimonious exchanges on sanctions.

Internal and external pressure on the Pretoria government to begin negotiations to end apartheid was the focus of two conferences recently held in Harare. The first brought together 30 South African lawyers and top members of the African National Congress (ANC) to discuss the shape of a new constitution for a post-apartheid South Africa. The second gathered eight foreign ministers from Commonwealth countries to examine how to increase pressure on South Africa through economic sanctions and a tightened arms embargo.

Somewhat surprisingly, the lawyers' meeting was marked by more general agreement than the Commonwealth conference. The two sessions also pointed out that as it becomes more difficult to get news from South Africa, Harare has become an important listening post for developments from activists inside South Africa and from officials of the ANC.

It seemed a most unlikely group of lawyers who came to Harare to meet in conference with the ANC.

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Albie Sachs (right) with Gerardus Lubbe of Stellenbosch University: "A most unlikely group of lawyers came to Harare to meet in conference with the ANC"

Sarah-Jane Poole

The group was dominated by academics from South Africa's Afrikaans universities, generally a conservative lot. Some were members of the ruling National Party and as a group, they came from the highest ranks of the Afrikaner intellectual elite.

The lawyers arrived from South Africa buttoned up and business-like, but in the relaxed, friendly atmosphere of the meeting, they were soon engrossed in discussions with their sleeves rolled up. As conference organizer Frederick van Zyl Slabbert pointed out, such is the fast pace of changing attitudes in South Africa that the conferring of Afrikaans law professors with the ANC over a new constitution was simply treated as a matter of course in the South African press.

Van Zyl Slabbert said he hoped such meetings would continue in order to create the climate where more responsible South Africans would talk with the ANC, which he

said would illustrate that it is extremely unreasonable for the government to refuse to do so. The well-known maverick politician said that his Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA), which sponsored the meeting, intended to bring the ANC together with other influential groups of South Africans.

Titled "The Role of Law in a Society in Transition," the conference considered various legal problems in South Africa, but concentrated on proposals for a new post-apartheid constitution. As such, the discussions centered on the issues that would feature in any negotiations to end apartheid—minority rights, property ownership and distribution, and civil rights.

It was significant that the discussions took place in Zimbabwe, where those issues were determined by the Lancaster House constitution. Emmerson Mnangagwa, Zimbabwe's justice minister, officially opened the meeting, noting that he was pleased to see South Africans together discussing their future. He said when it came time to write their new constitution, they would find plenty of outsiders eager to offer "expert advice," a wry reference to

Zimbabwe's largely British-drafted Lancaster House constitution.

Both the ANC and the Afrikaner legal experts agreed that there was significant common ground in discussing a new constitution and in beginning to map out the terms of any compromise which could form a negotiated settlement for South Africa.

"Everyone here agrees that the situation in South Africa has to change, that apartheid cannot survive," said Johaan van der Vyver, professor of law at Johannesburg's Witwatersrand University. "We accept that change is inevitable and that we will have a post-apartheid society in which a new constitution is needed. We are talking about how we can get there and what it would look like."

Van der Vyver said there was a broad range of difference between the conference participants over what a new constitution would look like. He said the ANC supported straight majority rule, one-man, one-vote, whereas "within the white community in South Africa a kind of consociational power-sharing is a popular option." He said that South Africa's far right, which would like to see the restoration of "old-fashioned apartheid," was not represented at the conference.

For the ANC's side, Steve Tshwete, a member of the organization's top executive body, the National Executive Committee, said the South African lawyers were "drawn from the power base of the ruling National Party and now have been added to the broad-based anti-apartheid forces. We are now chipping away at the National Party's power base."

Tshwete said that while much of the discussions were on legal technicalities and somewhat academic, many of the ANC members "nudged these lawyers into more confrontation against apartheid, to confront the government more clearly. This is a powerful group and we would like to see it carry back the democratic ideas we are discussing to radiate throughout Afrikaner society."

Although complete consensus in the constitutional debate was neither expected nor achieved at the conference, merely by opening the legal discussion of the transfer of power, it achieved its purpose.

Van der Vyver explained, "I intend to take the documents back home and let my students read them and include them in some tutorial teaching. I think it's important that everybody within South Africa should take note of the line of thinking of the ANC, who in my opinion, will be an important participant in any final settlement."

Gerhard Erasmus, professor of constitutional and international law at Cape Town's Stellenbosch University, said the lawyers had come to meet with the ANC members because "the ideal of a non-racial democracy is the one that is appealing to us. That is a very important principle which has the potential to be the rallying point from which we can address our divided society and our problems at home."

For the ANC, the Harare meeting was yet another friendly encounter with a significant sector of white South Africa, dating back to its meeting with top South African businessmen in 1985 and including others with leading church officials, academics, journalists, students, and sports officials.

The director of the ANC's department of information and publicity, Thabo Mbeki, has been present at most of those meetings and as President Oliver Tambo's right-hand man, he is understood to be the architect of the diplomatic initiative to bring as many South African groups as possible into contact with the ANC.

At the close of the conference, Mbeki summed up its importance to the ANC: "Increasing numbers of South Africans recognize the importance of talking to us and every meeting of this kind helps in the process of propagating the idea that it is necessary for South Africans to get together to resolve the problems we are all facing...It is normal for South Africans to talk and to think this problem through together. No doubt

this conference and what follows it will contribute to the building of that sort of consciousness."

The meeting also had its personal side, as it was a great triumph for veteran ANC member Albie Sachs, who is still recuperating from the car bomb blast in Maputo last year which blew his right arm off and left him with serious injuries. South African agents were blamed for the sabotage.

Sachs, a lawyer, had been working before the blast on drawing up suggested constitutional principles for South Africa. Conferring with ANC legal experts and others, Sachs worked to take the basic principles of the ANC's Freedom Charter and develop them into a legal constitution. His booklet, "Towards a Bill of Rights in a Democratic South Africa," was distributed to participants and served as a basis for discussion.

Badly scarred and visibly tired, Sachs was clearly still on the mend from his injuries, but he was an enthusiastic and articulate participant in the conference. Many of his colleagues counted Sachs' spontaneous address as the emotional highlight of the meeting.

There had been many sessions where differences between the participants were debated, argued, and rationalized. When consensus could not be reached, participants said there would have to be some "horse-trading" to work out a compromise position.

On the last day of the meeting, Sachs spoke to the group, saying he was not happy with all the talk of "horse-trading." He said the delegation from South Africa must give the ANC credit for being a group of idealists. Noting that they had dedicated their lives to their ideals, he was not happy to think of them cynically bargaining away those ideals in a smoke-filled room. The ANC would be reasonable and rational in the negotiations, he said, but "there will be no horse-trading."

Afterwards, many in the Afrikaner delegation said they were deeply impressed by Sachs—by his legal

work on the proposed constitution, by his unwavering dedication, and by his moving speeches.

While the lawyers' conference was marked by such goodwill and common ground between the two sides, the Commonwealth foreign ministers meeting was in dramatic contrast, with sharp disagreements characterizing the discussions. Held to explore ways to tighten economic sanctions and the arms embargo against Pretoria, those aims were thrown in disarray when it was revealed that the chairman of the meeting, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark, had recently approved a \$600 million bank loan to a South African-controlled company.

The scandal of the Canadian loan and further reports of a Canadian company evading around the arms embargo caused a furor and overshadowed much of the press coverage of the conference. The meeting's close was marked by a pointed disagreement between Clark and Commonwealth Secretary-General Sir Shridath Ramphal.

Clark said that the loan by the Bank of Nova Scotia to Minorco, a subsidiary of South Africa's mining giant, the Anglo American Corporation, was in accordance with existing sanctions against South Africa because the company is not based in South Africa but in Luxemburg.

But the outspoken Ramphal unequivocally stated that he believed the spirit of the financial ban had been ignored by the Canadian approval of the loan. "If I had been asked, I would have said no! That loan was to a company controlled by a South African company," he said. "Clearly it is against the spirit and intent of the Commonwealth sanctions to approve a loan to a South African subsidiary. It should not make any difference whether the company is based in Luxemburg or Pretoria."

He said that the Commonwealth secretariat would get to work immediately to draft a new measure to prevent any new loans by consenting Commonwealth countries from

going to South African-controlled companies, no matter where they are based. He said he intended to get the measure approved before the next Commonwealth foreign ministers meeting set for July in Australia.

The controversial \$600 million loan was to enable the South African-controlled Minorco company to purchase Consolidated Goldfields, a British mining multinational. Minorco is the main foreign investment company of the Anglo American and De Beers mining groups, which are controlled by South African magnate Harry Oppenheimer.

The foreign ministers—from Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—also agreed to urge the United Nations to send the full military contingent of 7,500 troops to monitor the elections in Namibia later this year. Following a proposal by Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, the foreign ministers suggested that the UN call on the Commonwealth to send an observer group to monitor Namibia's election process to guard against possible South African interference.

Despite the gaping holes in the Commonwealth's sanctions against South Africa that became apparent at the conference, anti-apartheid campaigners and Commonwealth officials alike said they were pleased at new moves to strengthen the arms embargo.

"There was movement in terms of tightening the arms embargo. It is going to tighten the noose around the South African Defence Force," said Abdul Minty, director of the World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa.

He explained that the foreign ministers resolved to urge the UN to set up a special unit to monitor the embargo and to investigate violations. Another measure is to publish a list of items to be banned for sale to South Africa because many countries sell components for weapons or heavy vehicles on the pretext that they do not know the components will be used for military purposes.

Minty explained that both Australia and Canada are on the UN Security Council this year and have pledged to put these measures on the agenda. "This is going to be of vital importance. Even if you deny the South Africans a rather limited amount of equipment, when they are already so short of it, it will make a critical difference to their military capacity," he said.

The current limited arms sanctions against Pretoria helped give Angola air superiority over South Africa last year and therefore helped bring South Africa to negotiate for peace with Angola and Namibia, according to Minty.

In the study he presented to the ministers, Minty documented violations of the arms embargo. Israel was named as the biggest violator, and he said that a team of 50 Israelis helped South Africa update its ageing Mirage jets. He said the first contingent of those jets has been placed in the town of Louis Trichardt, threateningly near the Zimbabwean border.

Insiders at the conference said that Canada came in for a great deal of criticism for allegedly selling arms packages, especially G-5 and G-6 artillery, to South Africa through third parties. These accurate long-range guns were key in South Africa's attacks in Angola.

British companies were named for violating the arms embargo by selling spare parts for the Buccaneer fighter-bomber jet which was used in South African raids on Mozambique and Angola. Britain's Plessey was also blamed for selling a sophisticated radar avionics system to South Africa, which Minty charged had been used to lure the late Mozambican President Samora Machel's plane off course and into a mountain-side.

"The arms embargo, even with its loopholes, is already having effect and aided the peace process in Angola," said Minty. "We are encouraged that if it is strengthened, it can further weaken the South African military and in that way help bring about the end of apartheid." ○



TURNING RIGHT

By MARGARET L. KNOX

The Pretoria government made use of the flap over the Conservative Party's reinstatement of "petty apartheid" in Boksburg to enhance its reformist image and discredit the right-wing. However, the Boksburg town council was only upholding what is still the law throughout apartheid South Africa.

South Africa's National Party government executed some clever public relations in 1988, presenting the world with the New York accord on Namibia, the Sharpeville Six reprieve, and Nelson Mandela's swimming pool. They may all be overshadowed, though, by the wildest PR move of the year—the so-called Battle of Boksburg.

Boksburg gave the ruling National Party—the architects of apartheid—a chance to look like cool-headed crusaders against racist zeal. The flap concerned what the government calls "petty apartheid," a term that tends to dignify other aspects of South Africa's system of racial segregation.

Over the past several years, Boksburg, a blue collar town just 15 miles from Johannesburg, had relaxed

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Conservative Party. The Boksburg town council then did for Boksburg what the Conservative Party wants to do for South Africa as a whole: It banned blacks from the formerly desegregated public facilities.

The move then caused financial catastrophe for local merchants and an international uproar. "It is of vital importance to the present and future image and prosperity of Boksburg that the repugnant actions initiated by the Conservative Party be reversed," the Boksburg publicity association told the *City Press*, a Johannesburg newspaper.

In truth, Boksburg's town council

is only upholding the law. The Separate Amenities Act, passed in 1953, allows municipalities to maintain segregated beaches, parks, toilets, and other public accommodations. While Boksburg was noisily

"petty" rules reserving its public swimming pool, tennis courts, recreational lake, and town hall for whites. But in October's elections, Boksburg was one of 60 towns in Transvaal province captured by the right-wing

W. Campbell/Sygma

restoring its "whites only" signs, segregated buses were still rolling quietly through Johannesburg, Pretoria whites were enjoying separate buses, pools, parks, libraries, and town halls, and others were passing their Christmas holidays on the segregated beaches of Durban and Cape Town.

"We're not alone," Conservative Party leader Andres Treurnicht rightly told supporters at a meeting in Boksburg, citing segregated facilities in Pretoria, Durban, Bloemfontein, George, Vereeniging, and other National Party-controlled cities.

But for the moment, it behooved the government to chastise Boksburg. Minister of Constitutional Planning and Development Chris Heunis warned he might find a way to overturn the Conservative Party policy of resegregating accommodations—especially in areas where it caused potentially violent (and attention-grabbing) racial confrontations. Heunis even hinted he might support a reappraisal of the Separate Amenities Act in the coming year.

Foreign Minister Pik Botha said Boksburg's moves were "endangering white security," "contributing to the polarization of society," and "likely to harm white businesses and the economy of the country." Just a few miles from his office, however, the sign on the Pretoria trailer park reads: "No Natives Allowed on These Grounds Except in Attendance on Europeans or in Charge of European Children."

Businesses, sports clubs, and the press joined in the government's display of outrage. Boksburg was the biggest story of the Christmas season, with papers carrying as many as two or three stories a day on it. *The Argus* of Cape Town called Boksburg's moves "Verwoerdian-style apartheid" after the 1960s-era prime minister who devised not only the Separate Amenities Act, but the Group Areas Act which still mandates separate living areas and the homelands policy intended eventually to revoke citizenship from all blacks. "State Wrath May Sting CP

Towns," the *Star* splashed across its front page. "More Cities Go Whites Only," the *Argus* screamed as other right-wing town councils followed Boksburg's example.

The South African Amateur Swimming Union moved a meet scheduled for Boksburg to a nearby town. Colgate-Palmolive, which accounts for 57 percent of Boksburg's business earnings, threatened to rezone its plant out of town. Budget Rent-a-Car and the Natal Building Society withdrew their franchises from two Boksburg Conservative Party councillors. But most important, the blacks of Vosloorus, the township adjoining Boksburg, launched an illegal boycott of businesses.

By letting the blacks protest Conservative Party policies and bring business to its knees in Boksburg, the government hopes to let its right-wing opposition discredit itself before national elections expected as early as May.

Normally, the government is swift and harsh in its response to black boycotts. The leaders of Port Elizabeth's 1985 boycott remain in detention, according to their lawyers. A boycott of the northern Transvaal city of Pietersburg ended the following year when police raided black homes, arresting everyone suspected of organizing the protest. But in Boksburg, police have taken no action. So the boycott, which only helps heighten the "difference"

between Boksburg's Conservative Party councillors and the National Party government, is roaring along.

By mid-January, after a disastrous Christmas season, five Boksburg shops closed and 14 more were expected to follow. In a Boksburg by-election, a Conservative Party candidate lost to an independent. And the Town Council has been forced to hold at least one secret meeting with the black Vosloorus council, according to the "Southern Africa Report," a newsletter published in Johannesburg. They reportedly talked about improving black parks and sports facilities, maybe even building a separate lake in return for lifting the boycott and leaving Boksburg "white."

By letting the blacks protest Conservative Party policies and bring business to its knees in Boksburg, the government hopes to let its right-wing opposition discredit itself before national elections expected as early as May. More important, with the help of a foreign press shackled by two-year-old state of emergency restrictions, the artificial "crisis" may help defuse pressure for sanctions abroad.

The New York Times, in a December 2 article by Christopher Wren, called Boksburg's move a "decision to restore petty apartheid, a system that had fallen away across South Africa." Spencer Reiss of *Newsweek* wrote that blacks who "once meekly" accepted the iniquity of segregation are no longer willing to tolerate it, now that they have the economic muscle to stand up for themselves." Conservatives in Washington are likely to read in Boksburg the lesson that segregation is on its last legs and that blacks will only gain political power through buying power, which opponents to sanctions say is hurt by sanctions and helped by continued investment.

With a record 32 organizations banned last year, it may be some time before the government has to unleash its usual response to a consumer boycott. And with the press on an ever-shorter leash, the world might not be watching anyway. ○

DAMAS MBOGORO: THE BUSINESS OF DEVELOPMENT

By COLLEEN LOWE MORNA

Two major changes took place in Tanzania in 1985. After leading the country for close to 25 years, Julius Nyerere stepped down as president, making way for a younger and more managerial, if less charismatic successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi. He, in turn, lost little time in implementing an IMF-sponsored structural adjustment program, breaking the many years of icy relations between Tanzania and the Fund.

Gross domestic product grew by 3.8 percent last year, and 4 percent in 1987, but Mwinyi says that the program has exacerbated the poverty of more vulnerable groups. Still chairman of Tanzania's all-powerful one party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Nyerere has been quite open in his opposition to the reform program.

Last year, relations with the Fund seemed to take a nosedive again, as for nearly eight months, officials haggled over conditions for a new standby facility with the Fund and multi-sectoral support from the World Bank which ended in January. Donors, meanwhile, held back \$800 million, pending an agreement.

That was finally reached in November 1988, heralded by a devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling from 98 to 120 shillings to the dollar.

A former economics professor and Tanzania's current minister of state for finance, economic planning, and development, Damas Mbogoro was at the center of the negotiations, as the country's finance minister, Cleopus Msuya, recovered from an accident. In a frank interview he discussed with *Africa Report* how he views the IMF, what the economic reform program has achieved, and what challenges lie ahead.

Africa Report: What were the main sticking points in your last round of negotiations with the IMF?

Mbogoro: The exchange rate. As managers of the Tanzanian economy, we had to try and negotiate a rate which takes into account our economic realities. As local economists, we feel we know our economy much better than Fund experts who come in for a few days and jet out again. Unless you are irresponsible, you can't just accept what the Fund people say.

Africa Report: The figure you agreed on was presumably a compromise of sorts. What would you have preferred?

Mbogoro: A realistic figure would have been an average of 115 shillings to the dollar, and a maximum of 125 shillings by the end of June 1989. That would have been ideal for us.

Africa Report: How will this compromise affect you?

Mbogoro: The basic repercussion will be a price increase for all our imported goods. Our economy is substantially import-dependent, particularly in the industrial sector and for inputs for the agricultural sector. The other side of the coin is that we will be in a position to pay our exporters more. But in a situation where there are transport bottlenecks, that doesn't help much.

One of the reasons why we resisted a big hike in the

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exchange rate is that our principal bottleneck is now transport and communications, both of which are import-dependent. There is no point in encouraging peasants to grow more cotton, for example, if all they are going to do is watch it rot.

Another problem we are running into is that a lot of industries are finding it difficult to pay their taxes, and stay profitable. As a ministry of economic planning, as well as finance, we have to be conscious of such side-effects.

This is why we are worried about pushing the exchange rate front too much, too fast, because that can have negative effects on our productive sectors, which are supposed to be stimulating growth. There is a danger of finally stifling economic growth if we keep forcing an exchange rate which bears no relationship to our economy.

An exchange rate is a policy instrument that is supposed to generate a response. In our case, we are saying that the main reason we are failing to achieve our targets has nothing to do with exchange rates, but rather with structural rigidities.

Africa Report: What alternatives would you propose?

Mbogoro: There are no alternatives to tackling exchange rate policy as such, but what we are saying is that the speed should be revised. If you don't address the structural rigidities first, the whole exercise becomes counter-productive.

Africa Report: What led you to finally agree to a devalua-



Betty Press

Subsistence farmer, Morogoro: President Mwinyi contends that the IMF program has exacerbated the poverty of more vulnerable groups

tion? Did you feel under blackmail in any way?

Mbogoro: I wouldn't say that our predicament was necessarily externally induced. The worst thing that can happen to an economy is to allow it to get into a stage when you can't manage things on your own, and therefore have to go to the Fund. Had we been putting certain macroeconomic policies in place all along, we would not be in this situation. That is the essence of the problem. If you get to a stage where you have no way out, then you've boxed yourself in, and the only solution is to sweat your way out. So you can't really talk about blackmail as such.

The good thing about these negotiations is that we are quite aware where the Fund stands. We speak the same language and even agree in terms of theoretical models. But as equally competent economists, where we disagree is that the real world is not a model. As an economist, I can't be blind to what is going on on the ground. We simply want our friends to understand this, and to avoid a situation where the economy is not moving at all.

Africa Report: Since Michel Camdessus took over as managing director of the Fund, there have been whispers about the IMF putting on a more humane face. Have you found that to be true?

Mbogoro: It's difficult for me to make a comparison, since I am fairly new in this. But I will say one thing: When you talk to people at the top, at the political level, there is some understanding. But when you talk to some—not all—experts, they don't seem to understand the down-to-earth problems. They, for example, see the exchange rate as a harmless instrument, whereas we see it as a very dangerous instrument. Their focus is macro, rather than microeconomic and they seem to apply the same model to every country, regardless of its circum-

stances.

Africa Report: What is your overall assessment of the reform program so far?

Mbogoro: So far, the pros outweigh the cons. The cons are high prices. But people have moved from a situation of shortages and scarcities at high prices to plenty at high prices. Most people prefer the latter.

But of course, we are saying there is a limit, and you can't push this too far. We've moved substantially on the exchange rate, but we have not been able to raise output proportionately. Through import support and our own efforts, the shops are now full of goods, but we haven't been able to do much about wages and salaries. Our revenue position has not improved. So we are moving to a stage where the cons could outweigh the pros. It will require other policies, internally, to reach a stage where our standard of living does not go on falling.

The top salary of a top executive in this country—and you can include me in that bracket—lasts at most two weeks. I take home about 5,000 shillings, and even on a totally local diet of beans and ugali [thick maize porridge], with meat only once in a while, it does not stretch beyond a fortnight.

Comparatively, in 1983/84, my salary could last a month, but we have to be careful here because that was at official prices. Given that one had to get a lot of basics on the parallel market, it ended up being more or less the same situation as now. The quality of life may be slightly better, if you budget carefully. But most of us, including top executives, have not changed our lifestyles substantially.

Africa Report: Recently, the prime minister announced that Tanzania intended to tighten up on individuals using their own money to bring goods into the country. Isn't that a step backward, as far as your trade liberalization program is concerned?

Mbogoro: Basically what we have said is that by July 1989, everyone will have to disclose the source of their foreign exchange. The idea is to clamp down on black marketeers who give the wrong signals to our friends at the Fund, because they look at the black market rate [currently about two times the official rate in Tanzania] and say this ought to be the exchange rate. I know it is difficult to do this in practice, but we want to at least put in place measures which will force money to go through official channels.

Africa Report: What is Tanzania's debt profile, and are you considering some of the market-based solutions to your debt problem currently in fashion internationally?

Mbogoro: To give you some idea of the magnitude: If we were to pay all our outstanding debt for this financial year, it would chew up about 85 percent of our export earnings. We are thinking about debt-equity swaps, and we are actively considering buyback schemes, which is one of the reasons why we are working to put a new investment code in place in 1989.

But the problem is that you have to find partners. Most of these debt schemes are applicable to newly industrialized, middle-income countries. We are in the category of a sub-Saharan, least developed country, and the amounts concerned are relatively small. So in our case, the first line of argument is, why not write off the debts all together, so we can get on with the business of development? ○

ing urban standards of living. No one, quite literally, can afford to live on what he earns officially.

The latest government salary increases in Tanzania produced a scale of \$10 to \$64 a month, while a sack of maize, the staple food, costs over \$7.50; secondary school fees are \$11 to \$22 in government schools and up to \$75 in private ones; and income taxes, exclusive of other levies, take \$3.50 out of monthly salary of \$30. When the government recently announced rent increases, there was widespread protest from tenants and the new rates were lowered, but were still nearly a 500 percent increase.

Everyone has to do something to supplement his wages. Virtually every urban home has a small farm. The once-broad lawns and formal gardens of the middle class sections of colonial Arusha are now plowed under and planted with maize and beans. Bananas and fruit trees replace ornamental ones, while chicken coops and stables fill backyards. And in the more densely settled poorer developments and shanty towns, every vacant piece of land is cultivated, while herds of cattle and goats graze along the roadsides.

The aim is not always to produce for one's own consumption. Chickens and eggs are produced for sale, as is milk. Both fetch good prices in urban markets and one can easily double or treble one's salary with a modest investment of time and money.

Petty trade and cottage industries also abound. Front rooms house small stores; back yards, carpentry and auto repair shops. The family car, if there is one, becomes a taxi. Many supplemental activities border on the illegal or immoral, ranging from black market trading to bribery, but the cause is often the same—need, not avarice.

Urban living standards continue to decline in spite of such activities, however, down an average of 10 percent over the past two to three years. Malnutrition and associated childhood diseases are increasing: A particularly virulent, chloroquine-resis-

tant malaria is taking an extremely high toll among already weakened children. Adult diets are also deteriorating. One comparatively highly paid, two-income family—a university lecturer and her civil servant husband—complain that they can afford to eat nothing but maize meal three times a day.

Some are beginning to have doubts about the benefits of urban life and have forsaken good jobs to return to the farm. One man, who earned his Ph.D. from Oxford and returned to Tanzania to lecture at the university and serve as the head of a prestigious research institute, recently gave it all up to settle on a small family plot on the side of Mt. Meru. It is only three acres, but the fertile mountain soil is extremely rich, producing an abundance of bananas, coffee, maize, and beans for consumption and sale.

Today, people all over the mountain are increasingly adopting dairying and market gardening to supply Arusha town market a few miles away. Coffee was once the cash crop of preference, but the government price does not even cover the costs of inputs. Access to inputs, loans, and transport is irregular and uncertain, and full payment is often delayed for two years.

By contrast, maize, beans, milk, fruits, and vegetables can be marketed directly, getting a good and instant return. And food crops have the added advantage of being used for either cash or subsistence, depending on yields and need.

Grade milk cows, of which there is a growing number on the mountain, produce 8-12 liters of milk per day. At \$.32 a liter, that adds up to \$2.50 to \$3.80 per cow per day, and many have two or three cows. Goats and bulls bring similar high prices for meat. A local teacher related that he easily earns more from the milk of one cow than from his salary, and he moonlights, teaching two sessions as well as night school. The average secondary school teacher might earn \$30 a month, whereas a cow can easily earn its owner \$60.

Another man who has responded

to the lure of the countryside is a former teacher, pastor, and head of the diocese, who now farms eight acres on the mountain. In an area where population densities exceed 1,000 per square mile, that is a lot of land. He inherited the bulk from his father, but he has also been able to buy a few small additional parcels adjacent to his own. He is only now starting to farm, for the first time in his life.

"It is a hard life," he notes, "but now I can at least take care of my family. I am only learning slowly how to farm, but I am convinced that it is just a matter of planning which crops to grow and when to plant them to avoid the hungry season and get cash all year round." He is already making more than twice his former salary, in addition to growing all his own food. "The church thinks all of us who have left will tire of farming and return to work after a few years," he relates, "but no one can live on a pastor's salary, and there is no pension or security. How could I take care of myself and my sons?"

The last query is heard frequently. The return to the land is thus not simply a matter of economics. After a lifetime spent away, both the pastor and the scientist are responding to the psychic as well as economic call of their own land and home. "Life in the city is so hard. I spent most of my time trying to find food, and I never really felt that I belonged," complains the scientist. "Here I feel comfortable. I am at home again among family and friends." The pastor adds: "I like working the soil. It is a good feeling and I can see what I have accomplished."

The transition to farming is not likely to be an easy one. Both men are highly educated. Both spent most of their lives away from the farm, committed to wider intellectual goals. Redirecting such energies, interests, and hopes will probably be a long process. The scientist still writes articles, while the pastor is socially active in the community and now devotes his intellectual energies to learning the local knowledge he missed when he went to school. "I

am convinced farming is the future," he said. "We all must rediscover our roots."

There is no doubt that these ex-urbanites are serious about making the transition. I met others as well, one a former agricultural officer now struggling with the practicalities of farming, and another an ex-politician. While they may still be a small minority, they are joining the mass of peasants and increasing numbers of school leavers who remain on the land, but who are equally anxious to develop a new way of life.

A switch from export to market crops by peasant farmers was reported by the *Daily News* for Iringa, where tobacco production has been declining steadily over the past 10 years; the number of growers has dropped from 51,000 to 17,000; acreage is down from 31,000 to 21,000 hectares; and overall production has slipped from 18.2 million to 16 million kilograms. A report from the government Tobacco Processing and Marketing Board attributes the decline to poor farming practices by peasants—applying insufficient fertilizer, poor weeding and harvesting, and local consumption.

But the farmers affected attribute the decline to the fact that producer prices paid for tobacco fail to cover the costs of inputs, resulting in losses of from \$22 to \$220 per acre depending on the level of mechanization. Given the poor extension services, bureaucratic inefficiencies in providing loans, inputs, and transport, ageing machinery, and delayed payments to growers admitted by the Board, it is not surprising that peasants are paying less attention to tobacco while seeking to diversify with more lucrative and dependable market crops.

Arusha is not typical of Tanzania as a whole. Farming on Mt. Meru, like that on Kilimanjaro to the east, has always been intensive and highly productive. The soil is rich, water is available throughout the year, and people have farmed the same permanent plots for over a century. This highly productive area lies adjacent

to modern Arusha town, a rapidly expanding urban market for rural produce. The Arusha themselves have always disdained the lure of the town; few work there today even as land shortage grips the mountain. They remain as deeply attached to the mountain as they were during the colonial period when they sold crops and cattle to pay taxes in preference to working on settlers' farms.

Few rural areas in Tanzania are both as fertile and as conveniently located, but the experience of the Arusha may point in a new direction from that of the past. A productive rural sector producing primarily for the local urban market and earning enough money to buy its products may just promote the kind of domestic economic linkages that will lead to a more sustainable and self-reliant form of development than the export-driven models of the past.

Poorly paid export crops do not put food on the table, children through school, or a tin roof on the house. Nor, it seems, do they pay for necessary imports of capital goods, spare parts, intermediate goods, or agricultural inputs and equipment. Tanzania's exports last year earned only a third the foreign exchange required for imports and debt servicing. Arusha have not been adverse to raising export crops that pay, however, as evidenced by the coffee boom of the 1940s and 1950s. Today, under a scheme to develop non-traditional exports, farmers are allowed to market new crops directly and to retain higher percentages of foreign exchange earnings to reinvest in necessary inputs. As a result, people are now producing green beans, fruits, and flowers that are air-freighted to Europe, while all such exports have gone from 5 to 40 percent of total exports in the past year alone.

Much has been written over the years about the low productivity, conservative attitudes, and alleged economic irrationality of Tanzania's peasants, on the one hand, and about rapacious capitalist kulaks destroying rural society on the other—both of which quite obvious-

ly cannot be true. What these contrary positions both miss is how the situation appears to the farmers themselves. Many living in drier, less fertile areas cannot afford to fail and so continue to follow the risk-averse rationality of their domestic economy that matches available land with low capital needs and family labor to produce an acceptable minimum in bad years as well as good.

The average peasant in more fertile areas—and a map of population densities shows the majority live in such areas around Lake Victoria and in the northeastern and southern highlands—are certainly not displaying such risk-averse behavior, however. Low producer prices, government attempts to mandate and control peasant production, and the lack of availability of such highly desired goods as cloth, roofing iron, cement, and plows simply had not made producing for sale worthwhile. But now it is, and Tanzania's urbanites might be beginning to discover that their rural cousins are not irrational or backward at all.

There has always been tension in Tanzania between an overt ideology of popular participation and a more covert reality of strong, highly centralized bureaucratic control. While peasants have usually defined development in terms of social needs, for example, the government has stressed production in order to extract the maximum surplus from the countryside for its own needs. Given the imbalance of power between the people and the government, the state has usually been seen, at least nominally, as in control, with peasants only able to react negatively to state directives. But government control is now breaking down, weakened by a combination of domestic policy failures and Tanzania's faltering position in the world economy, and peasants are moving to reassert their autonomy. The choices they are making are already beginning to have an impact on state practice, and may well force policy changes in the future toward greater popular participation in economic decision-making. ○




RETURN TO THE LAND

By THOMAS SPEAR

A new migration is occurring in Tanzania, as educated people who once headed for the cities are now beginning to return in mid-career to the farm. The reasons are not hard to find: The terms of trade that once favored urban consumers are now shifting to favor the countryside, as economic readjustment policies reduce urban subsidies and increase the prices paid to rural producers.

In the 1960s, the aim of every student was to eventually get an attractive government job in town or city. Farming was not an option. It was seen as poor and backward—a dead end. Government policies reinforced these goals. Development projects were concentrated in urban areas. Price controls kept the cost of food for urban consumers low, while impoverishing rural producers. Taxes, both open and hidden, kept the prices paid by the government to producers of food and cash crops to a fraction of market value, further transferring resources from village to town. Rural people sold cheap and bought expensive manufactured goods from protected urban industries.

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Part-time farmer examining his corn field, Morogoro: Many Tanzanians supplement their incomes by farming

Betty Press

The Tanzanian government's well-known battles with the IMF concluded with its adoption of an economic adjustment program, the effects of which have meant declining living standards for urban workers and consumers. Many are now returning to the farm as an option, taking advantage of higher prices now paid to rural producers.

Broader factors were at work as well. World commodity prices for Tanzania's agricultural exports fell increasingly behind the prices paid for manufactured and capital imports, further exacerbating the urban-rural terms of trade. The situation became desperate with the oil crisis and worldwide recession of the 1970s. Rural prices declined further, and goods disappeared from the shops or were only available at exorbitant prices. Rural producers went on strike, reducing production to subsistence levels or trading on the black market. Figures for officially marketed produce plummeted.

The crisis forced Tanzania to accept the economic adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund. The costs of these policies for urban workers and consumers have been high. Inflation, now running around 30 percent generally but often higher for necessities, is rapidly outpacing salaries, visibly reduc-



UGANDA

Back to School: **THE REVITALIZATION OF MAKERERE**

By COLLEEN LOWE MORNA

Once among the leading universities in Africa, Makerere's fortunes declined under the tyrannical regimes of Idi Amin and Milton Obote. Supported by the donor community, President Museveni's government is launching an effort to rehabilitate the institution, hoping to restore some of Makerere's former glory.



Like Rome, the Ugandan capital, Kampala, straddles seven hills. One of these is occupied by an institution which evokes a mixture of nostalgia and unity among the continent's intellectuals.

Makerere—home at one time or another to such well-known names as Julius Nyerere, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, and Ali Mazrui—is one of the few African universities whose name is readily recognized in just about any country on the continent.

For the past decade, academics and well-wishers world-wide have watched Makerere shrivel into a skeleton of its former self, under two of Africa's most brutal regimes. Now, thanks to the relatively peaceful era ushered in by Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement in 1986, they have a chance to take part in a unique reconstruction effort.

In 1987, under the leadership of Vice Chancellor B. George Kirya, Makerere drew up a comprehensive reconstruction program and held a donor conference on the campus which drew participants from 30 donor agencies in 12 countries.

"It will be recorded in history," said Minister of Education Mayanja Nkangi on the occasion, "that you contributed to the development of mankind in Uganda at the time peace was restored here, and laid fresh foundations for a revitalized Makerere."

Amid the persistent scars of neglect and decay, the smell of fresh paint permeates the campus. Light bulbs and sockets have been refitted; hinges restored and electric stoves repaired. In a cordoned-off section of Makerere's once-famous library, new books are being loaned out and musty subscriptions revived.

To the extent that repairs and renovations signify a new mood, there is little doubt, comments one donor, that Makerere is on its way up again.

But it will be a long climb to the

top. As Nairobi-based Ford Foundation representative William Saint puts it: "The magnitude of resources needed are beyond the capacity of any donor to make a real dent."

And—especially after President Museveni's shock announcement last year that he wanted to build a second university which would be more development-oriented—some are asking just how much like its former self Makerere should want to be.

Each year, says Student Guild President Andrew Kasura, the university has faithfully turned out 1,000 graduates—"half to leave the country and the other half to become black marketeers." It is time, he suggests, that Makerere look more closely at how it relates to the Uganda of today.

That is a reality far removed from 1922, when colonial administrators founded Makerere as the first college in British East Africa. Although other colleges sprang up in neighboring Kenya and Tanzania, Makerere remained the administrative seat of the University of East Africa during the federation between the three countries.

Students from across the continent jostled for places at the university, which was also frequented by African scholars from across the globe.

"Makerere University College in Uganda in the 1960s was at once a great African institution and a great internal crossroad," writes the well-known Kenyan intellectual, Ali Mazrui, who served as the first black head of Makerere's political science department. "There was a constant flow of traffic from all parts of the world."

But about the same time as the East African Community fell apart in the early 1970s, Uganda began its own slippery descent, first under Idi Amin—Africa's most notorious dictator—and then under the country's reinstated first president, Milton Obote, who seemed either unable or unwilling to stop the mayhem.

Between 1970 and 1985, some 800,000 Ugandans were massacred, GDP fell by 11 percent, corruption chewed up an estimated two-thirds of the budget and Uganda became an importer of every essential item except for staple foods, thanks only to the abundantly rich soil.

The effects on the university were two-fold. "The insecurity," says Deputy Vice Chancellor Frederick Kayanja, "was felt much more by the intellectuals than by ordinary people. As a professor, you were always vulnerable—faceless people could come at any time and take you away." One vice chancellor and several lecturers lost their lives that way.


Meanwhile, as inflation galloped in the three digits, staff salaries soon eroded to below subsistence level. Over 300 expatriate and local staff—including Mazrui—left. Today, 48 percent of staff posts, particularly in the science field, lie vacant, and only 26 percent of the staff hold Ph.D's.

Maintenance and capital expansion came to a halt, yet enrollment continued to increase, leading to serious overcrowding. Today, hostel facilities designed for 2,800 students house up to 4,000, while the remaining 1037 students live in "awful conditions" in digs they find in town, according to Kayanja.

Gone are the days when students dressed up in their black caps and gowns to partake of three-course meals, served with wine, by waiters in white-starched uniforms. Today, students queue up for helpings of thick porridge and beans, supplemented by tinned food from the World Food Programme—a UN agency normally associated with emergency relief in disaster areas.

But some elements of etiquette have survived. A reporter who wanders off the pavement and onto the lawn is politely reminded by a Makerere "gentleman" that this is against accepted practice. Potted plants line the windows of many hostels, providing aesthetic relief to the

Colleen Lowe Morna is a Zimbabwean freelance journalist based in Harare.



"Makerere University College in Uganda in the 1960s was at once a great African institution and a great internal cross-road"

Uganda Info

obvious overcrowding and obnoxious stench emanating from the wash rooms. The physical beauty of the campus has remained the one constant.

And while offices in town get going an hour or two after their nominal starting time, "lecturers here turn up at 8 a.m. because it is tradition: You turn up and that is that," observes Kayanja. Despite dismal salaries—an elderly administrator notes that his monthly salary would buy all of eight bunches of bananas, the staple food in Uganda—a core of dedicated staff has stayed on.

The endurance so evident at Makerere—which despite the traumas has never once closed down—is highly commended by donors who pledged \$25 million toward the reconstruction effort in mid-1987, and promised a further \$30 million

in cash and kind.

The World Bank has undertaken basic maintenance repairs in the hostels and kitchens; the EEC has been repairing roofs and painting a number of academic blocs; the Italians are tackling the faculty of technology; Germans, veterinary medicine; U.S.AID, agriculture and the university farm.

Meanwhile, the British council has completely renovated the university guest house for visiting faculty and donated books. The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations—old friends of Makerere—have been contributing to a staff development program through fellowships.

Local lawyers, bankers, professors, and businessmen—who still revere the university—have banded together to set up a fund. They are assisting in renovating staff housing—one of the few perks which the university is still able to offer.

Still, all monies pledged so far only amount to about one-third of what the university wants for its capital development projects. Worse still, current expenditure in the present

financial year has had to be limited to half the original estimates, due to government austerity measures. The result, says University Secretary David Sentongo, has been major cut-backs in such items as chemicals, paper, fieldwork, student diet, and research.

"The university still needs basic-things, like photocopiers, xerox paper, vehicles, and gas to run them on," says Ford Foundation representative Saint.

"Virtually every university in Africa has the same problem," he continues. "Governments whose economies are in difficult straits and are often involved in structural adjustment agreements with the IMF put caps on budget deficits and require cuts in the provision of social services. Because of other needs, there is perhaps a greater tendency to cut back on support for universities."

In such situations, he says, there is not much that donor agencies can do to make a lasting difference.

Throwing another spanner into the works, the Ugandan government

has announced that it intends to build a second university in the southwestern town of Mbarara. Current donor attitudes toward the project, coupled with the dire economic circumstances of the Ugandan government, raise some questions concerning the viability of the project: Already, the opening date has been postponed by a year to October 1989.

But the mere suggestion of a new university has set Makerere thinking. According to university officials, explaining the project, President Museveni—who is also chancellor of Makerere—said he wanted a university less steeped in tradition and more oriented toward the rural areas, where the bulk of Ugandans live.

Student Guild President Kasura agrees that there is merit in this argument. Makerere, he maintains, "was put up by the British to turn out clerks for the colonial system and in many ways it still serves that purpose."

He cites the case of an engineering student friend who can design just about anything save for a charcoal stove. Ironically, the student "will probably need this more than what he is struggling to learn at school" in today's Uganda, Kasura observes.

"Makerere is a very conservative university, like most famous universities," says Kayanja. "There are things you just don't do at Makerere, because that is the way it is. A new university has the chance to break with that conservative thinking, and that may not be a bad thing."

What should Makerere be aiming for?

"I don't know if it is desirable that Makerere go back to being the Oxford of Africa," Kayanja continues. "Makerere has now become a national university, and that has to be our focus. The glory related to the fact that presidents and prime ministers from across the continent went to Makerere is not going to happen again. The university needs to be oriented toward serving Uganda better than it is at the moment." ○

A Second University?

The decision to build a second national university has been fraught with controversy in many African countries. Always a good reason for it, there seldom seem to be the requisite resources, especially when held up against other pressing needs. Uganda is no exception.

On the surface, the proposal has merit. For a population of 15 million, one university with an enrollment of just over 5,000 is minute by any standard. Out of the 50,000 who take the pre-university "A" level exams each year in Uganda, only 1,600 find places at Makerere, says the permanent secretary for education, Pius Tibanyendera.

In addition, the country is short of graduates with technical skills, which the new university at Mbarara is to focus on in its four faculties: medicine, education and applied science, technology, and development studies.

In an interview, Tibanyendera compared Mbarara with the "red brick" universities like UCLA in the U.S., which he said "have come up with a completely different orientation to the Ivy League of the eastern United States.

But donors—whose support will be crucial in raising the \$100 million to build the university—feel this is all pie in the sky. Already, as a result of lack of staff, Makerere has had to cut back its intake from a peak of 7,000 in 1982. They feel that with the right inputs, Makerere could handle up to 10,000 students, and argue that current rehabilitation efforts at the university will be compromised if the Mbarara idea is pursued.

"In Uganda," says a World Bank official, "where one has to choose priorities among priorities, one wonders—if Makerere itself is in such dire need—what is the logic of starting yet another faculty of medicine? On the face of it, it does not make a lot of economic sense."

Makerere Deputy Vice Chancellor Frederick Kayanja, who has been designated the new vice chancellor of Mbarara, agrees that "because the national cake is limited, and you are going to take a large slice out of it, Makerere will be affected." Originally, he says, staff tried to persuade President Museveni to wait a bit, but he persuaded them that "there will never be a time when there is enough money. If we like the idea, then we must just start and tighten our belts."

"In the short-term, it is obviously cheaper to expand existing facilities," adds University Secretary David Sentongo. "But in the long-term, things like food are cheaper in the rural areas, since these places feed Kampala."

Makerere, observes University Registrar Bernard Onyange, "needs a grandchild. We've been isolated for too long." A bit of competition, he suggests, will do the university good. Conversely, by having two instead of one institution to pressure the government, "we might be able to get more out of the ministry of education," he says.

But some staff at Makerere say they haven't bothered to think the matter through at all. "We are so used to suffering that whether there is a new university or not, we expect hard times ahead," said a young history lecturer.


—C.L.M.



WESTERN SAHARA

SAHARAN STATESMANSHIP

By GARY ABRAMSON



Christine Spengler/Sygma

After more than a decade of war, the Polisario Front and the Moroccan government are engaged in diplomatic efforts which may result in a referendum to determine the fate of the disputed Western Sahara. Will 1989 be the year of reconciliation in North Africa?

unlikely name for a popular eatery down in the Sahara. When matched with the handful of wool-capped Moroccans with northern features and ill-fitting sport jackets who mill about outside, the small street scene in the capital of Western Sahara at first glance gives the impression of an opera backdrop mistakenly lowered during the wrong act.

The sign is no comedy of errors, however, but ordinary life in El Ayoun, the once-sleepy Spanish colonial town where Morocco has done its best in the last decade to make Western Saharans and Moroccan settlers feel at home in Morocco's "southern province," while walling out the Polisario Front that is fighting to make the territory independent.

In front of the restaurant on the bustling Boulevard Bucraa, a tall, slender man draped in the blue robes traditional in this part of the desert strides past the doorway. As he loses himself in the flow of Saharan women in their orange and electric-green gauze wraps, the odd soldier or two, and other passers-by, he begins talking to a visitor.

The thirtyish-looking man, who says he is a native of Western Sahara, says life is not bad these days under the Moroccans, who have reopened the Bucraa phosphate mines where he works, not far from the capital. Then what does he think should happen to the territory, if as he has heard, the Saharans vote on Moroccan sovereignty or independence?

A look of suspicion comes over the man's face. "I am only a laborer. I cannot provide you with an opinion on that," he says. Firm, but with a hint of apology, he adds: "It is a delicate question, you know." The conversation ended, the man walks on, glancing over his shoulder a few times as he draws away.

The vote that appears likely to be held this year on the future of Western Sahara, one of the very last of Africa's former European colonies whose status remains unresolved, has always been a delicate question. Now the war that split African states

into two camps and led to Morocco's withdrawal from the Organization of African Unity may be at a turning point.


After years of fighting between the 100,000-strong Moroccan army and the Polisario's 6,000 or so guerrilla fighters, both sides say they expect victory, and are ready to put their supporters' wills to a final test. But not with bullets. Instead, officials on both sides say, the conflict can now be settled by a much-postponed referendum which the United Nations and the OAU have been proposing for many years.

Conversations with Saharans in the territory held by Morocco yield an uncertain forecast. Like the Bucraa mine worker, many people enjoy the relative comforts brought by Morocco's \$1 billion investment in housing, roads, and other areas. But not all Saharans express support for Moroccan sovereignty.

Yet enough do, one Moroccan official said, to encourage the country to finally risk a vote. A key sign that both sides feel the time is right came last winter, when top-level talks opened for the first time since the fighting began in 1976.

Ever since Spain handed over control of most of what was then known as Spanish Sahara to his kingdom in 1975, King Hassan II of Morocco had argued before his subjects and the world that Polisario's guerrilla army was essentially a nasty creation of his North African rivals, mainly Algeria. Polisario, which controls perhaps a quarter to a third of Western Sahara in this stalemated war, would collapse without the support and refuge it received from Algeria, Morocco maintained. Even after agreeing last August to a UN proposal for a ceasefire and referendum, Moroccan diplomats continued to speak of Algeria, and not Polisario, as the key to a settlement.

Then not exactly suddenly, but with great discretion, Hassan ushered Polisario's leaders through the doors of his palace in Marrakesh on January 3 for two days of discussions. It was the sort of dramatic



The Cafe Restaurant Rif, with its painted sign evoking the mountainous berber region of northernmost Morocco more than 800 miles north of El Ayoun, seems an

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"The key question at voting time may turn out to be the Saharans' perception of their identity"

Christine Spengler/Syigma

diplomatic gesture—Hassan's 1986 meeting with Shimon Peres, then foreign minister of Israel, or his short-lived treaty of union with Libya come to mind—that has come to be a hallmark of the deft monarch's often unpredictable statesmanship.

No immediate progress was announced, as authorities in Marrakesh remained behind a blanket of silence they had drawn around the visit as soon as an aircraft landed, bringing Polisario's second-ranking leader, Bachir Mustafa Sayed, and other Polisario officials. As if to underscore the point, Hassan told Spain's largest newspaper, *El Pais*, a few weeks later that he had invited Polisario "to listen to them as Moroccans," and not to negotiate.

Clearly, after Hassan's years of championing the historic "Morocanness" of the Western Sahara and Polisario's insistence on "All the homeland or martyrdom," both

sides need to avoid the appearance of capitulation, North African observers and diplomats in the region say. Of even greater concern now, however, seems to be a combination of old and new circumstances in North Africa that is leading the adversaries to conclude that they are better served by gambling on a settlement than by sticking to the old absolutes.

For Morocco, while the government has not said publicly why Polisario was received, the accelerating rapprochement with Algeria supplies considerable incentive. Since the two countries re-established relations last summer, Morocco and Polisario have moved faster and closer than ever to ending the war. Shortly after the Polisario-Morocco talks, President Chadli Benjedid of Algeria went to Morocco on the first state visit between the countries in 20 years.

The new relationship opens the door to cooperation blocked until now by an ideological gulf that set Morocco and Algeria against each other on economics, domestic politics, and liberation movements such as Polisario. Now the former rivals discuss plans for an Algerian pipeline to Europe via Morocco; Morocco offers support when rioters ravage Algiers; and entrepreneurs seek out opportunities across the once-closed border.

Morocco and Polisario's decision to negotiate should be seen in a larger, regional context as well. King Hassan said recently he hopes to host North African heads of state at a meeting where accords would be signed on trade, finance, and customs issues. Multilateral commissions have been working on the agreements since last fall. He also predicted Morocco would rejoin the OAU once the Sahara vote is held.

The costly Saharan war—estimates start at about \$350 million a year—paid well for Hassan domestically for a decade, identifying the monarchy with a populist, patriotic cause. Morocco managed to rely on allies for the bill, including Saudi Arabia and the United States, which provided \$53 million in military aid

and \$912 million in economic support in 1988. War and isolation from its neighbors, however, is just the opposite of Hassan's agenda for the 1990s as he aspires to lead in the consolidation of the "grand Maghreb."

For Polisario, an organization that began preaching national consciousness and independence in the Western Sahara before the Spanish had left, the movement toward ending the war may provide a definitive opportunity to demonstrate what its diplomats have skillfully persuaded its intellectual backers and more than 70 countries that recognize its Saharan Arab Democratic Republic—that the Saharan people exist, and want to be independent.

Much will depend on the lessons that Saharans themselves have learned on both sides of the 900-mile "wall" of sand and sensors that separates the Moroccan-controlled sector from the outer fringe left to Polisario and its encampments near Tindouf, Algeria.

If Saharan national identity can be bought off—and at least a few Moroccan officials are concerned that it cannot be—then Morocco has a clear financial advantage in this behind-the-lines battle. While the Moroccan army has built and gradually extended the wall outward since 1981, Moroccan administrators and engineers have changed the face of cities such as El Ayoun and Smara, and in so doing, changed Saharans' lives.

El Ayoun, a sprawling city of about 90,000, bore slight resemblance last fall to the tense garrison town a reporter visited in 1981. Even in the poorer, Spanish-built Zemla quarter, once a bastion of Polisario support, many Saharans, who still clearly outnumber the easily distinguishable Moroccans from further north, expressed support for Morocco's claim to the territory.

A Moroccan official acknowledged, however, that a visitor was not likely to find many overtly pro-Polisario Saharans—direct challenge to Morocco's claim was considered a threat to national security, he said,

and the consequence was detention. Officials would not say how many Saharans might be detained, but suggested the number was small.

The threat of imprisonment does not appear to be Morocco's main weapon in the struggle to hold on to the Western Sahara. The UN's plans to rely strongly on a 1974 Spanish census of the territory makes that strategy quite impractical.

Both Polisario and Moroccan officials say that the roughly 74,000 Saharans recorded by Spain's colonial administration are not difficult to account for—though, ironically, each side claims a majority live under its control. "Our estimates are that 60 percent of the population census is in the [Polisario] camps," says Ahmed Haj, Polisario's representative in Spain. "But we also trust that many who now say they are content with Morocco will vote for independence." Likewise, Moroccan officials said that only a small proportion of the census population fled Spanish Sahara when Morocco and Mauritania were given administrative control. (Mauritania initially claimed the southern third of the territory, but withdrew from the war in 1979.)

Instead, Morocco's efforts have focused on building industry in the territory, such as fishing and fish processing, that were once anathema to the Saharans. "Until I was eight years old, my family lived as nomads, traveling the area from El Ayoun to Smara to Tarfaya," says Mohamed El Moussaoui, who now supervises the Western Sahara's nascent fishing industry.

Though the Western Sahara boasts one of the world's richest fishing banks, for centuries a dangerous coastline and deep disdain for fishing kept all Saharans but for some small coastal tribes away from fishing, which is still almost entirely the preserve of foreign fleets. Mousaoui, sporting a well-tailored blazer and fashionable shoes, says those days are gone; a graduate of programs in navigation and fishing management who has worked in ports from Casablanca to Rotterdam, he is

the sort of Western Saharan Moroccan would be lucky to have making its case among the population.

Then again, the key question at voting time may turn out to be the earlier, ambiguous, and emotional one of the Saharans' perception of their identity. Even before Polisario brought tens of thousands of Saharans to its camps as the Spanish withdrew from their old colony, the fault lines in Saharan society were already developed between those who saw a Saharan people denied its independence and those who respected traditional—if distant and occasional—tribal alliances with the kingdom of Morocco.

If Morocco and Polisario each remain confident that their supporters will predominate in a still-to-be-negotiated voting list, then they may take the risk of the publicly proposed all-or-nothing referendum question. But it is possible, some diplomats conjecture, that neither Polisario nor Morocco will, in the

end, want to go for broke and a vote that produces winners and losers. In such a case, they and other observers speculate, a question could be found that grants some recognition to Morocco's claim of "historic sovereignty" while recognizing some Saharan right to autonomy.

A Moroccan diplomatic source said that Morocco understands any settlement would have to enable both sides "to save face." Ahmed Haj, the Polisario diplomat, insisted that "the referendum question is clearly established already—independence or integration in Morocco. Any other option is totally ruled out." But a new Saharan state could join a federation "within the context of the building of the Grand Maghreb," Haj said.

If this final question can be settled, regional, African, and United Nations officials are hoping that 1989 will be the year of reconciliation in the Sahara. ○

No One Can Stop The Rain

Glimpses of Africa's Liberation Struggle

by GEORGE M. HOUSER

26-year Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa


Foreword by JULIUS K. NYERERE

A stirring eyewitness account of Africa's liberation struggle from the Eisenhower through the Reagan administration. Houser emphasizes the dynamics of the African struggle for independence from colonial domination, the critical role of South Africa and the impact of U.S. foreign policy as well as non-governmental action. Here is a hard but hopeful look at Africa's continuing fight for freedom.

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LIVING DANGEROUSLY

By ERNEST HARSCH

A wily political survivor, President Samuel Doe is now beset with an unprecedented economic crisis which even American financial experts couldn't resolve. With crackdowns continuing on any sign of dissent, Liberia's opposition parties are now looking at new strategies to challenge Doe's rule.

Rising several stories above the main road through Congotown, one of Monrovia's neighborhoods, stand the raw concrete slabs and pillars of the new Ministry of Defense building currently under construction.

"They can spend millions on something like that, for the military," observes one Liberian. "But look at our hospitals—they're death traps. Look at this city."

It is not unusual for residents of the capital to reminisce about days gone by, when Monrovia was relatively clean and pleasant, with its many rolling hills and verdant foliage. Yet now, as in much of the rest of Liberia, the decay is patent.

Life in Monrovia is scarred not only by physical squalor. Fear, tension, and uncertainty are also pervasive. People keep a wary distance from the men with the guns, dressed in discarded U.S. army fatigues and carrying M-16s—the poorly disciplined soldiers who form the bedrock of President Samuel Doe's authority—and who are dreaded for their arbitrary and often brutal exactions.

Concern about repression is a constant worry for journalists, students, and opposition political

Ernest Harsch is a freelance journalist based in New York who has written extensively on African political developments for over a decade.



President Samuel Doe: "Sound financial and economic management is not considered one of his trademarks"

activists. For ordinary Liberians, however, the daily struggle to survive may be more of a preoccupation. With an economy that has been on a downward spiral ever since Doe seized power in April 1980, large sectors of the population live close to the edge. Sudden scarcities and even slight losses of income can set off feverish reactions.

Almost 10 years after the 1979 "rice riots" that undermined the government of Doe's predecessor, William Tolbert, Monrovia was again gripped by a virtual rice panic. Liberians frantically scoured the markets, but could find little of their favorite food. Even the timely arrival of several rice shipments from Taiwan and the United States did not immediately ease the shortages or tension.

Although Doe, the former master sergeant, has proven himself a wily political survivor, sound financial and economic management is not considered one of his trademarks.

Liberia's real gross domestic product has declined by an astounding average of 5.5 percent a year since 1980. The U.S. dollar—legal tender in Liberia—has all but disappeared from circulation, while the Liberian \$5 coin (known as the "Doe dollar") has plummeted to less than half of its nominal value. Liberia's foreign debt now stands at \$1.7 billion. Unable to pay its arrears, the country has been cut off from further IMF funding. Loans from other sources have likewise shriveled.

Per capita income has fallen from \$400 a year in 1983 to \$370 (in overvalued Liberian dollars) today. A third of all children under five suffer from some degree of malnutrition, and 15 out of every 100 children die before they reach the age of five.

Widespread business closures, combined with sharp cutbacks by major employers such as Firestone Rubber, have pushed unemployment to volatile levels. In Monrovia's poorer neighborhoods, it is unofficially estimated at some 70 percent.

While the bulk of Liberians are still engaged in farming, only the barest resources have been allocated to agriculture and rural develop-

Betty Press

ment—despite a “Green Revolution” program launched with much fanfare in 1986. Minister of Agriculture S. Gblorzuo Toweh stated in an interview that during 1988, his ministry sold more than \$400,000 worth of fertilizers, chemicals, cutlasses, rakes, wheelbarrows, and spray to farmers at reduced rates. One Liberian economist, to emphasize how little this was, compared it to the \$250,000 the government spent celebrating Liberia’s August 1988 soccer victory over Ghana.

Liberians frequently point out that the problem is not just of skewed priorities or poor management. “These fellows are as corrupt as they get,” observed a local banker.

Government appointees in the state-owned enterprises are said to routinely demand bribes and kickbacks, embezzle funds, and sell off public property for their own benefit. The state sector, as one commentator wryly put it, has been “privatized.” In July 1987, the U.S. General Accounting Office reported that millions of dollars of American aid to Liberia have simply disappeared since Doe’s coup, amid indications of massive improprieties and misuse.

Such revelations reinforced calls within the U.S. Congress to drastically cut back on further aid to Liberia. In what was widely seen as an effort to forestall such a move, the White House won Doe’s agreement to accept the posting of 17 American financial advisers there. Their brief was to clamp down on corruption and introduce a degree of sound economic management.

Those “Opex” (for “operational experts”) arrived at the beginning of 1988 and fanned out into the Ministry of Finance and other state agencies and enterprises. Operating at deputy ministerial level, they had the authority to co-sign checks, contracts, and purchase orders, to veto economic planning decisions, and to take part in the drafting of the budget.

The extent of their powers stirred considerable controversy, with most of the opposition parties viewing it

as an infringement on national sovereignty. The Liberian Action Party (LAP), the largest legal opposition group, called it an “offense to Africa and Liberia in particular.”

In practice, however, the American advisers’ powers proved largely nominal. They were able to ensure that civil servants were generally paid on time, instead of months late. But on the broader problems of corruption and lack of accountability, there was little apparent progress.

“They’ve discovered that as fast as they establish controls, someone’s found a way to get around them,” comments Clifford Flemister, a Liberian economic consultant. He believes that the Opex officials, “with typical American arrogance,” underestimated the ingenuity of corrupt Liberian officials.

Few were surprised when the Opex team packed its bags at the end of 1988, only halfway through its two-year contract. No reasons were given publicly for their premature departure, but those who had been in contact with the advisers cited sheer frustration. A confidential Opex report, completed in October 1988, said that the government had “shown no commitment to either reining in its extra-budgetary expenditures or abiding by a sound budget process.” Unplanned expenditures had actually risen, the report said, reaching nearly a third of the budget, while public corporations were still being used as conduits for the political control of funds.

Such slush funds appear vital to Doe’s system of rule. His National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) lacks broad legitimacy, having come in through elections in October 1985 that many Liberians believe were rigged. The NDPL nevertheless is able to garner a degree of support through an elaborate and extensive patronage system. It not only has direct access to significant funds, but also the capacity to place people in potentially lucrative jobs.

In a country with Liberia’s economic difficulties, where the public sector is one of the rare sources of secure employment, this can be a

persuasive argument for political cooperation. A visit to the Sinkor office of the NDPL’s national chairman found the waiting room packed with people seeking audiences, jobs, and favors.

Doe’s largesse has succeeded as well in weakening at least a sector of the political opposition. A number of opposition party officials have joined the NDPL since the 1985 elections, while some have gotten jobs in exchange for their silence. For example, David Farhat, a former LAP treasurer, was named finance minister in early 1988.

Gabriel Bacchus Matthews—the central leader of the United People’s Party (UPP) and once one of Liberia’s most influential political figures—accepted a gift of a car from Doe in late 1986. During a discussion at his home, Matthews denied that this had anything to do with the UPP’s stance of “loyal opposition,” in which it has distanced itself from the other opposition parties and come out in support of some of Doe’s policies. (Others indicate that the public credibility of Matthews and the UPP have suffered badly as a result.)

The dispensing of patronage has likewise been useful in neutralizing or incorporating elements of the overthrown True Whig Party of Tolbert’s days. For the most part, they are from the pre-coup “Americo-Liberian” elite, the descendants of the repatriated former slaves who founded the Liberian republic in 1847 and who governed until Doe’s coup.

Does their gradual return to prominence signify a broader process of national reconciliation, as government officials sometimes present it? By most accounts, no. Many Liberians indicate that ethnic tensions have grown sharper than ever, particularly between Doe’s own Krahn people and most of the other indigenous groups.

Though they comprise just 4 percent of the population, Krahns are represented disproportionately in the government, state corporations, and especially the leadership of the armed forces. By itself, such near-

monopolization of the spoils of office would likely have been enough to foster some ethnic friction and distrust. But the situation has been worsened considerably by the apparent free rein given to Krahn soldiers to carry out brutalities against non-Krahns.

Liberians still hark back to the conduct of Krahn-dominated military units in November 1985, in the aftermath of a failed coup attempt led by former Armed Forces Commander Thomas Quiwonkpa. The fact that Quiwonkpa was a Gio from Nimba County was taken as a license by Krahn troops to carry out massacres not only of Gio soldiers and civilians, but also of people from the related Mano community and other ethnic groups. A 1986 study by the New York-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, which interviewed dozens of people in Nimba County, found evidence that many were detained, beaten, tortured, or killed for no apparent rea-

son other than their ethnic affiliation.

"Feelings have really reached a dangerous point now," explains one Liberian opposition activist. "There's so much hatred of Doe, of the Krahns. If the government collapses, I'm afraid there may be reprisals. I don't know if we'll be able to restrain people."

According to some Liberians, Doe and his followers' realization of this is one factor reinforcing their intolerance of opposition or criticism. Despite the veneer of constitutional rule that came into place with Doe's January 1986 inauguration as a civilian president, political repression is said to have eased little from the days of open military rule.

The opposition parties have all suffered from harassment of their members and leaders. It has been virtually impossible for the LAP and the Unity Party (UP) to maintain public offices or activities. Their members were quite cautious in

arranging meetings with this journalist, and most requested anonymity. The Liberian Unification Party (LUP) of Gabriel Kpolleh was banned outright in 1987.

Kpolleh himself was detained last year and along with nine others, convicted of plotting to overthrow the government. The paucity of evidence and the government's heavy-handed conduct of the case are considered typical indications of how little the authorities are guided by the rule of law.

For months, Kpolleh and the other defendants were held without charge. Most maintained that they had been beaten, hung upside-down, and otherwise mistreated and threatened while in custody. The alleged "mastermind" of the plot, Joseph Robert Kaipaye, died during the initial investigations—supposedly by leaping from a window in Doe's Executive Mansion office. During the trial, held in the dim, dilapidated Temple of Justice, prosecution wit-

GLASS

nesses contradicted each other and one revealed that he had been bribed. In open court, the judge let slip his view that "the constitution is not applicable to our tradition."

The most stellar performance was that of the theatrical minister of justice, Jenkins Scott, who delivered part of the closing prosecution argument. "There were other, more experienced men who could have overthrown the True Whig government," Scott maintained. "But God had chosen Doe." Pointing dramatically to the 10 defendants in the dock, Scott branded them "sanctimonious, self-serving men, filled with their own righteousness. They wanted to change what God had created."

For such a government, the slightest criticism becomes blasphemous. Liberia's lively press has thus been a particular target of persecution. Journalists tell harrowing tales of harassment, detention, and beatings.

Since its launching in early 1981,

the influential *Daily Observer* has been closed five times and its editor, Kenneth Best, detained almost as often. Best recalls that once he was actually threatened with execution during a televised address by then-Minister of Justice Chea Cheapoo. Several other papers have not survived. *Footprints Today* and the *Sun Times* were closed down entirely in April and May 1988. Some of their journalists were detained, winning release only after other journalists protested.

The highly vocal student movement also suffered a crack-down—the latest of many—when last August the government outlawed the Liberian National Students Union (LINSU) and prohibited "all campus politics" in both public and private schools. This provoked a round of class boycotts, which were met by more round-ups of student leaders. Several months later, this reporter found security forces still posted at the university gates to

restrict entry.

NDPL National Chairman Augustus Caine tried to justify LINSU's banning. "This whole thing of campus rights leads to students challenging the constituted authorities," he affirmed during an interview. The students, Caine went on at some length, were "ungrateful" to Doe, whose government was subsidizing their education. He complained about a statement issued by the University of Liberia students comparing Doe to Idi Amin.

"Freedom has become a burden in the West," Caine philosophized. "Our people should not try to emulate it."

Unfortunately for officials like Caine, few Liberians appear to see it that way. "The very name of our country, Liberia, means the land of the free," states J. Laveli Supuwood, a leading civil liberties lawyer. "For generations, our people have had a basic commitment to democracy, to human rights. And if a government

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doesn't respect that, the Liberian people feel a duty to question the government's actions."

When asked if he was concerned about reprisals, Supuwood replied, "You take precautions, but you don't put your life first. If everyone did that, you wouldn't have had a Martin Luther King or a Jesus Christ." Referring to the "horrible" repression of November 1985, Supuwood stated with conviction, "Those of us who survived feel we have a mission."

Despite the evident risks, such defiance is not all that rare. G. Gedinan Flomo, who was detained for a time as president of LINSU, affirmed that regardless of the student union's banning, "students will continue to play their traditional role in speaking out on behalf of rights. We'll continue to challenge things we consider unconstitutional and illegal."

Although most strikes are forbidden, workers still occasionally defy the authorities when their grievances become too acute. There have been recent strikes by miners at the Bong iron-ore pits, by several thousand employees of the Liberia Agriculture Company and the Montserrado Industrial Complex, and by teachers in Grand Bassa and Bomi counties.

The opposition parties are also seeking to function, though for them this is a difficult and complex time. Discussions with a range of party activists and supporters reveal a process of individual and collective reassessment, with old assumptions and strategies coming under close scrutiny.

They cite a number of factors that have spurred re-thinking. There was the frustrating outcome of the October 1985 elections, when the opposition appeared well on its way to sweeping the polls, only to see Doe's hand-picked election commission stop the vote tallying and reorder the results in the NDPL's favor. There was the trauma of the November 1985 massacres, and the continuing repression since then. And there has been the public stance of the

U.S. government, which despite some mild criticisms of Doe's policies, is generally seen in Liberia as supportive of his regime.

Since Doe's coup, American economic and military assistance has totaled \$500 million, compared to \$400 million for the entire period from Liberia's founding in 1847 until the coup. This has been more, on a per capita basis, than for any other sub-Saharan country. The aid levels have declined in the past few years, however, and currently hover around \$30 million annually.

Some opponents think American assistance should be cut off entirely. Others, while agreeing with a halt to military aid, believe that some economic assistance could be useful, provided it is carefully targeted to programs that directly benefit the Liberian people, with adequate safeguards against misuse.

Few continue to harbor much hope that Washington is able, or willing, to nudge Doe along the road toward democratic reforms. Stated one, who identified himself with the radical Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA), "The Liberian people were burned by the 1985 election experience and the failure of the U.S. to live up to its promises. They're now more politically sophisticated. There's less looking to the outside, to America, for a solution."

Similarly, for LINSU's Flomo, "This is a Liberian problem. We need to find a Liberian solution."

Yet the Liberian opposition remains weak and divided, a fact that is prompting some stinging self-review. Particularly sharp criticisms have been directed at the old party leadership, on the grounds that their timidity in October 1985 made it easier for Doe to steal the elections. One LAP supporter insisted that his party should have simply proclaimed its presidential candidate the winner of the elections, à la Corazon Aquino of the Philippines. "The people were ready for a response, but the leadership hesitated. It was weak. It missed an opportunity."

Supporters of the two other parties that ran in the elections, the UP

and the LUP, agree. In addition, they fault their own party leaders for not having acknowledged the LAP's commanding lead, thereby reinforcing the image of a divided, bickering opposition.

In practice, the old party divisions are now becoming blurred. With the exception of Gabriel Bacchus Matthews' UPP, which continues to go its own way, the younger members and supporters of the opposition parties often collaborate in their day-to-day work. This is true not only of LAP and UP, but also of those who once looked toward the now-outlawed LUP and MOJA. (The latter no longer functions as a distinct organization, but some of its adherents have since gone into the LAP, while others retain considerable political influence in the student movement.)

Opposition unity, most agree, could be an important factor in pushing for political change. But even if unity is achieved, how can change come? Through what forms of action? Few clear answers are offered.

To most, the prospects for electoral change do not appear as promising as they once did. The next elections are scheduled for 1991, but if current trends continue, hardly anyone expects them to be free and fair. Ominous rumblings have already come from NDPLers, floating the idea of a one-party state or the scrapping of the constitutional provision limiting the president to two six-year terms.

Without the option of the ballot box, opposition could very well take other forms. "If the government institutionalizes a one-party system" states the UP's general secretary, Walter Wisner, "it will be fostering violence. There are so many ways to make a revolution."

Flomo is equally emphatic. "Many students no longer think there can be change through the electoral road. We look to what has happened in the Philippines, in different countries, and see what has been accomplished through other kinds of action." ○

CECELIA JOHNSON

A Woman's Place

By ERNEST HARSCH



Ernest Harsch

Ghana's 31st December Women's Movement takes its name from the date in 1981 when Ft.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings seized power, ushering in a period of major changes in most facets of Ghanaian life. Officially launched in May 1982, the Women's Movement sees its basic role as drawing the country's women into this process, both politically and through their productive activities. Since then, the movement has spread throughout the country and has grown to some 4 million members. Its president is Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings, wife of the head of state.

Cecilia Johnson, acting general secretary of the movement, spoke to *Africa Report* about the problems facing women in Ghana's development process and about the activities of her organization.

Africa Report: What do you see as the greatest differences in emphasis between the concerns of women in countries such as Ghana and those in the industrialized countries?

Johnson: I believe there is a vast difference. In the developed world, you have the basic necessities. The conditions of life there are far better than in the developing world. Our concerns here are basically economic and social.

I say economic not in the sense that we need equal pay for equal work, since most of us are not employed in the formal sector anyway, because the majority of us are uneducated. Women form a higher percentage of the illiterates than men. *What we fight for with our women's organization is to try to find some employment for women. That is a basic difference.*

Also we try to improve the living conditions of the women. Unlike in your country, where you have various gadgets that help women in their work at home, in Africa there is no such aid. You have to use human labor to do a lot of things. So we are striving to improve upon the technologies and skills that

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women employ in their work.

Africa Report: The food sector is dominated by women, while cash crops tend to be dominated by men. Yet the early emphasis of the Economic Recovery Program [ERP] here in Ghana was on reviving and rehabilitating the cocoa sector. Did that mean that women farmers were overlooked?

Johnson: Yes. When it comes to cash crops, women are not so much engaged. It is basically the work of men. But in providing food for the majority of Ghanaians, that is the work of women. Therefore, one could say that the women were overlooked, maybe because with the ERP, one didn't think of food cropping as part of the economy, because these crops are cultivated mainly for home consumption, not for export.

The food sector may have been taken for granted. Except for those times of drought, you don't find shortages as such. Although we have cassava shortages during the lean seasons, on the whole, food is available almost throughout the year.

Africa Report: Is there any specific effort to form cooperatives of women farmers?

Johnson: Unfortunately, the idea of cooperatives in food cropping has not been encouraged so much. This is because

many of our farmers are able on their own to cultivate without much of a problem, on a small scale. They generally can get their own seedlings. And when we come to another input like fertilizer, we are not using it at the moment for food crops, with the exception of maize and rice, the cereals.

But we, the women's movement, do have cooperatives among our branch members. The women come together and cultivate crops in what we call the movement's farms. The women have their individual farms, but being members of the movement, they also come together to cultivate for the movement.

Africa Report: What about in other sectors, such as food processing?

Johnson: Food processing is mainly the domain of women. A farmer engaged on a commercial basis may have a gari plant or a palm oil extractor, which he will usually hire out to women. What we are trying to do is to group the women

show that they have the will to work as a group.

We have these groups scattered throughout the whole country, in our branches. Some are involved in shea butter or palm oil extraction, the processing of some of the tubers, especially cassava, the processing of vegetables, drying peppers, and so on.

This year, we started going to donor agencies, appealing for help to improve on some of the methods that they are using. Fortunately, there've been some positive offers of assistance from the Canadians, the Dutch, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Japan. Next year we hope to be opening some of these projects, basically in food processing.

Africa Report: At a certain point in the political process here, especially in the early 1980s, market women were often reviled as the source of the high prices confronting urban consumers. Is there still some of that sentiment?

Johnson: The market women were attacked because they

Margaret A. Novicki



"The kind of message we are preaching appeals more to the rural folks"

together to enhance the traditional skills that we are using now, which are so laborious, full of drudgery, and time-consuming. We are trying to introduce some technologies that will cut down on this labor and increase production.

As you may be aware, ours is a very young organization, formed in 1982. We decided at first to leave the initiative to the women themselves, let them decide to come together, let them decide to engage in one economic activity or another with their traditional methods. Then we go in to improve upon the methods. Otherwise you risk repeating the experience of the past, when people went to a village to provide a type of technology that the villagers might not be interested in.

We found that some of those projects were just there for a few months and that was the end of it, a complete waste. So what we are doing is to let the women show the interest first,

were at the last stage of the purchasing of these commodities. They became the targets. But if you look at it closely, you will find that most of the problems were not with them as such, but with middlemen. Believe me, most of the market women had just a little bit of profit. The huge profits were with the middlemen. But they were not seen, and therefore those who were seen were attacked.

Right now we don't have a problem with the market women at all. That is because fortunately we have the commodities in abundance. We don't have to queue and beg for them in the shops.

Africa Report: Have women felt the impact of Ghana's economy recovery yet?

Johnson: We have felt it. Normally we have the task of going around looking for commodities, because we provide

the meals in the house. And as I just said, we don't have to do that anymore. So we are benefitting, in that there is now a more sane atmosphere. People are not so harassed, so tense because they don't know when they are going to get foodstuffs for the next meal.

Africa Report: What do you think of the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment [PAMSCAD] which specifically addresses some of the problems that confront women?

Johnson: The beginnings of PAMSCAD are very promising, provided we are able to do the implementation very well. There is the job retraining, and if your partner is employed, the burden on the women's shoulders is lessened. Also a percentage of those who are going to be redeployed will be women. There are plans to retrain them. If there is a program to better women's skills or give them a new career or vocation, it is definitely going to be better than what we have now.

Johnson: Before, the work that women did was not actually measured in terms of value. Most people forgot about the contributions of women to the economy. Now, many of these donor agencies and the international community have come to realize that if the concerns of women are not addressed, most of these projects fizzle out. Why? Because the woman is the focal point in each community. We form the majority in most societies.

Therefore, there is now the effort to address the concerns and needs of women to develop. Some of these international organizations have been insisting that in every program there should be a part addressing the concerns of women. And if it's done properly, then half of the society's needs are addressed and it will carry far beyond into the domain of men and the community in general. I see it as an eye-opening thing, a recognition of the importance of the work that women do in society, which has hitherto not been recognized and val-



Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings, President of the 31st December Women's Movement

Ernest Harsch



Peeling cassava, Volta Region: "Food processing is mainly the domain of women"

Margaret A. Novicki

We have this bitter experience of most women going into trading, because it is the quickest way of making money. But most of them are now saying that business is bad because we have abundance and therefore their profit margin has fallen. We are trying to educate the women to see the necessity of having a vocation, rather than just buying and selling. If you want to go into trading as a secondary source of employment, that is okay. But don't make it your only vocation, since trading is so fluid. But some of these other vocations can be permanent, like hairdressing, dressmaking, carpentry, and the electrical trade.

Africa Report: Over the past few years there's been more talk among UN agencies, NGOs, and development experts about "women in development." Some women think that is positive, others are not so sure. What do you think?

ued.

Africa Report: What was the initial impetus behind the formation of the 31st December Women's Movement?

Johnson: Right from the beginning of the revolutionary process, we realized that women were not taking part. The process called for the participation of all Ghanaians in the affairs of the nation. But if you look at our history, you have this idea that the political arena should be the domain of men. That is because the woman has so much to do that she doesn't have the time to even think of other things apart from the work she's got to do for the family.

But if we have a process asking for the participation of the majority—and the majority of people, the women, are outside of it—then we are not going to achieve the basic aim of the revolutionary process, participatory democracy.

Therefore, we found the need to encourage women to be part of the revolutionary process, to also join in the decision-making process of the country. There were a few women who were ministers in the previous two regimes, but just a few. And one found that the part women played was to just cheer on the men, not to take any active part in government or matters affecting the governing of the nation.

Another major objective was to learn about the living conditions of women, so that we can stimulate women to work relentlessly to improve our conditions of life and contribute our quota toward the economic recovery of the country.

Africa Report: How is the movement organized?

Johnson: It is organized at the national, regional, district, unit, zonal, and work place levels. We have offices in all the regional and district administrative capitals. Then we have organizing committees, auditing and finance, and project committees in the regions and districts as well.

Africa Report: What's the approximate membership?

Johnson: According to the last count we did about three months ago, we have a little over 4 million members throughout the whole country. The movement is open to all women 18 and above. Sometimes, in a village, you find that almost all the women are members, because we have managed to also involve the queen mothers. That is one great asset. The queen mothers normally would not engage in these kinds of activities, but for the movement they are the focal point of organization in the communities.

Africa Report: What kind of women has the movement tended to attract? Who tend to be the most active?

Johnson: Fortunately, the women in the rural areas, because the majority of women live in the rural areas. There, they have problems, they are less fortunate. So the kind of message we are preaching appeals more to the rural folks than to the urban. Most women in the urban centers believe they have a better standard of living or that because they are employed, they are all right.

Recently, because of the work that the movement is trying to do, the urban women are also coming into the fold. This is especially true when we tackle the basic problem of women: the provision of child-care centers. Women in Ghana have just a few day-care facilities, most of which are privately owned and very expensive. With the help of the women themselves, we explain how this will help us to work better, to increase production in whatever field we are engaged in, be it farming, trading, or in the formal sector. This is a basic necessity of women.

With the provision of a few day-care centers in some of the urban areas—in Accra we've got three centers right now—the women see that we are not just talking, like most women's organizations. We are acting.

Africa Report: What kinds of problems do you encounter in trying to get women to be more politically and socially active?

Johnson: In Ghana, we've had this negative experience of people getting attached to a political system for what they will gain, especially the women. In the past, you joined the female group of a political party and you were provided with certain commodities.

So our initial problem was trying to educate the women to see the need to work without that kind of incentive. We tried to educate them to understand that if you got cloth, you used it for a few years and that was the end of it. These were personal gains that didn't last. But what we are trying to do is something that will improve upon our community, and therefore will

be there forever, for our children, for our children's children. If you put up a day-care center in a village, it's not going to be for the benefit of just a few individuals, but of a whole community.

Fortunately, we were able to overcome this problem especially with the rural folks, who lack these basic necessities. Therefore, if you go there and they see that you are interested in their problem and in helping them resolve it, then they will open up their arms.

Another problem we had is that of the men being comfortable, learning that we are not out to challenge them, that we are just trying to complement whatever efforts the women are making toward the restructuring of the country. In Ghana, there is a lot of discrimination against women in customs, traditions, and social norms. Sometimes when the men see the women organized, they see them as a force to contend with. So you have to educate them, to see it is not something we have organized to challenge the authority of men.

You even have to educate the women themselves that we are not out to challenge the men, before they'll accept it. Who doesn't want a peaceful family life? If the woman is asked to join an organization where she's going to have problems with her husband, she's not going to have anything to do with it.

And there is the age-old problem of finances. We do not have any financial support from the government, because we are non-governmental. We talk to the women to assist, to contribute some labor. And believe me, most of these women are poor. For some years now, we've asked our organizers not to demand any monetary contribution, because if you ask for even 50 cedis, someone's going to have an excuse for not joining. It would be an obstacle.

In most cases, the women themselves decide how much they can afford. But if there is a very poor area where they can't contribute now, we just leave them and let them engage in other economic activities that will benefit the movement. We organize these cooperatives to engage in agricultural ventures, from which we can get some finances.

Africa Report: How would you rate the Provisional National Defense Council [PNDC] in comparison with earlier governments, in terms of how much concern is shown for the problems of women?

Johnson: We had this law, the Intestate Succession Law. Because of our traditional customs, when the husband died, the family could throw the woman out. This law sought to address this problem. It had been on paper, with the previous governments, for many years. But they did not do anything about it. It was only when this government came to power that the law was passed.

Looking at educational reform, it's more to the advantage of women. Where you have uneducated children, who have left school but without employment, you see that the women suffer more than the men. The government recognizes the unique position of women in some of its programs, as in PAM-SCAD, for instance. It makes special mention of women. Before it was not like that. These are signs of the government's concern for women.

And I would like to state here that the involvement of the wife of the head of state in our movement is also a big sign of the government's interest in women. If the chairman of the PNDC had not given his support or encouragement, she couldn't have done it. This is the first experience of the wife of the head of state actually getting involved, not just on paper, but working to improve upon the standards of women. ○



SOMALIA

BARRE'S UNHOLY ALLIANCES

By RICHARD GREENFIELD


It was the night of May 27—a Friday and thus a holiday throughout Islamic Somalia. Senior government, party, and military officials in the northern Somali city of Burao had long since retired to chew *chat*, a mild narcotic supposedly banned. The evening was deceptively peaceful, for the whole of the north was seething against harsh rule and economic neglect.

Incidents such as demonstrations, particularly in Hargeisa, the northern capital, attacks on isolated police and military posts, the seizure of arms by rebels based in Ethiopia and the 'liberation' of political prisoners from the less secure of the many political prisons had become commonplace.

But the 27th of May was different. As early as February 26, 1987, Hassan Ahmed Gabay, party secretary of the northwestern region, had written to headquarters in Mogadishu, accurately listing the serious and urgent grievances of the peoples of the north. He urged the party to check the mounting excesses of the military and to restore at least a semblance of the rule of law and some respect for human rights.

Sadly, more weight had been given to the views of the colorful but cruel military commander, Gen. Mohamed Sayeed 'Morgan', who had submitted a devastating report to Somalia's President Mohamed Siad Barre advocating vicious repression and policies tantamount to genocide against the opposition Somali National Movement (SNM)

Richard Greenfield, a member of Oxford University's International Development Centre, was political adviser to the Somali government from 1977, but was dismissed in 1986 following his private and public appeals that greater attention be given by the Somali government to human rights issues.



The Somali government, increasingly isolated from its traditional allies and under threat from guerrillas of the Somali National Movement, has unleashed harsh repression against those suspected of disloyalty, turning to some unlikely sources for weapons and support.

and in particular the Isaak clan which provided most of its armed guerrillas.

By April last year, doubtless due to the deteriorating security situation in Eritrea and Tigre in neighboring Ethiopia, President Mengistu Haile Mariam had decided to withdraw his last objection to a possible *détente* between Ethiopia and Somalia. Troops were called back from both sides of the much disputed frontiers. It was mutually agreed that hostile propaganda would end—as, supposedly, would assistance to 'liberation' forces heretofore encouraged by both governments in their attempts to destabilize one another.

In Mogadishu, the office furniture of a truculent Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was hurled into the streets by Somalia's own police force. In Addis Ababa, Radio Halgan, voice of the Somali rebel movements, was silenced. Consideration was being given to isolating the camps of guerrilla forces in both countries.

Unexpectedly and suddenly, the SNM guerrillas in Ethiopia implemented a long-considered plan. Put more simply, they just went home. An alarmed Siad Barre rushed back from the 1988 OAU summit in the Ethiopian capital. Gen. 'Morgan' likewise rushed to Hargeisa, the capital of the north, in a borrowed Ethiopian plane.

But in Burao, the relaxing officials dismissed the warnings flashed to them by the Ethiopian authorities. They were still chewing *chat* when the guerrillas fell violently upon them. Burao was quickly taken. Hargeisa, however, proved a harder task, although much of the city, with the exception of certain pockets and the army headquarters and airport, fell to the rebels and was held for several weeks. Predictably, in July and August, the Somali army, deploying heavy guns, tanks, and rockets, rolled back across the north, decimating every village and settlement through which they passed. Burao city was all but destroyed. More than three-quarters of Hargeisa's buildings sustained

damage.

In the north, suspected SNM sympathizers were lined up and arbitrarily shot. Likely supporters—particularly, but not only, Isaak—were arrested throughout the nation. Camps recently emptied of Ethiopian prisoners from the Ogaden war under the new agreement began to fill up again with businessmen, airline employees, and any civilian of northern origin suspected by the National Security Service (NSS) and other paramilitary units of possible disloyalty to Siad Barre.

Even diplomats abroad were recalled, though many ignored or contested the summons. United Nations and foreign aid workers were evacuated. As floods of refugees made their way through the scrub and bushlands of northern Somalia to the Haud region, ruled by neighboring Ethiopia, the international community began to learn of the scale and ferocity of the regime's reaction to popular discontent and to the return of the guerrilla forces. Somalis demonstrated in New York, Washington, and in many Western capitals.

The National Academy of Sciences Committee on Human Rights and the Committee on Health and Human Rights of the Institute of Medicine in Washington had already published a damning report on the human rights crisis in Somalia. This was followed by one of the most horrific reports ever issued by Amnesty International, entitled *Somalia: A Long-Term Human Rights Crisis*. In February, the UN Commission on Human Rights meeting in Geneva had to consider unprecedented accusations leveled against the Somali regime from the International Human Rights Law Group, the Canadian Center for the Investigation and Prevention of Torture, and others.

With its long coastline, Somalia is strategically important not only for Africa, but for the Middle East and the Gulf. Facilities at the ports of Berbera, Mogadishu, and Kismayo could be of considerable import to the Pentagon. But the repressive nature of the Somali government, its

documented use of torture and arbitrary imprisonment, and its denial of consensus politics and human rights presents a grave embarrassment to the American government. Moreover, the opposition forces, although encouraged by Ethiopia, are largely Western-educated and dedicated to democratic values.

In late September, last year some 35 members of Congress addressed letters to the U.S. secretary of state, urging the "re-programming of \$21 million in economic support funds" for Somalia "due to the on-going gross violation of human rights, especially in the northern region of the country." They pointed out that "more than 400,000 Somali citizens have fled into Ethiopia since late May, prompting a grave humanitarian crisis."

They expressed concern over "suggestions that U.S. military supplies or equipment have been used to support the reported slaughter of civilians by Somali government troops." Although the provision of such weapons may have been contracted under previous military aid programs, they warned then-Secretary of State Shultz, "You well know such assistance was never intended to kill, maim, or bomb civilians."

Nor were many members of the Somali military and defense forces prepared to participate in a civil war against their own kith-and-kin. There have been no Dolbahante generals at the northern fronts. In mid-July 1988, one pilot chose to ditch his MiG-17 in Djibouti Bay rather than strafe civilian targets. He was guided down by French nationals, to the temporary embarrassment of the Djibouti authorities.

Alarmed and furious, the ageing and desperate Somali president turned to the use of mercenaries. Secret contact between Somalia and the South African regime dates from as early as 1979, in the aftermath of the Ogaden war, when the Somali army was defeated by Ethio-Cuban forces supported by massive Soviet armaments and technical advice. Subsequently, South African and white Rhodesian mercenaries were

hired.

The occasion was a switch in air force technology. The Somali Air Force had suffered greatly during the Ogaden war, but the Reagan administration had firmly refused to supply anything but small "defensive" weapons. However, in 1983, Abu Dhabi indicated its willingness to part with certain ageing British-made Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers, owing to an imminent purchase of more advanced French Mirage jets.

A further six Hawker-Hunters had been sold to Kenya, and five of those were later transferred to Zimbabwe (one having crashed). And here lies the renewed connection with southern Africa. A team of technicians able to service these planes, but with South African and possibly British passports, was discreetly welcomed to Somalia. They were active participants in the military campaigns in the north.

Chinese technicians evacuated from northern Somalia along with UN and foreign aid workers have given evidence of vicious air-strikes and video tapes of some of the attacks have been shown on British and Dutch television. Hundreds of innocent citizens have died. Meantime, for their services, the mercenaries have demanded thousands of dollars per sortie—and on days of good weather several have been flown.

Following the destruction of Burao and Hargeisa, there were weeks of apparent military stalemate, but the countryside has remained largely in the hands of the SNM. Berbera, the Soviet-developed port, although surrounded, has not been directly attacked, despite press reports to the contrary. However, heavy fighting has taken place nearby on several occasions, and convoys are regularly ambushed on northern roads. There has also been fighting near Eragavo.

For Siad's dispirited forces, the problem of the supply of military hardware escalates daily. This issue has been aggravated by an acute shortage of foreign exchange



Alain Nogués/Sygnia

There is a move in Congress to suspend some \$50 million of American aid

because most commercial activity in Somalia has been seriously interrupted by the civil war. So alarming is the situation that a school of thought has developed in the capital that Somalia should turn once again to the Soviet Union. But in these times of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, it is most unlikely that the Soviet Union would agree to renew the supply of any weaponry.

Libya, on the other hand, has built up an unenviable record of training "liberation" groups only later to supply bombs to destroy them—Chad, Eritrea, southern Sudan—and now Somalia. Several visits by high-powered Somali delegations to Libya have stressed common membership in the Arab League and built on an earlier quarrel between the erratic Col. Qaddafi and the leaders of the SNM.

As a result, in October Libyan aircraft began deliveries of military supplies to Mogadishu International Airport. Shiploads of arms were also dispatched, but at least one was later recalled following diplomatic pressure from more informed Arab states. Particularly significant was a Libyan Airlines flight which landed on October 7 and allegedly delivered canisters of nerve gas to the air force warehouses.

Although there have been many recent reports of the development of

chemical warfare factories in Libya, these are not yet on-stream. The gas specified above were similar to those which have been reported by U.S. aid agencies as having been delivered to Juba in southern Sudan.

The probable delivery of these inhuman and illegal weapons provoked outrage in the Western press and condemnation by members of the House of Lords in England. While it is most unlikely that Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi would ever countenance the use of such weapons even in desperation, the same, many Somalis believe, cannot be said of Siad Barre—despite the protests of his diplomats. These same diplomats have been required to deny even the existence of any crisis, let alone the civil conflict currently paralyzing the country.

Even so, the SNM has still met with only slow success in its appeal to clans other than Isaak to join the uprising. Although its constitution is very clear on the matter, it has largely failed to counter propaganda that it is clan-based and seeks secession for the north rather than the "liberation" of the whole country. However, recently some *Mijertein* leaders have joined the movement and there has been an increase in restlessness among the Hawiye, one of the largest clans of south. Members of

this group have recently formed the Somali Unity Congress, based in Rome, which is in contact with the SNM.

Not a day goes by without a planeload of wounded arriving in Mogadishu. It is very hard to keep such matters secret, and with so many recalls and defections, Somalia's remaining diplomats are fast losing credibility. An ominous development in the capital is that certain leaders are said to be forming their own militia groups. Meanwhile, key members of Siad Barre's family are enjoying accelerated promotions in the military.

The prospects for Somalia in 1989 remain very bleak. During the fighting, government troops armed Ogadeen and Oromo refugees in the north and set them against the Isaak. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees first countered by withholding food and supplies meant for refugees since those same refugees had in fact become a militia.

A further row between the Somali government and the UN developed around a UN team's report on the situation in the northern region as of last September. Furious that the report covered not only relief needs but the root causes of the new refugee flows—and touched even on the bombardment of the northern cities and the lorry loads of loot witnessed being removed in a southerly direction—the Somali commissioner for refugees wrote expressing strong objections to many parts of the report.

"Much is biased and does not cover the major aspects of the mission's terms of reference," he wrote. He attached a "reaction" to the UN report (NRC 18.09.88) which went so far as to suggest that it "be dismissed as a collection of personal prejudices of a political nature." Following further sharp exchanges, UNHCR has announced that it intends to wind down and end operations in Somalia.

In the meantime, meeting in Geneva, UNHCR's executive committee endorsed "voluntary repatriation" in principle, but has put for-

ward an emergency budget for additional care for Somali refugees still crossing the border into the Haud. However, visitors are not encouraged by Ethiopia. Much of the environment in which they seek shelter is hostile, windy, and waterless. Pri-



President Siad Barre: U.S. concern has been expressed over Siad Barre's recent overtures to Libya

ivate Somalis from nearby towns have trucked water and other supplies, covering up a slow reaction on the part of aid agencies in general (with certain notable exceptions) and the governments who contribute funds to UNHCR in particular. Expatriate Somali communities abroad are also actively raising supplies and money.

In Mogadishu, former prisoners of war and the injured of the Ogaden war have demonstrated several times against their government's perceived callousness. Their protests have been met with curfews, truncheons, and bullets. Meanwhile, the cost of living soars to unmanageable heights. There are repeated reports of corruption both at home and abroad. In Nairobi, the Somali presidency has even been accused of involvement in the decimation of elephant herds and ivory smuggling across the borders with Kenya and Ethiopia.

In January, on a visit to Djibouti, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British For-

eign Secretary, commented: "One cannot continue making aid available if the conditions on the ground are so full of conflict that it is not possible for aid workers to deliver help safely, or at all." Similarly, U.S. Congressman Sam Gejdenson led a move to suspend some \$50 million of American aid. The administration also has made its views on human rights quite clear to the Somali government and has been urging "national reconciliation." Considerable concern has also been expressed over Siad Barre's recent overtures to Libya.

Under heavy pressure on all sides, the Somali politburo met on January 11 and resolved to make certain amendments to the constitution, to privatize national banks, the state insurance company, the shipping, hide and skins and frankincense agencies, and the importation of medicine. Further, it recommended that a political solution be sought in the north, with the establishment of a new agency to be responsible for reconstruction there.

To this end, three top-level delegations were dispatched to the United Kingdom, the U.S., and Canada; to Italy, France and Germany; and to Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Oman and Syria, led respectively by the prime minister and his first and second deputies—all former vice presidents. As an after-thought, a fourth delegation visited Soviet-bloc countries.

None met with any conspicuous success. Siad Barre, who had recently visited Libya, also traveled to Egypt and Kuwait. Meanwhile, SNM chairman Ahmed Silanyo traveled to London and held a press conference on the eve of the prime minister's visit. He anticipated that reconciliation would not be possible while Barre still ruled.

Clearly, there is certain to be many changes in Somalia in 1989, changes which the Bush administration, Siad's most important though reluctant ally, will monitor closely, as will the Soviet Union and Siad's two other friends—Libya and the Republic of South Africa. An unlikely set of allies, indeed. ○

COLORING HISTORY: SENEGALESE GLASS PAINTING

By HOWARD SCHISSEL

Glass painting in Senegal is facing a daunting challenge as the young generation of artists attempts to steer this traditional art form into more commercial channels. Many younger painters have become almost exclusively market-oriented, catering mostly to the tourist trade in Dakar. "The trend now evident in Senegalese glass painting is leading to an impoverishment of thematic material as well as in the utilization of color," remarked a French art historian specializing in African art.

The looming crisis in Senegalese glass painting was compounded by last summer's loss of the glass painting community's doyen, 60-year-old Gora Mbengue. Undoubtedly the most original Senegalese glass painter, his artistic roots plunged deep into popular culture. Mbengue's death also leaves a major gap in the Senegalese artistic community: He was the standard-bearer for high artistic quality and purity of inspiration.

Glass painting in Senegal has its origins in the colonial era. At the beginning of the century, French colonial authorities banned Islamic literature and engravings from the Middle East and North Africa as subversive. As a result, the first Senegalese glass paintings tended to reproduce the banned images, portraying themes predominantly of a religious nature. The presence of inexpensive glass and paint at French trading houses made this new art form readily available to even the most modest Senegalese pocketbook.

The Senegalese refer to glass paintings by the French name, *peinture sous verre* (literally, painting under glass), or by *suwer*, its phonetic deformation in Wolof, Senegal's lingua franca. The technique of glass painting has been known since the time of the ancient Greeks, and was widely diffused in the Balkan peninsula and the Middle East by the Byzantines. The Arab conquest brought it into North Africa. It was only late in the 19th century that the art form

Rooted in Senegalese history, the traditional art form of glass painting has undergone a transformation with the death of the nation's leading artist and a new generation of painters catering to the tourist trade.

penetrated south of the Sahara, although only in Senegal did glass painting evolve into a national form of popular art.

As Africa transformed Islam and Christianity through the assimilation of indigenous beliefs and customs, so glass painting of Middle Eastern origin was absorbed as a national art form in Senegal. From the first workshops in Kaolack, Rugisque, Saint Louis, and Dakar, itinerant merchants sold glass painting throughout the rural areas and hinterland towns, depicting, often in naive style, famous religious leaders known as marabouts, episodes of contemporary Senegalese history, moralistic vignettes of rural and urban life, biblical scenes, and decorative bestiary figures.

The novelty of glass painting is that layers of bright color are applied in reverse, on the side of the glass plate that becomes the inner face of the painting. The glass therefore serves a double purpose; it is the support for the painting and its protective covering. The artist, for his part, must work as if he was painting a negative.

Born around 1930 of peasant stock, Gora Mbengue was fascinated by all forms of painting, even as a youth. "When I was a child," he was fond of saying with a touch of nostalgia, "I painted with my fingers on scraps of paper or even on walls to learn the basic techniques and forms." To acquire the grounding for historical scenes as well as those emanating from Wolof legends, he steeped himself in oral culture as a youth by avidly listening to the elders recounting the past and commenting on the present under the *palaver tree* in the center of his village.

In the early 1950s, Mbengue was initiated into the technique of glass painting. He studied in the town of Kaolack under a local master, Serigné Sarr. In the following years, he moved to Dakar

to strike off on his own. At the time, glass painters were not yet considered artists, but rather artisans, similar in status to shoemakers and blacksmiths.

Unlike other Senegalese glass painters, Mbengue did not possess a set of ready-made models and designs. Most other glass painters simply trace them on glass plate before coloring in the design. Mbengue, however, directly designed with pen and India ink on glass paint, so each design was in fact an original. "When I start out, I really never know how the design will turn out to be," Mbengue would say while working in his modest workshop located in the Dakar suburb of Guediwaye.

Themes were also unpredictable. Mbengue often woke in the middle of the night to note down images and characters to later translate into glass painting imagery. Without difficulty he could do a painting of the legendary West African water goddess, Mani Water, produce a highly original scene of Senegalese daily life, or shape with his fingers a swirl of form and color that would not be out of place in a museum of modern art in a Western country.

Even as Mbengue's output grew during the last years of his life to match the ever-increasing demand from galleries and private collectors, the graphic quality and artistic inspiration of his painting remained at a high level. He also experimented with new forms, producing a series of miniatures, and breaking new ground in the history of Senegalese glass painting.

Mbengue was highly critical of the pronounced trend toward pure commercialism among the young generation of glass painters. "You cannot just operate for money like a machine," he often said. "An artist must work above all for art's sake."

Another negative aspect of the excessive commercialization of glass painting is that the ordinary Senegalese, especially in the rural areas, can no longer afford to buy them. In addition, many Senegalese presently dismiss glass painting as a *toubab* (a Wolof word meaning European) art form. In this way, Senegalese glass painting is being cut off from its popular roots, threatening in the longer term to desiccate artistic inspiration among the youthful painters. If some younger glass painters recognize the dangers and challenges facing this art form and eschew mercantilism, they will be fighting an uphill battle in the 1990s to maintain a reasonable balance. ○

Howard Schissel is a Paris-based freelance journalist specializing in French-speaking Africa.

THE BACK PAGE

NEWS COMMENTARY AND OPINION

By MARGARET A. NOVICKI

Maybe it's that optimism seems to bloom naturally along with the first crocuses of spring, but one can't help but feel that change is the one overwhelming constant in the southern African regional dynamic right now—change that provides fresh opportunities for American policy and could result in a new era for the region's peoples.

A convergence of interests on the part of the world's superpowers in burying regional hatchets has contributed in large part to clearing the stale air of failed policies and tired formulas. Though peace hasn't broken out yet in southern Africa, it may have at least a fighting chance for the first time in a decade, if the opportunities which are presented by this new scenario are seized.

In southern Africa itself, hope springs eternal, and new leadership and new approaches are grounds enough for optimism. Eight years of the Reagan era's ideological posturing won few friends in the region and an administration policy at odds with Congress and ultimately the American people was regarded with mistrust at best.

Always generous in spirit—despite having good reason not to be—the leaders of southern Africa, from Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda to ANC President Oliver Tambo, are now giving President Bush and his Secretary of State, James Baker, the benefit of the doubt. Few believe that the new administration is likely to be a carbon-copy of its predecessor and they expect more of an ear from its policy-makers than was extended in the past.

The appointment of the able and experienced Herman Cohen, formerly Africa chief on the National Security Council, to replace Chester Crocker as U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs is seen as positive. Expressed with a wry and sometimes self-deprecating wit, his forceful views on issues ranging from sanctions against South Africa to the war in Mozambique are regarded as a refreshing change.

Back in Washington, if the recent White House accord with Congress on aid to the Nicaraguan "Contras" is anything to go by, a new era of bipartisanship in foreign policy formulation is dawning. If such bridge-building can be extended to policy on southern Africa, and especially South Africa, an end to the ongoing confrontation pitting congressional sanctions activists against the executive branch could well be augured.

Getting the American government to speak with one voice on its opposition to apartheid and the policy options to be pursued should be Secretary Baker's immediate challenge. If a domestic consensus can be forged around the use of further sanctions as leverage on South Africa, then working out a unified sanctions policy with our Western allies would be the next logical step.

Secretary Baker is said to favor such an approach. If Margaret Thatcher, the leading anti-sanctions crusader, can be brought in line, Pretoria might well be pushed to the negotiating table, no longer able to maneuver around the chinks in the international sanctions armor. Recently returned from an African junket, Prime Minister Thatcher is keen on stepping up the pace of reform in South Africa, and has endorsed the new

spirit of East-West cooperation in resolving the region's crises.

Tipping the scales definitively toward an international consensus on southern Africa is the Soviet Union, which recently made public its position favoring negotiation over confrontation in South Africa. Anatoly Adamishin, deputy foreign minister, who played a pivotal role in the Angola-Namibia accords, has just completed his own southern African tour, and his government is anxious to expand its diplomatic role in the region.

Within South Africa itself, there are cracks in the National Party monolith. Former acting president Chris Heunis' characterization of the ANC as a "nationalist"—not terrorist—movement and a call for a "great indaba" of all racial groups by F.W. de Klerk, leader of the party and the likely next president, may indicate that talks with the ANC are not far off, provided, of course, that Nelson Mandela is released from prison.

There is also considerable scope for international cooperation in the other regional flashpoints. With the implementation of UN resolution 435 on Namibia having begun on April 1, the U.S., together with the other permanent members of the Security Council, will need to ensure that the process leading to November elections proceeds unhindered by South Africa. Should Pretoria prevaricate, high-ranking U.S. officials have already stated privately that further sanctions would be the likely result.

Next door in Angola, Jonas Savimbi's recent proposal to exclude himself from any potential reconciliation talks with the Angolan government should be explored. President Bush has affirmed his continued support for Savimbi's Unita rebels, and his advisers appear to be making diplomatic recognition of President dos Santos' government, facilitation of its membership in the World Bank and IMF, and aid for the rehabilitation of the Benguela railway contingent on negotiations between Unita and Luanda.

They might instead take a lead from the "Contra" accord and use their carrots and sticks on Savimbi to ensure that he won't be the spoiler in any potential discussions. The Angolan government has conceded the necessity of resolving this "internal problem," but has ruled out reconciliation while Savimbi is in the picture.

Lastly, there is the heart-wrenching conflict in Mozambique, which continues to be fueled by South Africa. Several trial balloons have been floated of late, mentioning British, American, South African, and Soviet involvement in negotiations to end Renamo's war. President Chissano's response has been rightfully circumspect. The key to the success of any such peace process, however, will be international monitoring of South African compliance in ending its support for Renamo.

There are tremendous possibilities for a new U.S. role in southern Africa in this rarefied international atmosphere and at this critical juncture in the history of the region. If bipartisanship rather than ideological confrontation are to be the hallmarks of the Bush foreign policy, then southern Africa can only stand to gain. Maybe not yet the wind of change, but at least a fresh breeze is blowing through the war-racked region, one which may ultimately turn a page on its bloody past. ○

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
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